N95RC

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 8, 2016, about 1651 Alaska Daylight Time, a float-equipped DeHavilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N95RC, sustained substantial damage during takeoff when the floats collided with the banks of Crosswind Lake, about 30 miles south of Iliamna, Alaska. The commercial pilot and three passengers sustained serious injuries, and three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Rapids Camp Lodge Inc under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined to King Salmon, Alaska.

The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.

The pilot said that this was the first season that he flew into Crosswind Lake and last year he had flown into Crosswind Lake five times and has never had to perform "shuttle" flights of people from the lake. The pilot stated that he, two fishing guides, and four guests departed Rapids Camp Lodge, from the Naknek River, located about 4 miles east of King Salmon Airport, King Salmon, Alaska, a little after 0800. After a flight of less than an hour, the flight landed at Crosswind Lake. They planned on returning to the airplane about 1630 for a return flight to Rapids Camp Lodge that was to depart before 1700. The pilot stated that he discussed with the head fishing guide about performing shuttle flights, with a half load per flight, to a nearby location with an "unrestricted runway." The head guide stated that he had done that numerous times and would show him the best location. The pilot said that he watched other airplanes taking off from the lake toward the west, and he thought "it was no problem" to attempt the takeoff.

The pilot's calculated takeoff water run distance and takeoff distance over a 50-foot obstacle for the flight was 1,050 feet and 2,210 feet, respectively. The approximate shore-to-shore distance along the takeoff path was 1,800 feet. The pilot did not state that he added a safety margin to his takeoff distance calculations.

The pilot stated that during takeoff, the wind was gusting and either it died down or there was a change of wind direction [during the takeoff]. He said that if he "cut back" the takeoff power, the impact would have been greater. He said that "his decision should have been to shuttle half of the people," and he "made the wrong decision."

The passenger seated in the right front pilot seat stated that during the takeoff, the airplane was "heading into a strong wind." He watched the GPS display of ground speed during the takeoff and saw an indication of 28 mph and then saw the lake bank getting closer. He said it was apparent that the airplane was getting "very close" without lifting off. When the airplane lifted off, it hit the bank with one of the floats and seconds later the airplane impacted the ground.

A second passenger, who had over 3,000 hours of flight time, said that he suggested to the pilot to "hug" the lake shore and accelerate turning out into the lake in a running takeoff. The passenger said that the pilot then pulled 50 yards from the shoreline and reduced the engine throttles to idle, letting the airplane floats sink into the water. The passenger then yelled at him asking what he was doing and the pilot then started adding full engine power. The passenger stated that he did not see the pilot select the wing flaps, which should have been "at least" 15 degrees. The passenger stated that the next thing he heard was a loud bang and saw limbs of shrubs and leaves coming over the plane and then woke up between the copilot's seat and his door. The passenger said his seat belt must not have worked; it was pulled out of the "floor or something." The only way out was through the pilot's door and which everybody crawled out of. The plane had come to rest about 400 yards from where it impacted the bank. The passenger stated that the wind was "not a problem" and "it could not have been more than 10 knots."

A witness, who was a pilot with about 6,000 hours of flight time and had flight experience in float airplanes, recorded an image/video of the airplane. He "believed" that the airplane wing flaps were in the down position at "some point," and then the flaps were in the up position. He stated that the flaps were not extended during the takeoff. He said that the airplane was "motoring around," and it "motored" over to the beginning of the takeoff point about 3-4 times and would "motor away" before starting the takeoff. He said that it was not a "normal" amount of time to warm up the engine oil. He said at the end of the video, the right aileron was deflected down to "break" the right float out of the water.

Figure 1: The left and right images were taken by the witness. The left image shows the airplane with flaps extended during the taxi prior to takeoff and right image shows the airplane with its flaps retracted during its takeoff run.

The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane and that he should have "done the right thing," which was "to do two takeoffs with half load each!!!" PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot began employment as a pilot for Rapids Camp Lodge Inc in 2015. The pilot's resume showed two periods in which he was pilot flying DHC-2 float equipped airplanes in Alaska. The most recent was his employment as a Part 135 pilot from June to September 2014 flying DHC-2 and Cessna 185 float equipped airplanes, and wheel-equipped Cessna 206 airplanes. From June to September 2012 he was employed as a pilot for Part 135 pilot operator flying DHC-2 float equipped airplanes.

The operator had no training records that were available and/or provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The operator did not hold a Part 135 certificate and its operations conducted under Part 91 did not require an FAA approved training program and records of that training. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was manufactured in 1956 and according to the airplane type certificate data information it was certified under civil air regulations (CAR) 3 and CAR 10. The airplane registration certificate was issued to the operator on June 22, 2000.

The airplane had a supplemental type certificate (STC) installation for Aerocet 5850 floats (SA 01722SE), which was dated September 9, 2011, and a STC installation for a Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase (SA 4025NM), which was dated June 28, 2000. The Aerocet float STC had a flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances. The Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase STC had no flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances.

The airplane was not required nor was it equipped with shoulder harnesses under CAR 3 and 10 certification standards. FAA airworthiness records, dated May 9, 2001, show that shoulder harnesses were installed for the airplane pilot and copilot seats. There were no shoulder harnesses installed for the passenger seats.

Airplane Flight Manual and Takeoff Performance Charts

The DHC-2 Beaver Flight Manual states that the cockpit wing flaps indicator is situated on the instrument panel and is marked: FULL FLAP, LANDING, TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, and CRUISE.

Section 2.8 (f) of the flight manual, Takeoff Check, states in part: "Flaps – TAKE-OFF position." Section 2.9 (f), Takeoff, states in part: "Allow aircraft to fly itself off at 55 to 65 mph in a tail down attitude and climb at 65 mph.

Flight Manual Takeoff Distance Chart

The Operating Data Charts section of the flight manual provides takeoff distance charts for land and seaplane configurations. All the takeoff distance charts are based upon a wing flap configuration that is in the takeoff configuration. There are no distance charts within the manual that provide takeoff distances with retracted wing flaps.

STC Flight Manual Supplements for Takeoff Performance

The STC flight manual supplement for Aerocet floats states the correction factors to be applied to the seaplane takeoff and landing performance. At a gross weight of 5,090 lbs or less: water run – none, takeoff to 50 feet – add 50 percent. At a gross weight between 5,090 lbs and 5,370 lbs: water run – 15 percent, takeoff to 50 feet – add 70 percent.

Approximate Flight Manual/STC Takeoff Distances

The pilot reported that the airplane maximum gross weight was 5,370 lbs, and the airplane weight at the time of the accident as 5,150 lbs. The pilot reported that the winds were 240 degrees at 13 knots, gusts were 8 knots, and the outside air temperature was 15 degrees Celsius. Recorded GPS data shows that the altitude of the airplane at takeoff was about 950 feet.

According to Aerocet, the approximate water run was 914 feet. The approximate total distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle was 1,989 feet.

Airplane Stall Speeds

Section 4.6.1, Load Factors, of the flight manual, states that the Section 4.10.1, General, of the flight manual states that the stalling speed with flaps up is 60 mph indicated airspeed (IAS) and with flaps "Landing" is 45 mph IAS.

A stall speed of 60 mph is equivalent to about 52 knots. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was manufactured in 1956 and according to the airplane type certificate data information it was certified under civil air regulations (CAR) 3 and CAR 10. The airplane registration certificate was issued to the operator on June 22, 2000.

The airplane had a supplemental type certificate (STC) installation for Aerocet 5850 floats (SA 01722SE), which was dated September 9, 2011, and a STC installation for a Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase (SA 4025NM), which was dated June 28, 2000. The Aerocet float STC had a flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances. The Kenmore Air Harbor gross weight increase STC had no flight manual supplement correction factor for takeoff distances.

The airplane was not required nor wa...