Summary
On June 20, 2016, a Swearingen SA226 (N127WD) was involved in an incident near Farmingdale, NY. All 2 people aboard were uninjured. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this incident to be: The pilot-in-command’s failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing.
According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," and seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. During the approach, he recalled that they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up". During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended, as he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset.
This incident is documented in NTSB report GAA16CA527. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N127WD.
Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot-in-command’s failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," and seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. During the approach, he recalled that they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up". During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended, as he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the knee of SIC obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that following the flare he heard the airplane propellers hit the runway, and he made the decision not to go-around because of the unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down, and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons and stringers.
The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in VFR conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy, and during the approach he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset.
The Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that during recovery the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main gear doors, the main landing gear was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn, was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway.
Both pilots were wearing noise canceling headsets, and the landing gear warning horn is presented by an aural tone in the cockpit, and is not configured to be heard through the crew's headsets.
When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual (AFM) before landing checklist.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# GAA16CA527