N669WR

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 27, 2016, about 1756 eastern standard time, an experimental, amateur-built Epic LT airplane, N669WR, sustained substantial damage when it impacted terrain during an instrument approach to Spruce Creek Airport (7FL6), Port Orange, Florida. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was privately owned and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which originated from Millington Regional Jetport (NQA), Millington, Tennessee, about 1558, and was destined for 7FL6.

The pilot initially departed from Willmar Municipal Airport (BDH), Willmar, Minnesota, on the morning of the accident, with a planned stop at NQA before proceeding to 7FL6. The pilot received a weather briefing from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service at 1249 before departing BDH. The information provided to the pilot indicated that the terminal area forecast (TAF) predicted visual flight rules (VFR) conditions until 2300; however, an AIRMET and a Center Weather Advisory (CWA) called for low IFR conditions at 7FL6. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated, because the CWA was only valid for 2 hours and any new AIRMETs would be released at 1545 or earlier.

The pilot landed at NQA about 1529 and subsequently departed about 1558. There were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained updated weather information during this time. At 1555, a CWA for low IFR conditions (ceilings below 500 ft and visibility below 1/2 mile in fog) was issued and was valid for the accident site until 1755. Another CWA was issued at 1700 and valid until 1900 regarding low IFR conditions.

A review of air traffic control communications provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that, about 1741, the pilot told the approach controller that he had the current weather conditions at 7FL6 and the "visibility to get in there." The controller did not provide the pilot with the 1700 CWA. The controller gave the pilot vectors to the final approach course, provided missed approach instructions (fly heading 070° and climb to 2,000 ft), and cleared the flight for the approach. Once the airplane was established on the final approach course, the controller told the pilot that a frequency change was approved. The pilot acknowledged and said that he would call on the ground and cancel his IFR flight plan. There were no further communications from the pilot.

A review of radar data revealed that, during the final 46 seconds of flight, the airplane approached the airport on a northeasterly heading just north of the final approach course. At 1756:01, the airplane was abeam the runway numbers at an altitude of 100 ft mean sea level (msl) (76 ft above ground level) before it initiated a climbing right turn. During the turn, the airplane initially climbed to 200 ft msl then descended to 100 ft msl before climbing up to 300 ft. After completing a 360° turn, the airplane began to climb on a northeasterly heading. Over the next 14 seconds, the airplane climbed to 800 ft, while making a shallow turn to the right followed by a turn to the left before the data ended at 1756:47. The last radar return was near-coincident with the location of the accident site (See figure 1).

Figure 1. Radar Flight Track of Attempted Landing at 7FL6. Several witnesses observed the accident. One witness, who was driving to the airport's café, reported that he saw the airplane's landing lights as it approached the airport. The airplane was about 100 ft above ground level (agl) and in a left turn. The airplane then climbed back into the fog layer and disappeared. The witness said, "I didn't hear anything for a few seconds. Then I heard a very loud distinct corkscrewing sound, very familiar to a spinning plane at an airshow. I then saw two wing-tip lights fall through the clouds straight down and heard an extremely loud thud."

Another witness, who was an FAA designated pilot examiner, was monitoring air traffic communications on his handheld radio. He stated that general aviation aircraft were diverting to Deland, Florida, and commercial airliners were diverting to Orlando, Florida, due to "below minimum conditions." The witness said that, when he heard the accident pilot was going to attempt the instrument approach into 7FL6, he became concerned and drove to the runway to watch. The pilot, whom he knew, had a history of "careless and reckless" flying, and the witness was convinced he did not have the "skill set" to fly an instrument approach to minimums. The witness saw the airplane when it broke out of the overcast ceiling about 200 ft agl. At that time, the airplane was about 1/8-mile north of the final approach course. He said that the airplane suddenly pulled up (thought maybe the airplane struck trees) and banked to the right over the airport into the fog, before it descended in an inverted flat spin to impact. The witness used his cell phone to record part of the approach. The video was consistent with the witness's statement, and the airplane's engine was clearly heard on the video.

A third witness said that he heard a loud engine noise, so he went out onto his lanai and looked up. He saw the airplane emerge from the fog in a 70° to 80° nose-down "fully developed spin." The witness said the airplane made three rotations before he lost sight of it behind trees; he then heard the sound of an impact.

Airport surveillance video captured the final seconds of the flight. The video showed the airplane descending through fog in a spin with its landing lights on just before impact.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. His last FAA third-class medical was issued on December 2, 2016. At that time, he reported 5,635 total hours of flight experience.

On the pilot's most recent insurance application, dated July 2016, he reported 4,246 hours of flight experience, of which 956 hours were in the accident airplane.

The pilot's most recent flight review and Epic Factory Recurrent Training were completed on October 1, 2016. The factory training included both flight and ground instruction. The flight portion included precision and non-precision approaches, unusual attitude recoveries, stall recognition and recovery; however; the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review and his instrument currency could not be established.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Epic LT was a kit-built, low-wing, single-engine turboprop airplane that seated six. Its structure was carbon-composite material with retractable landing gear. The airplane was equipped with a 1,200-horsepower Pratt & Whitney PT6-67A engine and a four-blade Hartzell propeller.

The pilot built the airplane and was issued a special certificate of airworthiness from the FAA on December 18, 2009.

A review of the airframe maintenance logbook revealed that the last condition inspection was conducted on August 18, 2016, at an aircraft total time of 822.31 hours. The engine and propeller were inspected on August 17, 2016; both had accrued the same time as the airframe.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Whether the pilot obtained additional weather information during the flight to 7FL6 could not be determined.

The 1655 automated weather observation at 7FL6 included wind from 070° at 4 knots, visibility 25 miles, temperature 68°F, dew point 65°F, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury.

The airport's weather reporting system was not equipped to provide cloud ceiling heights.

The 1755 automated weather observation at 7FL6 included calm wind, visibility 2 1/2 statute miles, mist, temperature 67°F, dew point 66°F, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury.

The second closest official weather station to the accident site was at the New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (EVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida, about 5 miles east of the accident site.

The 1650 weather observation at EVB included wind from 090° at 4 knots, 1/2-mile visibility, fog, overcast ceiling at 200 ft, temperature 67° F, dew point 67° F, and an altimeter setting of 30.17 inches of mercury.

The 1750 weather observation at EVB included wind from 090° at 4 knots, visibility 1/4 statute mile, fog, overcast ceiling at 100 ft, temperature 67° F, dew point 67° F, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury.

The third closest weather reporting system was at the Daytona International Airport (DAB), Daytona Beach, Florida, located about 6 miles north of the accident site. The 1726 observation included wind from 090° at 4 knots, visibility 1/4-mile in fog, overcast ceiling 300 ft, temperature 67° F, dew point 67° F, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.

The 1753 observation at DAB included wind from 110° at 5 knots, visibility 1/4-mile in fog, vertical visibility 300 ft, temperature 67° F, dew point 67° F, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.

No AIRMETs were issued or valid for the accident site at the time of the accident; however, an AIRMET for IFR conditions was issued for areas north of the accident site.

Three separate pilot reports (PIREPs) that reported low IFR conditions were recorded within 1 hour and in the vicinity of the accident. However, these reports were not disseminated to the pilot by the air traffic controller.

According to the U.S. Naval Observatory Astronomical Applications Department, sunset was at 1734 and the end of civil twilight was at 1800.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

7FL6 was a private, residential airport that has a 4,000-ft-long by 176-ft-wide paved and lighted runway oriented 05/23. The airport was owned and managed by the Spruce Creek Fly-In Property Owners Association. The pilot was a resident of Spruce Cre...