Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The non-instrument-rated pilot's decision to continue a night visual flight rules into instrument flight rules conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to obtain an official weather briefing.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 29, 2016, about 1844 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 182P, N52388, collided with terrain near Dabob, Washington. The non-instrument-rated private pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to the pilot who was operating it under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity of the accident site, and no flight plan was filed for the personal cross-country flight. The visual flight rules (VFR) flight departed at 1816 from Boeing Field International Airport (BFI), Seattle, Washington, and was enroute to William R. Fairchild International Airport (CLM), Port Angeles, Washington.
According to a family member, the pilot, his wife, and two grandchildren flew from CLM to BFI in the morning, spent the day in the Seattle area, and were returning to CLM when the accident occurred. According to air traffic control communications, at 1833, the pilot was transferred from the BFI tower controller to the Naval Air Station Whidbey Island Approach Control West (APW) controller.
A review of the airplane's radar track (see Figure 1) showed that the airplane departed the BFI area on a northwest heading climbing to about 2,800 ft mean sea level (msl) before descending with altitudes varying between 2,500 ft msl and 2,000 ft msl.
At 1833:30, the airplane traveled west into the northern side of restricted airspace P-51. At 1834:04, the APW controller asked the pilot if he was reversing course, and the pilot replied that he was just trying to stay out of the restricted airspace. At this point, the airplane started a 270° left turn at 1,850 ft msl. Halfway through the turn, the airplane descended to 1,025 ft msl or about 600 ft above ground level (agl). The airplane exited P-51 traveling northwest about 1834:44.
At 1837:26, the APW controller asked the pilot for his intentions, and the pilot replied that he was trying to stay out of the clouds. The airplane completed a 270° turn at 1,400 ft msl and headed northeast. At 1837:58, the pilot asked for vectors to Port Townsend. The APW controller recommended a 050° heading to get the airplane east of an area where the minimum vectoring altitude was 8,800 ft msl before turning the airplane north toward Port Townsend.
At 1839:15, the APW controller instructed the pilot to maintain VFR flight and indicated that Port Townsend was at a heading of 340°; the pilot confirmed that he was turning to 340°. Over the next 5 minutes, the airplane performed two left 360° turns, while its altitude varied between 1,100 ft msl and 2,475 ft msl. At 1840:41, the controller told the pilot he would be unable to fly on that 340° heading to maintain VFR and recommended that he head east. The pilot replied and stated he was heading east. About a minute later, the airplane turned north and the controller asked the pilot his intentions. The pilot stated he was going to turn west to CLM, and the controller informed the pilot he would not be able to maintain radar contact with him. The controller again offered assistance and the pilot responded by stating he was heading towards CLM and thought he may have been out of the clouds. At 1843:30, as the airplane completed the last 360° turn and headed northwest, the controller asked if he was heading towards CLM now, and the pilot responded with "affirmative."
At 1844:43, APW lost radar contact with N52388 about 14 miles south of Jefferson County International Airport, Port Townsend, Washington, and about a half mile northwest of the accident site.
Figure 1-Radar Track
A witness located at his residence, about 800 ft to the southwest of the accident site, reported that he heard an airplane flying southeast then east and that the engine was loud.
After radio and radar contact were lost, the FAA issued an alert notice. A search was conducted by the US Navy and a Washington State search and rescue team. The airplane was located on the morning of December 30, 2016, about 1.5 miles south of Dabob, in steep, heavily wooded terrain. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 63, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. His most recent third-class FAA medical certificate was issued on April 3, 2015, with limitations that he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot reported on the medical certificate application that he had accumulated 700 total hours of flight experience of which 54 hours were in the last 6 months. The pilot's logbook was examined during the investigation, and the entries did not appear to have been updated recently. The last entry in the logbook was dated September 18, 2015. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONA review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane, serial number 18262571, had a total airframe time of 2,554 hours at the last annual inspection dated August 11, 2016. The engine was a Continental Motors O-470-R-25A, serial number 451850. Total time recorded on the engine at the last annual inspection was 2,554 hours, and time since major overhaul was 517.2 hours.
Refueling records provided by Diamond Service at BFI, revealed that the pilot purchased 10.2 gallons of 100 low lead aviation grade gasoline on the day of the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1753, the reported weather at BFI included variable wind at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, light rain, broken ceiling at 1,800 ft agl, overcast skies at 3,000 ft agl, temperature 8°C, dew point 6°C, and altimeter setting 30.13 inches of mercury.
At 1835, Bremerton National Airport (PWT), Bremerton, Washington, located about 20 miles south of the accident site, reported, in part, wind calm, visibility 10 miles, overcast ceiling at 600 ft agl, temperature 5°C, dew point 4°C, and altimeter setting 30.15 inches of mercury.
Review of infrared satellite imagery from 1845 and 1900 indicated abundant clouds over the accident site at the accident time. The clouds were moving from west to east, and there was a band of clouds oriented west to east over the accident site around the accident time. Based on the brightness temperatures above the accident site and the vertical temperature profile provided by upper air data, the cloud-top heights over the accident site were about 20,000 ft at 1845. Based on the upper air data, infrared satellite imagery, and surface observation data, the flight likely encountered precipitation, lowering ceilings, and instrument meteorological conditions shortly after passing northwestward across Puget Sound.
Astronomical data obtained from the United States Naval Observatory for the accident site on the day of the accident indicated that sunset was at 1627, the end of civil twilight was at 1703, and moonset was at 1721.
A search of official weather briefing sources, such as Lockheed Martin Flight Service and Direct User Access Terminal Service, indicated that the pilot did not receive an official weather briefing from those sources. A search of ForeFlight weather information revealed that the pilot did not request a weather briefing using ForeFlight Mobile before the flight. It is unknown if the pilot checked or received any other weather information before or during the accident flight.
For more information see the Weather Study in the public docket for this accident. AIRPORT INFORMATIONA review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane, serial number 18262571, had a total airframe time of 2,554 hours at the last annual inspection dated August 11, 2016. The engine was a Continental Motors O-470-R-25A, serial number 451850. Total time recorded on the engine at the last annual inspection was 2,554 hours, and time since major overhaul was 517.2 hours.
Refueling records provided by Diamond Service at BFI, revealed that the pilot purchased 10.2 gallons of 100 low lead aviation grade gasoline on the day of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe on-site examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane came to rest at the base of a draw between two hills that gradually sloped down in a northeast to southwest direction. The debris field from the initial impact to the last piece of wreckage was about 160 ft long and on a magnetic heading of 225°. The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was with three trees at about 30 ft above the ground. The left aileron outboard wing section was found near the base of the trees.
The main wreckage consisting of the fuselage, engine, propeller, empennage, and sections from the left and right wings, was located near the end of the debris path. The fuselage was orientated on about a 100° magnetic heading. The forward fuselage and cabin were fragmented and mostly separated.
The engine had separated from the airframe and was located near the main wreckage.
The propeller had separated from the engine and was found buried in the dirt near the main wreckage. The propeller hub assembly was heavily fragmented and both blades had separated from the hub. Rotational scoring was observed on one of the propeller shanks. Both blades displayed S-bending and about 2 inches of the tip had separated from one blade.
The aft fuselage and empennage separated from the main wreckage near the aft cabin area. The separated rudder and vertical stabilizer fragments were located 160 ft northeast of the main wreckage and displayed circular tree strike indentions.
The attitude indicator had separated from the instrument panel and was located near the main wreckage. The outer case of the instrument was fragmented. Its gyro was extracted, and rotational scoring was noted. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONSpatial Disorientation
According to the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3), "night flying is very different from day flying and demands more attention of the pilot. The most noticeable difference is the limited availability of outside visual references. Therefore, flight instruments should be used to a greater degree.… Generally, at night ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR17FA044