Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's failure to detect the presence of water in the helicopter fuel system before the flight, which resulted in a total loss of engine power during cruise. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's delayed recognition of the power loss and late initiation of an autorotation, which resulted in a hard landing on the ocean.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 22, 2017, about 1325 local time, a Hughes (McDonnell-Douglas/Boeing) model 369A helicopter, N805LA, was substantially damaged during an autorotation to the Pacific Ocean, in international waters near Guam. The commercial pilot was seriously injured, and the aerial observer's injuries were reported as "minor." The aerial observation flight was operated by Jim's Air Repair, which was owned by an individual who owned multiple helicopter operations, the largest of which was Hansen Helicopters. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, during daylight visual meteorological conditions.
A written accident report was completed and submitted to the NTSB by a representative of Hansen Helicopters. According to that report, the flight was a fish-spotting mission that was operating from a Japanese fishing boat. The report stated that the helicopter had been airborne about 30 minutes, cruising about 1,000 ft above the ocean, when the pilot noticed that a "Generator Light" was illuminated. The report then stated that, in response to the light, the pilot applied friction to the collective control in order to free one hand to reset a switch, and that concurrently, the pilot "felt the helicopter drop suddenly." The pilot noticed that the main rotor rpm was "at the bottom of the green" arc on the cockpit instrumentation. He initiated an autorotation but the helicopter struck the water in what a Hansen representative termed a "hard landing." The main rotor blades severed the tail boom, but the helicopter remained upright and afloat, supported by its utility floats.
The wreckage was recovered to the fishing boat, and subsequently transported to a Hansen Helicopters facility on Guam. On March 13, 2017, representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Rolls Royce examined the wreckage at the Hansen facility. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot was a US citizen who held FAA Commercial and Flight Instructor certificates. The filed report indicated that the pilot had about 2,936 total hours of flight experience, all of which were in helicopters, and 1,350 hours of which were in the accident helicopter make and model. The pilot's most recent flight review was completed in July 2015, and his most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in January 2016. The medical certificate status reverted to third-class status after 12 months, and per FAA regulations, the pilot could not exercise his commercial privileges for compensation.
NTSB attempts to interview the pilot were unsuccessful; he was still hospitalized and could not be reached telephonically. FAA attempts to interview the pilot in person on March 13 were also unsuccessful; he refused to speak to the FAA without counsel, but was unable or unwilling to provide the name of, or any other contact information for, his counsel. Two days later, the pilot was transferred by air ambulance to the Philippines for surgery related to his accident injuries. The pilot made no subsequent contact with the NTSB.
The observer was a Japanese citizen, and according to a representative of Hansen Helicopters, he had no pilot experience. The observer was evacuated to Japan shortly after the accident, and no NTSB attempts were made to interview him. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe helicopter, an OH-6A (Manufacturer's Model 369A, SN 101355) was delivered new to the US Army on February 24, 1970 as US Army SN 69-15985. Hughes Tool Company (HTC), Aircraft Division was the original manufacturer of the helicopter. HTC underwent several ownership (and name) changes subsequent to the production of this helicopter.
FAA registration and airworthiness documentation indicated that the helicopter was powered by a Rolls-Royce (Allison) C250 series turboshaft engine. FAA records indicated that the helicopter was first registered to Jim's Air Repair in August 2009. Jim's Air Repair is based in the country of Vanuatu.
Hansen-provided information stated that the airframe had 7,374.8 total hours of service, that the engine had 2,702.4 total hours of service, and that the engine had accumulated 393.7 hours in service since its most recent overhaul. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe Hansen-provided accident report stated that the weather at the time of the event included winds from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 20 miles, clear skies, temperature 26° C, and daylight conditions. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe helicopter, an OH-6A (Manufacturer's Model 369A, SN 101355) was delivered new to the US Army on February 24, 1970 as US Army SN 69-15985. Hughes Tool Company (HTC), Aircraft Division was the original manufacturer of the helicopter. HTC underwent several ownership (and name) changes subsequent to the production of this helicopter.
FAA registration and airworthiness documentation indicated that the helicopter was powered by a Rolls-Royce (Allison) C250 series turboshaft engine. FAA records indicated that the helicopter was first registered to Jim's Air Repair in August 2009. Jim's Air Repair is based in the country of Vanuatu.
Hansen-provided information stated that the airframe had 7,374.8 total hours of service, that the engine had 2,702.4 total hours of service, and that the engine had accumulated 393.7 hours in service since its most recent overhaul. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONAirframe
The investigation team's first contact with the helicopter was about 3 weeks after the accident. The helicopter was examined inside a Hansen Helicopters building, where it was reported to have been stored since shortly after the accident. It was upright, resting on the left utility float, fuselage lower structure, and the right forward and aft struts. The right utility float had been removed from the helicopter during recovery. The four fuselage attach points for the landing gear struts/dampers were severely damaged, with torn skins and fractured structure.
The fuselage sustained extensive impact damage, with the left side more damaged than the right side. The tailboom was separated into at least two sections. According to the Hansen Helicopters report, one portion of the tail boom assembly that was severed by the main rotor blades during the ocean impact was lost at sea. The recovered section was fracture-separated from the fuselage near fuselage station (FS) 197.78, and extended to approximately FS 258.0. The recovered section showed evidence of main rotor blade contact. The tailboom aft of FS 258.0, including the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, tail rotor transmission, and the tail rotor system, was not recovered from the ocean.
The canopy windscreens and overhead transparencies, doors, and doorframe structures were all damaged from impact. The cockpit instrument panel and center console assembly, and its associated components, showed little damage. Two hour meters were located in the helicopter. One displayed a reading of 937.8 hours, and the other one displayed a reading of 1,245.9 hours. Hansen personnel did not provide any information regarding the functions of these two hour meters.
Both the left and right cockpit seat pans were significantly deformed downward, and their box structures were crushed. The seat restraint systems were intact and functional.
The helicopter was equipped with single pilot, left hand controls. Cyclic and collective control system continuity was confirmed. The cyclic stick balance was consistent with the trim actuators being neutral. Anti-torque control continuity was confirmed from the pilot's pedals to the fractured tail rotor control rod at the tailboom separation point.
The main rotor system hub assembly and components, strap assemblies, pitch housings, feather bearings, and pitch change links were relatively undamaged. The rotor system exhibited hub damage that was consistent with excessive blade lead/lag excursions and high flapping angles. All four main rotor blades were unbroken, with varying degrees of bends and skin damage. The damage to the main rotor system components was consistent with low rotor rpm, power-off, main rotor blade strikes.
Drivetrain continuity was established from the engine, through the main transmission, to the main rotor. Rotation of the main rotor hub by hand resulted in rotation of both the engine-to-transmission drive shaft and the tail rotor driveshaft. The over-running clutch assembly was functional. The transmission cooler blower assembly appeared undamaged. The main transmission appeared undamaged. One transmission magnetic chip plug had a small amount of unidentified paste-like material on it, and the other chip plug was clean.
The tail rotor driveshaft separation locations matched the locations of the tailboom separations. The shaft fracture signatures were consistent with lower-than-flight-normal rpm.
Engine
The engine is a two-spool design. In the direction of airflow, the first spool is referred to as "N1," and includes all 7 compressor stages and the first 2 turbine stages. The N1 turbine section, which drives the compressor, is also referred to as the "gas generator" turbine. The second spool includes the last two turbine stages and the mechanical accommodations to drive the rotor system. This section is also referred to as the "N2" or "power turbine" section.
The engine mounting structure was properly secured and generally intact. All engine mounts exhibited deformation consistent with a hard landing. Inspection of the engine exterior revealed no evidence of fire or uncontained failure. The N1 section was able to rotate freely, and had no indications of foreign object damage or housing rubbing. The N2 section showed no visible damage. Its rotation was stiff, but this appeared consistent with saltwater corrosion damage to the accessory gearbox, and not with impact damage.
All fuel, lubrication, and pneumatic lines, and their associated fittings, were found to be at least finger tight. No evidence of oil leakage was observed in the engine ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR17LA075