Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's loss of helicopter control during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions due to spatial disorientation and the cumulative effects of task saturation.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On May 25, 2017, at 1153 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 helicopter, N62UP, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near New Castle, Delaware. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to the University of Pennsylvania and was being operated by Metro Aviation, Inc., as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the accident site about the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight. The local flight originated from Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey, at 1117.
According to a representative of Metro Aviation, a helicopter air ambulance operator, the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to practice instrument approaches at New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, pick up a clearance in flight, and then return to ACY. The pilot obtained weather briefings via the Foreflight application at 1026 and 1042. The briefings included weather observations, forecasts, and NOTAMs for the departure, destination, and selected en route stations; PIREPs (pilot reports); and in-flight weather advisories for the planned flight. At 1043, the pilot submitted a flight request form to the company, which documented the weather products he reviewed before the flight and indicated that he was aware of the reported and forecast weather conditions for the route before departure. After reviewing the request, weather, and risk assessment, the company's operation control center approved and released the helicopter for the flight five minutes after the request was submitted. In addition, the pilot performed and signed off the preflight inspection of the helicopter the morning of the accident.
A review of radar data and air traffic control (ATC) communications provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that after departing from ACY, the flight proceeded uneventfully and at 1150, an ILG tower controller cleared the pilot for the ILS RWY 1 approach (see figure 1, which shows an overhead view of the helicopter's radar ground track overlaid on the ILS RWY 1 instrument approach procedure plan view). The radar track showed that the helicopter was established on the final approach course about 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl), which was both the assigned altitude and the intermediate altitude for the approach. The helicopter maintained 2,000 ft msl as it continued through the glideslope and crossed over the locator outer marker (HADIN). The published crossing altitude for HADIN while established on the glideslope was 1,842 ft.
Figure 1. Overhead view of helicopter's radar ground track (red) overlaid onto the ILS Rwy 1 instrument approach procedure plan view. The helicopter continued on course toward the runway; when it was about 3 miles, and about 2 minutes and 15 seconds beyond HADIN and still at an altitude of 2,000 ft msl, the pilot declared a missed approach. The controller advised the pilot to fly the published missed approach procedure. (The published procedure was a straight ahead climb to 900 ft, then left climbing turn to 2,000 ft to a heading of 220° to the ELUDE fix). Following the instruction, the helicopter climbed on course to 2,525 ft msl before it turned right and started a descent to 2,225 ft msl 4 seconds later. Subsequently, radar contact was lost when the helicopter was at 1,625 ft msl, and no additional communications were received from the pilot.
One witness reported seeing the helicopter for about two seconds "spinning down…out of the clouds in an upside-down nose dive." Another witness reported that the helicopter descended "like a rocket" and that he did not observe any smoke or fire before the helicopter impacted the ground.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rotorcraft-helicopter rating. Additionally, he held a flight instructor certificate with helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings and a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on October 20, 2016. At that time, he reported 4,200 hours of total flight experience, 100 hours of which were in the previous 6 months.
According to Metro Aviation's duty log for the pilot, he had accumulated 827.0 hours of flight experience with the company since he was hired in June 2013, 21.9 hours of which were in IMC and 33.2 hours of which were simulated instrument time. Since January 1, 2016, he had completed 18 precision instrument approaches and 21 non-precision instrument approaches. The duty log indicated that, from January 2016 through the accident date, the pilot had only flown to ILG for the company once, on March 12, 2017, on a day, visual flight rules flight.
The pilot's most recent instrument proficiency program check flight was on April 9, 2017. During that flight, the pilot practiced several types of instrument approaches, including an ILS approach and a missed approach.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The light helicopter was manufactured in 2006 and was configured with the pilot's seat on the right side. It was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW206B2 engines.
The helicopter was equipped with a four-blade, rigid hingeless, bearingless main rotor system. In addition, it had a fenestron-type antitorque system, which is comprised of a ten-blade fan housed in the vertical fin. The helicopter was also equipped with an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), three-axis autopilot.
According to the helicopter flight manual, the AFCS had the ability to perform several different types of instrument approaches such as localizer approaches and ILS approaches (which used localizer mode with the glide slope mode), in addition it had a "Go around (GA) mode," which could be used in the event of a missed approach. When using the autopilot during an ILS approach, the AFCS would capture and fly the localizer first, and then capture the glideslope and command the helicopter to track the glideslope beam. The glideslope mode captured when the glideslope deviation was inside the -0.2/+0.5 dot range. In order to use the autopilot for an ILS approach the approach and the glide slope modes needed to be engaged separately. In the GA mode, the helicopter would acquire and hold a vertical speed of 1000 ft/min or 75 knots indicated airspeed.
According to the helicopter's maintenance logbook, the most recent approved aircraft inspection program 100-hour inspection was conducted on April 25, 2017, at an airframe total time of 5,152.1 hours. Before the accident flight, the helicopter's airframe total time was 5,163.1 hours and the left and right engines total operating times were 5,168.9, and 5,155.7 hours, respectively.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 1036 weather observation from ILG, which was the prevailing conditions when the pilot was performing his preflight weather planning, reported wind from 070° at 13 knots, visibility 4 miles in light rain and mist, overcast clouds at 500 ft above ground level, temperature 14° C, dew point 14° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.52 inches of mercury.
The 1151 weather observation from ILG reported wind from 050° at 7 knots, visibility 2 1/2 miles in mist, overcast clouds at 500 ft above ground level, temperature 16° C, dew point 16°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.53 inches of mercury.
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Weather Tool images depicting the route between ACY and ILG, at 1000, 1030, 1100, 1130, and 1200, all indicated that IMC to "low" IMC prevailed in the area.
Terminal Forecast
The 0800 forecast for ILG predicted wind from 080° at 12 knots, gusting to 20 knots, visibility 4 miles in light rain showers and mist, ceiling overcast at 800 ft. The forecasted weather at 1000 was with wind from 090° at 10 knots, visibility greater than 6 miles, and ceiling overcast at 1,200 ft. Then, visual flight rules (VFR) conditions at 1400, with visibility greater than 6 miles and a cloud ceiling broken at 3,500 ft. Low-level wind shear was not mentioned in the forecast.
The forecast for ACY predicted wind from 070° at 12 knots, visibility 5 miles in light rain showers and mist, and ceiling overcast at 600 ft. At 1000, forecast conditions included wind from 090° at 10 knots, visibility greater than 6 miles in light rain, and ceiling overcast at 1,200 ft. After 1500, VFR conditions were expected with visibility unrestricted and ceiling broken at 4,500 ft.
Area Forecast
The forecast for southern New Jersey issued at 0445 and valid through 1700 predicted general overcast clouds at 1,000 ft with tops to 25,000 ft and visibility 3 to 5 miles in light rain and mist through 1500, then lifting to broken at 3,500 ft with widely scattered light rain showers and thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 ft. The forecast for Delaware and northern Maryland also expected general overcast clouds at 1,000 ft with tops to 25,000 ft, with visibility 3 to 5 miles in light rain and mist. After 1400, scattered clouds at 1,500 ft, and broken clouds at 4,000 ft were expected with scattered light rain showers. The forecast was amended by AIRMET Sierra, which was current at the time of the accident.
Inflight Weather Advisories
The primary advisories current at the time of the accident included a series of AIRMETs, which were issued at 1045, and warned of a wide area of IFR conditions, moderate turbulence, and low-level wind shear (LLWS). The conditions were expected to continue through 1700.
High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) Numerical Model Sounding
A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration HRRR model sounding for the approximate location of the accident at 1200 predicted a wind profile indicated easterly winds below the frontal inversion with winds veering to the south and southwest abruptly above the invers...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA17FA190