Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The in-flight failure of the left wing due to the owner's use of improper hardware and his improper assembly of the airplane, which reduced the strength of the left wing and resulted in its subsequent failure following a sharp pullup maneuver.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 17, 2017, about 1145 mountain daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Vans RV-3 airplane, N177TT, impacted terrain following an in-flight separation of the left wing while maneuvering near Payette Municipal Airport (S75), Payette, Idaho. The airline transport pilot sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to and was being operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the local flight, which departed S75 about 1140.
A review of a video of the accident sequence revealed that the airplane departed runway 31 and then made a shallow ascending right turn to the north. Seconds later, the airplane made a sweeping left descending turn to align with runway 13. The pilot proceeded to make a high-speed, low-altitude pass over the runway, during which the airplane descended to less than 20 ft above ground level (agl), before the pilot executed a sharp pull-up maneuver at the departure end of the runway. After climbing the airplane several hundred feet, the pilot initiated a left turn to a northerly heading. Several seconds later, the airplane entered a descent, and the left wing separated from the airplane. The airplane impacted flat farmland about 3,025 ft northeast of the departure end of runway 31. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe 74-year-old pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and helicopter ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single engine and helicopter. The pilot was issued a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate on April 27, 2016, with the restriction that he "must wear corrective lenses." At that time, he reported 16,700 total hours of flight experience, about 20 hours of which were in the preceding 6 months.
The pilot also held an FAA mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings and an inspection authorization. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe single-seat, single-engine, low-wing, kit airplane was a metal monocoque construction, had a conventional tail, and was equipped with fixed conventional landing gear. The airplane was powered by a four-cylinder Lycoming O-235 engine and was equipped with a two-bladed fixed-pitch wooden propeller. The airplane was modified from a standard RV-3 to have an open cockpit configuration. According to Vans Aircraft, the kit manufacturer, the accident airplane was sold as a kit in 1978.
Most of the airplane was assembled by at least three previous owners. The accident pilot bought the airplane not fully assembled in 1998, and he completed assembling it in 2007. The airplane was granted an FAA airworthiness certificate in the experimental category on May 2, 2007. Standard operating limitations, including requiring an annual condition inspection and prohibiting aerobatic flight, were issued in conjunction with the airworthiness certificate.
In 2014, the airplane was disassembled and shipped in a container from Hawaii to Idaho. The pilot reassembled the airplane in a hangar at S75 before the accident flight. The accident flight was the first flight after the airplane had been reassembled. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1153, the recorded weather observation at Ontario Municipal Airport, Ontario, Oregon, located 7 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, reported calm winds, visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear, temperature 22°C, dew point 5°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury. The density altitude at the time of the accident was about 2,899 ft. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe single-seat, single-engine, low-wing, kit airplane was a metal monocoque construction, had a conventional tail, and was equipped with fixed conventional landing gear. The airplane was powered by a four-cylinder Lycoming O-235 engine and was equipped with a two-bladed fixed-pitch wooden propeller. The airplane was modified from a standard RV-3 to have an open cockpit configuration. According to Vans Aircraft, the kit manufacturer, the accident airplane was sold as a kit in 1978.
Most of the airplane was assembled by at least three previous owners. The accident pilot bought the airplane not fully assembled in 1998, and he completed assembling it in 2007. The airplane was granted an FAA airworthiness certificate in the experimental category on May 2, 2007. Standard operating limitations, including requiring an annual condition inspection and prohibiting aerobatic flight, were issued in conjunction with the airworthiness certificate.
In 2014, the airplane was disassembled and shipped in a container from Hawaii to Idaho. The pilot reassembled the airplane in a hangar at S75 before the accident flight. The accident flight was the first flight after the airplane had been reassembled. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe main wreckage included the fuselage, engine, empennage, and right wing. The left wing was located about 1,450 ft southeast of the main wreckage, and the left flap was located about 1,150 ft south-southeast of the main wreckage. There was no evidence of a postcrash fire. The wreckage was crushed and deformed consistent with impact. The vertical stabilizer, rudder, horizontal stabilizer, and elevators remained attached to the empennage, and they all displayed extensive impact damage. Rudder control continuity was established from the surface to the rudder pedals.
Control continuity was established from the elevators to the control horn in the empennage, and the elevators moved freely when actuated by hand. The aft elevator control tube was bent in multiple places and fractured at the forward end. The forward elevator control tube was fractured at the aft rod end about 2 ft aft of the control stick. All control tube separations had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation.
The right wing had extensive crushing damage and fragmentation. The right main wing spar was mostly intact but damaged, and it was deformed from wing station (WS) 0 to the right-wing tip. The right aileron control tube was separated in multiple places, and the right aileron remained attached to the wing. The aileron control tube fracture surfaces had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. The right flap remained attached to the wing. Right aileron control continuity was established from the fracture points to the right aileron and the control stick.
The left wing separated from the airplane in the wing root area during the accident sequence. The left aileron remained attached to the wing, and the left flap was separated. The left-wing root rib and the inboard portion of the wing were buckled and deformed upward, consistent with wing separation in an upward direction. The left-wing root rib was 0.020-inch thick, and no stiffeners or additional angles were installed on it. No additional wing ribs were installed in the wing walk area outboard of the root rib. The left aileron control tube was fractured at the wing separation point. The aileron control tube fracture surfaces had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. Left aileron control continuity was established from the fracture point to the left aileron and control stick.
The left main wing spar was fractured in the left-wing root area and damaged adjacent to the fracture point. The outboard portion of the left main wing spar was intact and installed in the left wing. The inboard portion of the left main wing spar remained attached to the right main wing spar at WS 0. All 4 four wing fittings were intact and installed at the center portion of the main spar. The wing bolts were numbered starting at 1 adjacent to WS 0 on both the left and right main wing spars and ending at 15.The right upper spar cap at WS 0, from forward to aft, consisted of a 0.250-inch-thick steel wing fitting, seven 0.125-inch-thick aluminum bars, a 0.040-inch-thick aluminum shim, a 0.125-inch-thick aluminum web, a 0.040-inch-thick aluminum aft fuselage bulkhead, and a 0.250-inch-thick steel wing fitting. The 0.040-inch-thick forward fuselage bulkhead only engaged holes 9 and 10 on the right upper spar cap. Bolts were installed in holes 1 to 10 and 12 to 15 with the heads of the bolts on the forward side of the spar cap. Washers were installed underneath the bolt heads in holes 3, 5 to 10, and 13 to 15. No bolt was installed in hole 11. The head markings on the bolts installed in holes 1 to 4 indicated that they were AN5-X(A) bolts. The aft side of the spar cap was inaccessible, so the grip length, drilling of the shank, and type of nut or washer could not be determined. Hole 5 had an NAS1304-27H bolt installed. The aft side of the spar cap was inaccessible, so the drilling of the shank and the type of nut or washer could not be determined. Holes 6 to 10 and hole 12 had AN3HX bolts installed with L, X, and SC marked on the head. Holes 13 to 15 had AN3-XA bolts installed with C, X, and S marked on the head. Self-locking nuts with no washers were installed on the bolts in holes 6 to 10 and 12 to 15. An L-angle stiffener was installed between the upper and lower spar caps at hole 12. No evidence of adhesive was found between the spar cap layers.
The right lower spar cap at WS 0, from forward to aft, consisted of a 0.250-inch- thick steel wing fitting, a 0.040-inch thick aluminum forward fuselage bulkhead, seven 0.125-inch- thick aluminum bars, a 0.040-inch- thick aluminum shim, a 0.125-inch- thick aluminum web, a 0.040-inch- thick aluminum aft fuselage bulkhead, and a 0.250-inch- thick steel wing fitting. Bolts were installed in holes 1 to 9 and 12 to 15. The heads of the bolts were on the forward side of the spar cap except for hole 4, which had the head on the aft side. Washers were installed underneath the bolt heads in holes 2, 3, 5 to 9, and 13- to 15. No bolts were installed in holes 10 or ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR17FA128