Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
A partial loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information, and the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during an attempted return to the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to return to the airport following a partial loss of engine power.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 19, 2017, at 1130 eastern daylight time, an Aircraft Manufacturing & Design (AMD) CH601XLi special light sport airplane (S-LSA), N601PH, was destroyed when it collided with terrain shortly after takeoff from Bradford County Airport (N27), Towanda, Pennsylvania. The student pilot, who was also the owner of the airplane, was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight, which departed about 1110.
Several witnesses at N27 reported that the pilot departed the traffic pattern for a 20-minute local flight before returning to the airport to perform touch-and-go landings on runway 23. The first touch-and-go appeared normal. During takeoff following the second touch-and-go landing, the engine seemed to be producing partial power during initial climb; one witness reported, "It was clearly behind the power curve." The airplane climbed on runway heading and the airplane "stalled and recovered three times." The airplane made a shallow turn to the right, then, about 1 1/2 miles southwest of the airport, it made a shallow left turn south towards rising terrain. Shortly thereafter, the pilot declared an emergency over the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, stating that he was attempting to return to the airport. The pilot continued the left turn back toward the airport. During the turn, the left wing dropped; the airplane descended at a steep angle and impacted trees and rising terrain. Witnesses observed the airframe ballistic parachute rocket deploy immediately before seeing black smoke from the accident site. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 53, held a student pilot certificate. He did not possess a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate, nor was he required to in order to operate the light sport airplane.
The pilot's logbook was not recovered. According to his flight instructor, the pilot mentioned that he had lost his previous flight records. They started flying together on September 20, 2016; when the pilot accumulated 19 hours of dual instruction, on November 17, 2016, he was given a 90-day solo flight endorsement. On April 10th and 14th, 2017, he received an additional 1.2 and 1.0 hours of instruction, respectively, and a new 90-day solo endorsement, which expired 3 days before the accident. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate for S-LSA on July 18, 2007. According to FAA airworthiness records, the pilot purchased the airplane on January 6, 2014. The airplane was an all-metal, side-by-side, two-seat, fixed landing gear airplane equipped with a Continental O-200, 100-horsepower engine driving a Sensenich two-bladed wooden propeller. According to the airframe maintenance logbook, the most recent condition inspection was performed on September 16, 2016, at 264.7 total airframe hours and no discrepancies were noted. The previous condition inspection was conducted on August 15, 2015, at 258.2 total airframe hours and no discrepancies were noted. On July 5, 2013, an oil analysis was conducted, and the findings indicated wear consistent with normal operation.
The airplane was equipped with a Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc. (BRS) emergency parachute recovery system installed in the rear baggage compartment.
Two days before the accident flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 18.79 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. The airplane held a total of 30 gallons of fuel between two wing tanks, 28 gallons of which were usable. The pilot then conducted a 20-minute local solo flight. The airplane was not flown again until the day of the accident.
The AMD Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane make and model specified the following approach and prelanding procedures:
Auxiliary Fuel Pump…ON
Mixture……………….RICH
Carburetor Heat…….ON
Flaps…………….. … AS Required
Speeds………………. As Required
Harness………………Tight
Lights………………. As Required
The Emergency Procedures section of the POH stated:
Engine roughness is usually due to carburetor icing, which is indicated by a drop in RPM, and may be accompanied by a loss of airspeed or altitude. If too much ice is allowed to accumulate, restoration of full power may not be possible; therefore, prompt action is required.
Pull carburetor heat on. RPM will decrease slightly, and roughness will increase. Wait for a decrease in engine roughness and increase in RPM, indicating ice removal.
Additionally, the POH described expanded procedures in the event of an engine power loss during takeoff:
Any turn will increase the risk of a stall or stall spin, fatal at low altitude. Land as straight ahead as practical and maintain a safe airspeed and make only very shallow turn if necessary, to avoid obstructions… METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1153, the weather conditions reported at Elmira/Corning Regional Airport (ELM), 32 miles northwest of N27, included a clear sky, wind from 230° at 7 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, temperature 28°C, dew point 19°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.07 inches of mercury.
An FAA carburetor icing probability chart indicated that the temperature and dew point conditions were in the area of the chart that was conducive to the formation of serious icing at descent power and light icing at cruise or descent power. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate for S-LSA on July 18, 2007. According to FAA airworthiness records, the pilot purchased the airplane on January 6, 2014. The airplane was an all-metal, side-by-side, two-seat, fixed landing gear airplane equipped with a Continental O-200, 100-horsepower engine driving a Sensenich two-bladed wooden propeller. According to the airframe maintenance logbook, the most recent condition inspection was performed on September 16, 2016, at 264.7 total airframe hours and no discrepancies were noted. The previous condition inspection was conducted on August 15, 2015, at 258.2 total airframe hours and no discrepancies were noted. On July 5, 2013, an oil analysis was conducted, and the findings indicated wear consistent with normal operation.
The airplane was equipped with a Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc. (BRS) emergency parachute recovery system installed in the rear baggage compartment.
Two days before the accident flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 18.79 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. The airplane held a total of 30 gallons of fuel between two wing tanks, 28 gallons of which were usable. The pilot then conducted a 20-minute local solo flight. The airplane was not flown again until the day of the accident.
The AMD Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane make and model specified the following approach and prelanding procedures:
Auxiliary Fuel Pump…ON
Mixture……………….RICH
Carburetor Heat…….ON
Flaps…………….. … AS Required
Speeds………………. As Required
Harness………………Tight
Lights………………. As Required
The Emergency Procedures section of the POH stated:
Engine roughness is usually due to carburetor icing, which is indicated by a drop in RPM, and may be accompanied by a loss of airspeed or altitude. If too much ice is allowed to accumulate, restoration of full power may not be possible; therefore, prompt action is required.
Pull carburetor heat on. RPM will decrease slightly, and roughness will increase. Wait for a decrease in engine roughness and increase in RPM, indicating ice removal.
Additionally, the POH described expanded procedures in the event of an engine power loss during takeoff:
Any turn will increase the risk of a stall or stall spin, fatal at low altitude. Land as straight ahead as practical and maintain a safe airspeed and make only very shallow turn if necessary, to avoid obstructions… WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane impacted steep, wooded terrain in an inverted attitude about 1 1/2 miles from the departure end of runway 23. All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene.
The forward fuselage, cockpit, and instrumentation were consumed by postimpact fire. Both wings were separated from the fuselage but were found in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The empennage impacted a tree. The carburetor heat controls could not be examined due to impact and fire damage.
Control continuity was established from the cockpit to the flight control surfaces through several breaks consistent with overload separation and cuts made by first responders.
Continuity of the fuel system could not be confirmed. Both fuel tanks were breached; the right fuel tank exhibited thermal damage and the left fuel tank was heavily impact damaged. The fuel selector valve and fuel lines were damaged by impact forces and the postimpact fire; the selector position could not be determined.
The engine remained attached to its mounts and was found inverted. It exhibited postimpact fire and impact damage but remained largely intact. All cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. The engine could not be rotated by hand via the propeller hub or through the accessory section. The accessories were removed and the engine crankcase was opened to expose the crankshaft, camshaft, and valvetrain, revealing seized lifters consistent with exposure to high temperatures. There were no pre-impact anomalies noted with the crankshaft. The camshaft remained intact and displayed thermal damage consistent with the post-impact fire. All four pistons and their respective connecting rods showed normal wear and all overhead components (valves, valve springs, and rocker arms) displayed normal operating and lubrication signatures. The Nos. 1 through 4 main bearings showed discoloration consistent with a post-impact fire; no anomalies were noted. Several ounces of oil drained from the engine during the examination and all internal engine components appeared lubricated.
The left and right magnetos remained attached to t...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA17FA248