N1749R

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 27, 2017, about 0923 Alaska daylight time, a wheel-equipped Cessna U206G airplane, N1749R, impacted remote, tree-covered terrain while en route to a remote lodge on the Mulchatna River, about 12 miles northeast of Port Alsworth, Alaska, in the Lake Clark National Park and Preserve. The commercial pilot and sole occupant sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to Laughlin Acquisitions, LLC, Anchorage, Alaska and was being operated by Alaska Skyways, Inc., dba Regal Air, Anchorage, Alaska as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 visual flight rules (VFR) on-demand cargo flight. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were reported in the vicinity of the accident site at the time of the accident, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from the Lake Hood Seaplane Base (LHD), Anchorage, Alaska, about 0800.

The operator reported that the purpose of the flight was to deliver 334 pounds of lumber and insulation to the Kautumn Lodge on the Mulchatna River, about 29 miles northeast of Koliganek, Alaska and would conclude with a return flight to LHD with three passengers onboard. The Kautumn Lodge is about 245 miles southwest of LHD. Upon leaving LHD and departing to the southwest, the route of flight consisted of tree-covered terrain. Continuing past Tyonek, Alaska to the southwest, is the south to north oriented mountainous terrain of the Alaska Range, which also encompasses the Lake Clark National Park and Preserve. Continuing past the Lake Clark National Park and Preserve to the southwest consists mainly of hills before reaching the Mulchatna River.

The airplane was equipped with a Spidertracks Spider 6 system, which provided the operator real-time information such as location, direction, altitude, and airspeed of the airplane at 10-minute intervals. A review of the data showed that, before entering the Alaska Range, the airplane was at an altitude of 7,523 ft above mean sea level (msl) at 124 knots at 0839. The remaining three data points showed the airplane at 7,494 ft msl and 125 knots at 0849, 7,609 ft msl and 127 knots at 0859, and 3,954 ft msl and 135 knots at 0909. Figure 1 shows the various data points captured by the Spidertracks Spider 6 system.

Figure 1 – View of Spidertracks Spider 6 data points (courtesy of the operator).

The airplane was also equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) system. A review of ADS-B data showed the airplane departing LHD, traveling southwest toward the Alaska Range, and entering the airspace over the Lake Clark National Park and Preserve. The ADS-B data terminated about the same location as the second-to-last data point obtained from Spidertracks. Refer to the public docket for the Spidertracks and ADS-B data from the accident flight.

At 0924, the operator received a telephone call from the U.S. Air Force Alaska Rescue Coordination Center at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska indicating a signal was received from the airplane's 406-MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT). An aerial search mission was conducted with an airplane from the operator based at LHD, an airplane from the National Park Service based at Port Alsworth, and with a private helicopter based at Port Alsworth. The burning wreckage was discovered via aerial search in a forested area of the Miller Creek drainage about 1030. The wreckage was located about 85 miles northeast of the Kautumn Lodge. The location of the wreckage is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2 – Aerial view of the wreckage (courtesy of the NTSB).

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot

The operator's pilot training records showed no deficiencies and indicated that the pilot had completed all required training and was current, including a competency check ride on May 22, 2017. This was the pilot's first season working for the operator as a pilot and his first season as a pilot in Alaska. All his experience for the operator were based out of LHD as a dockhand for two summer seasons. The pilot was qualified and current to fly the wheel and float-equipped Cessna 206 and the float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2. The pilot completed all the operator's required initial training in early to mid-May 2017. According to the operator, at the time of the accident the pilot had 20 hours total of actual instrument experience and 84 hours total of simulated instrument experience.

Director of Operations

The director of operations (DO), is listed in the Regal Air General Operations Manual (GOM) as the president and vice-president/secretary of the company. The DO is also the owner of the company. This was the DO's 18th year working for the company and was his 11th year working as a pilot and as the DO for the company. All his experience for the operator was based out of LHD. The DO was qualified and current to fly the wheel/ski/float-equipped Cessna 206, the wheel/ski/float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2, and the Piper PA-31-350. Prior to and at the time of the accident, the DO was out of the country on personal leave.

Office Manager

The office manager had been employed for the operator for 8 years and first worked as a dockhand before becoming the office manager. While the office manager held a private pilot certificate (airplane single engine land), he had never flown for the operator nor for any other commercial operators in Alaska. He did not hold an aircraft dispatcher license, nor was he required to. All his experience for the operator was based out of LHD. The DO reported that the office manager, acting as the duty officer based out of the operator's headquarters at LHD, was the individual exercising operational control (first-tier with the two-tiered operational control concept) over the accident flight since he was out of the country on personal leave. The DO further reported that either himself or the office manager are the ones that exercise operational control over the company's flights.

Principal Operations Inspector

The principal operations inspector (POI), from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Anchorage Flight Standards District Office, Anchorage, Alaska had been assigned to the operator's certificate since June 2016. The POI was an experienced air transport pilot and certificated flight instructor, with flight experience in Alaska, along with holding positions as a chief flight instructor (14 CFR Part 141 pilot school operations) and as a chief pilot (14 CFR Part 135 commuter and on-demand operations) prior to working for the FAA.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Figure 3 – Exemplar photograph of N1749R (courtesy of the operator).

The airplane was configured for cargo operations at the time of the accident. A belly cargo pod was installed underneath the fuselage as shown in figure 3. The airplane was not equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system or onboard weather system, nor was it required to be. The airplane was not instrument flight rules equipped or certified, nor was it required to be.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONWeather Sources

The closest official weather observation station was located at Port Alsworth Airport (TPO), Port Alsworth, Alaska about 12 miles southwest of the accident site. The Aviation Routine Weather Report (commonly referred to as a "METAR") observation at 0650 (about 2.5 hours before the accident) included calm wind, 10 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 300 ft above ground level (agl), a broken ceiling at 1,500 ft agl, temperature 55°F, dew point 54°F, and an altimeter setting of 29.94 inches of mercury with remarks, "estimate pass closed" (the remark refers to the Lake Clark Pass). Figure 4 shows a National Weather Service (NWS) flying weather graphic issued at 0400 and was valid until 1000, showing the area encompassing the route of flight and the accident site as having forecast marginal VFR conditions.

Figure 4 – View of National Weather Service flying weather graphic, issued at 0400 and valid until 1000 (courtesy of the National Weather Service).

The following are images captured from a FAA weather camera station located at Lake Clark Pass West about 30 minutes before the pilot departed from LHD. These weather cameras are located about 10 miles east of the accident site and an elevation of 261 ft as shown in figure 5. Figure 6, figure 7, and figure 8 were taken prior to the pilot's departure from LHD and indicated complete mountain obscuration conditions with low visibility underneath the overcast cloud layer with all the higher terrain references obscured by clouds.

Figure 5 – Map of the closest FAA weather camera stations and the accident site (courtesy of the NTSB).

Figure 6 – FAA weather camera image, Lake Clark Pass West – NorthEast, 0731 (courtesy of the FAA).

Figure 7 – FAA weather camera image, Lake Clark Pass West – East, 0734 (courtesy of the FAA).

Figure 8 – FAA weather camera image, Lake Clark Pass West – South, 0738 (courtesy of the FAA).

The TPO METAR observation at 0958 (about 35 minutes after the accident) included calm wind, 15 statute miles visibility, a broken ceiling at 500 ft agl, overcast at 2,000 ft agl, temperature 57°F, dew point 55°F, altimeter 29.96 inches of mercury with remarks, "estimate pass closed" (the remark refers to the Lake Clark Pass).

Figure 9, figure 10, and figure 11 were captured from the FAA weather camera station located at Lake Clark Pass West, about the time of the accident. These three figures, similar to the images captured prior to the flight's departure, indicated complete mountain obscuration conditions with low visibility underneath the overcast cloud layer with all the higher terrain refences obscured by clouds.

Figure 9 – FAA weather camera image, Lake Clark Pass West – NorthEast, 0921 (courtesy of the FAA).

Figure 10 – FAA weather camera image, Lake Clark Pass West – East, 0926 (courtesy of the FAA).

Figure 11 – FAA weather...