N6216L

Substantial
Serious

GRUMMAN AA1S/N: AA1B-0016

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, August 1, 2017
NTSB Number
WPR17LA175
Location
Phoenix, AZ
Event ID
20170801X65228
Coordinates
33.686668, -112.099723
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
2
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The partial loss of engine power during initial climb due to the No. 3 cylinder exhaust valve becoming stuck open due to deposit buildup in the exhaust valve stem and guide and the pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack while attempting to turn back to the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. 

Aircraft Information

Registration
N6216L
Make
GRUMMAN
Serial Number
AA1B-0016
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1972
Model / ICAO
AA1AA1
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
SWORTZEL ROBERT L
Address
24033 N 80TH AVE
Status
Deregistered
City
PEORIA
State / Zip Code
AZ 85383-1630
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 1, 2017, about 1300 mountain standard time, an American AA-1B airplane, N6216L, was substantially damaged following a partial loss of engine power and subsequent loss of control during takeoff initial climb at the Deer Valley Airport (DVT), Phoenix, Arizona. The private pilot and pilot rated passenger were seriously injured. The airplane was registered to a private individual and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed. The planned local flight was originating at the time of the accident.

The pilot was not able to recall the events leading up to the accident due to his injuries.

The passenger reported that shortly after takeoff, and while turning crosswind to the north, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The passenger stated that at this time the pilot attempted to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. He then attempted to make a left 180° turn back to the airport, however, was unsuccessful as the airplane stalled and crashed into a fence and a tree. The passenger mentioned that at the time of the accident, the engine was completely off; "there was no power at all to the engine."

A witness to the accident, who was a student pilot at the time, reported that he was observing a small Grumman [airplane] take off from runway 25L at DVT. The witness stated that the airplane climbed to an altitude of about 200 to 300 ft above ground level, when he heard the engine slow to what sounded like half power. He further stated that a few seconds later the airplane leveled off and it veered about 30° to the right, and then began a steep 45° or more bank to the left. The witness opined that it appeared that the pilot was going to try to make it back to runway 7R, or at least land in the field near the end of the runway. However, during the left turn on an approximately southwest heading, the witness stated that the airplane stalled and banked sharply "…like a snap roll to the right and pitched nose down"; he did not witness the last few feet prior to impact.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector who responded to the accident site, several witnesses reported that after the airplane had taken off and was in its initial climb to the west, the wings started to rock back and forth. The airplane subsequently began to descend, struck the airport's western perimeter fence, and collided with a tree where it came to rest. Both wings and the engine had separated from the airplane due to impact forces.

An acquaintance of the pilot, a certificated flight instructor (CFI), reported that a few days prior to the accident the pilot contacted him and reported that on a recent flight the airplane's engine had run a bit rough for about 3 to 5 seconds. He asked the pilot what actions he took, and the pilot stated that he switched the electric boost pump on and switched fuel tanks, which resulted in the engine running smoothly. The CFI stated that he thought the pilot mentioned that he then switched the fuel selector back to the rough running side and it again ran smoothly but was not sure. The pilot did not indicate which side or tank had the issue. The CFI did not know if the pilot had a mechanic examine the engine prior to the accident flight, which occurred about 4 to 6 days after the rough running engine was reported to him. The CFI informed the airplane's owner of his conversation with the pilot relative to the engine issue when he met him at the hospital on the day of the accident. The CFI opined that the owner had no knowledge of the rough running engine issue, that he had taken all precautions to ensure that the airplane was safe, and that he had just spent $5,000 on an annual inspection.

During the investigation the passenger reported to the NTSB IIC that a few days prior to the accident the pilot was telling people and the CFI that he was having trouble with the fuel selector. When the IIC queried the CFI about the passenger's statement, the CFI stated that the pilot never mentioned anything about the fuel selector being an issue during any of their conversations. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe 18-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. A friend of the pilot reported that the pilot had accumulated about 270 total flight hours, 207 hours as pilot-in-command, and 226 hours which were in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The pilot held an FAA first-class airman medical certificate, which was issued on April 23, 2015, with no limitations reported. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe two-seat, low-wing airplane, serial number AA1B-0016, was manufactured in 1972. It was powered by a Lycoming model O-320-A3A, 150-horsepower engine, and equipped with a Sensinich two-blade propeller, model M74DM-0-58. A review of the maintenance logbook records revealed that during the 100-hour inspection that was performed on February 9, 2017, the number 3-cylinder was replaced with a new Millennium cylinder, part number SA 32006N-A21P, at a tach time of 432.4 hours. At the time of the inspection when the number 3-cylinder was checked for compression, it registered 36/80, which prompted the cylinder change. The most recent 100-hour inspection was performed on May 11, 2017, about 125 hours prior to the accident. At this time the number 3-cylinder exhaust gasket was replaced. In conjunction with the inspection, a subsequent ground run revealed no anomalies with the engine. A maintenance logbook entry revealed that all cylinders were inspected with a borescope. At the time of the accident the cylinder had accumulated 324.1 hours of operation since installation. (Refer to excerpts of maintenance records, which are appended to the docket for this accident.)

The airframe and powerplant mechanic who performed the installation of the number 3-cylinder during a 100-hour inspection, stated that on July 29, 2017, three days prior to the accident, he and the accident pilot exchanged a series of text messages, in which the pilot stated that on a go-around/missed approach, the engine started shaking and shuttered for about 10 seconds, and then it was fine. When the mechanic replied that he wondered if it could have been carburetor ice, the pilot said he didn't think so. The mechanic also mentioned that he did not perform any work on the airplane after the initial report of the engine running rough. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1253, the DVT weather reporting facility indicated wind from 180° at 4 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 34° Celsius (C), dew point 16° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe two-seat, low-wing airplane, serial number AA1B-0016, was manufactured in 1972. It was powered by a Lycoming model O-320-A3A, 150-horsepower engine, and equipped with a Sensinich two-blade propeller, model M74DM-0-58. A review of the maintenance logbook records revealed that during the 100-hour inspection that was performed on February 9, 2017, the number 3-cylinder was replaced with a new Millennium cylinder, part number SA 32006N-A21P, at a tach time of 432.4 hours. At the time of the inspection when the number 3-cylinder was checked for compression, it registered 36/80, which prompted the cylinder change. The most recent 100-hour inspection was performed on May 11, 2017, about 125 hours prior to the accident. At this time the number 3-cylinder exhaust gasket was replaced. In conjunction with the inspection, a subsequent ground run revealed no anomalies with the engine. A maintenance logbook entry revealed that all cylinders were inspected with a borescope. At the time of the accident the cylinder had accumulated 324.1 hours of operation since installation. (Refer to excerpts of maintenance records, which are appended to the docket for this accident.)

The airframe and powerplant mechanic who performed the installation of the number 3-cylinder during a 100-hour inspection, stated that on July 29, 2017, three days prior to the accident, he and the accident pilot exchanged a series of text messages, in which the pilot stated that on a go-around/missed approach, the engine started shaking and shuttered for about 10 seconds, and then it was fine. When the mechanic replied that he wondered if it could have been carburetor ice, the pilot said he didn't think so. The mechanic also mentioned that he did not perform any work on the airplane after the initial report of the engine running rough. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONA FAA aviation safety inspector, who responded to the accident site shortly after the accident, reported that after impacting the ground the airplane skidded into a tree, then broke at mid-fuselage splitting the airplane body into two pieces, with the cockpit and the fuselage on each side of the tree. The inspector stated that the engine appeared to be producing power, based on observable propeller blade signatures. The blades exhibited chordwise striations across the cambered surface, torsional twisting and trailing edge "S" bending. Additionally, the engine had separated from the airplane and came to rest on the road that borders the airport to the west, about 90 ft south of the main wreckage site. Both the left and right wings had also separated from the fuselage, with the left wing having come to rest about 30 ft northwest of the main wreckage, and the right wing about 180 ft south of the main wreckage site.

During a postaccident examination of the fuel selector by the NTSB IIC and a Federal Aviation Administration inspector, the component functioned as designed through all positions. It was observed that a stop pin was sheared off inside of the selector that would have prevented the selector from traveling too far to the left. Photo documentation at the accident site showed that the fuel selector was selected to the left tank posi...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR17LA175