N1905A

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 23, 2017, about 2245 Alaska daylight time (AKDT), a wheel-equipped Piper PA-18AS-125 airplane, N1905A, impacted remote, tree-covered terrain about 31 miles northwest of Tyonek, Alaska. The private pilot sustained fatal injuries and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 visual flight rules (VFR) personal flight. Night instrument meteorological conditions were present along the airplane's route of flight at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated from a remote airstrip near Telaquana Lake, located in the Lake Clark National Park and Preserve, about 2130, and was destined for Merrill Field (MRI), Anchorage, Alaska.

The pilot's wife reported that the pilot was returning from a solo Dall sheep hunting trip in the Alaska Range. The pilot departed from MRI on August 19 about 1630 and arrived at the remote airstrip about 1930. She reported that the length of the hunting trip was open-ended with no set return date.

The pilot placed three separate phone calls via satellite phone to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Kenai Flight Service Station (FSS), Kenai, Alaska, on the night of the accident requesting weather information for his route of flight. The Kenai FSS is located at the Kenai Municipal Airport (PAEN), Kenai. Each call was dropped due to interruptions of satellite coverage. The same flight service specialist (FS-S) spoke with the pilot on all three occasions. The public docket contains the transcripts for each phone call.

The first phone call was at 1950 and lasted about 1 minute. The pilot reported that he was south of Merrill Pass and requested an outlook briefing for flight via Merrill Pass to Anchorage for the night of the accident and for the following day. He asked, "whether or not it's going to remain VFR from Merrill Pass back into Anchorage tonight and into tomorrow." The FS-S provided the terminal forecast for Anchorage before the call was dropped.

The second phone call, at 1956, lasted about 3 minutes. The pilot reported that he was near Merrill Pass on the west side and requested a "quick weather brief" asking if VFR flight from Merrill Pass or Telaquana Pass to Anchorage would be recommended for that night. The FS-S provided the Merrill Pass forecast, which called for marginal VFR (MVFR) conditions, the area forecast (FA), and the Anchorage terminal forecast before the call was dropped.

About 2100, the pilot contacted his wife via a satellite phone and asked her to retrieve weather information for a flight to MRI. She instructed the pilot to call her back in about 5 minutes; however, the pilot never called back.

The third and final phone call to the FSS was at 2108 and lasted about 10 minutes. The pilot asked if VFR flight across the Alaska Range or in the Merrill Pass area was recommended that night. The FS-S responded by saying, "…I don't have anything that's giving me a good report…" and provided the pilot with information from the current FA, which included the current airman's meteorological information (AIRMET) and regional ceiling, visibility, precipitation information, and information from a pilot report (PIREP) advising that VFR was not recommended on the east side of Lake Clark Pass (about 34 miles southwest of the accident site).

The pilot again asked about conditions at Merrill Pass, to which the FS-S responded with a comprehensive description of what she was seeing from the FAA Merrill Pass "low" weather camera. The FS-S indicated the FAA Merrill Pass "high" weather camera was out of service. Following a request from the pilot, she also provided a comprehensive description of what she was seeing on the FAA Beluga weather camera. Despite being asked several times about Merrill Pass, the FS-S did not provide the pilot with the forecast for instrument flight rules (IFR) ceilings, rain, and mist that was indicated for the pass in the current FA.

Despite being asked directly for turbulence information for the Cook Inlet and Matanuska-Susitna Valley area, the FS-S did not provide the pilot with the forecast for isolated moderate turbulence below 6,000 ft above mean sea level (msl) for the region found in the current FA. Additionally, the FS-S did not provide the pilot with the current Kenai weather radar information.

The pilot indicated that he was not in a hurry to get home, and then asked about conditions the next day. The FS-S provided a synoptic summary of frontal systems and expected precipitation and wind and indicated that she was, "…not seeing anything too much for the passes." The pilot requested forecast information valid for 24-48 hours from that time. The FS-S stated "…that occluded front basically right now still over Kodiak Island there pushing into uh Cook Inlet/Susitna Valley definitely got your rain looking at that low coming right over by four o'clock in the afternoon tomorrow right over us. I'm showing IFR conditions right in your area where you're coming from so that's around four o'clock in the afternoon now tomorrow okay that occluded front is going to be right over the top of us into Prince William Sound there's going to be isolated areas where it's going to be in the clear but they're talking about the drying of those winds the Turnagain Arm winds there drying out that moisture at the same time you got those winds cause you got turbulence going to be in the forecast there…"

The pilot asked, "So it's going to get worse is what you're saying?" to which the FS-S responded, "yeah basically…" The FS-S then stated, "…I didn't know how else to relay that to you I just cannot tell you yeah go ahead and try to come home through Merrill Pass it's not looking too good especially what they said about the Alaskan range through the Aleutian areas there so I would not chance that." The pilot then indicated his intent to, "probably go tonight" and started to file a VFR flight plan, but the call was lost before the flight plan was completed.

About 2220, the pilot's wife received a text message from the pilot stating that he was flying over Kenibuna Lake and that he should be home around 2300. She did not receive any further communications from the pilot. She reported that he was not rushed to return home nor was there any sort of emergency that required him to depart when he did.

Upon departing from the airstrip and heading to the northeast, the route of flight was over mountainous terrain. Continuing east, the route was overwater as the airplane crossed Kenibuna Lake and Chakachamna Lake. Once past the mountainous terrain and continuing to the east, the area consisted mainly of hills before reaching the Cook Inlet and the Matanuska-Susitna Valley. An overview of the route of flight, along with the remote airstrip the pilot departed from, the accident site, and the destination airport is shown in figure 1. Figure 2 shows the last portion of the flight.

Figure 1 – Map of the route of flight, obtained from the onboard GPS unit (courtesy of the NTSB).

Figure 2 – Map of the last portion of the route of flight, obtained from the onboard GPS unit (courtesy of the NTSB).

Merrill Pass, which is depicted on a VFR sectional map, is shown in figure 3.

Figure 3 – Map showing the location of Merrill Pass (courtesy of vfrmap.com).

About 2245, the U.S. Air Force Alaska Rescue Coordination Center at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, received a 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal from the airplane. The wreckage was located the next morning in remote, tree-covered terrain about 1/4 mile south of the Chakachatna River as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4 – Aerial view of the wreckage (courtesy of the NTSB).

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot's wife reported that he was a conservative and safe pilot who was cognizant of the dangers of flying in Alaska, particularly with bad weather in the mountains. She stated that he always carried a satellite phone when he flew and would always call for a weather briefing.

In addition, she stated that the pilot had no issues with alcohol, drugs, fatigue, or stress. She further reported that the pilot was a fit, healthy person and lived an active lifestyle.

The pilot did not hold an instrument rating. A review of the pilot's logbook, as of the last entry on July 20, 2017, showed no actual instrument flight experience, 23 hours of simulated instrument experience, and 66.1 hours of night experience.

FS-S

The FS-S was based at the Kenai FSS in Kenai. Her air traffic control experience began in the U.S. Navy where she served as an air traffic controller (ATC) from 1990 to 1994. Between 1998 and 1999, she was training as a control tower operator with the FAA. From 2000 to 2005, she worked as a FS-S with the FAA. From 2005 until 2006, she worked as a certified professional controller at an FAA approach control center. She worked outside of aviation from 2007 until August 2016 when she was rehired by the FAA as a FS-S and began working in Kenai.

The FS-S had completed all required training for her duties. She possessed a second-class FAA medical certificate and her last ATC physical examination was conducted in October 2016.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was not equipped for instrument flight and did not have an onboard weather system. An examination of the airplane's maintenance records revealed no evidence of uncorrected mechanical discrepancies with the airframe and engine.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

An Automated Weather Observing System was located at PAEN and was located about 44 miles southeast of the accident location at an elevation of about 100 ft msl. Automated reports from PAEN during the times surrounding the accident time are as follows:

[2053 AKDT] METAR PAEN 240453Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM OVC060 12/12 A2958 RMK AO2 RAE34 SLP017 P0001 T01220122 TSNO=

[2153 AKDT] METAR PAEN 240553Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM -RA FEW050 OVC060 12/12 A2958...