N152AH

Destroyed
Fatal

HICKOX ANDY ANDYS GYROPLANES/N: H2-97-8-279

Accident Details

Date
Thursday, September 28, 2017
NTSB Number
ERA17FA339
Location
Umatilla, FL
Event ID
20170928X24350
Coordinates
28.907777, -81.636390
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's improper response to a total loss of engine power, which resulted in main rotor blade contact with the rudder and vertical stabilizer, and a subsequent uncontrolled descent. The loss of engine power was due to the separation of the electrical connector to the coil of the crank triggered ignition system.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N152AH
Make
HICKOX ANDY
Serial Number
H2-97-8-279
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
2008
Model / ICAO
ANDYS GYROPLANESA02
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
PENSINGER JAMES M
Address
5306 MARTINGALE LN
Status
Deregistered
City
APOPKA
State / Zip Code
FL 32712-5147
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 28, 2017, about 1122 eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built gyroplane, N152AH, impacted terrain near Umatilla, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured and the gyroplane was destroyed. The gyroplane was privately owned and operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated about 1 hour 22 minutes earlier from Bob White Field Airport (X61), Zellwood, Florida.

A witness reported to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that he saw the gyroplane flying in a north-northwesterly direction about 50 to 60 ft above ground level. He heard the engine running, followed by the sounds of two "bangs" or "pops." The witness reported seeing a large main rotor blade separate, which occurred "as soon as the engine stopped working." The gyroplane began descending and he lost sight of it, but then heard the impact. He drove to the accident site and informed the property owner of the accident.

The pilot's route of flight between the departure airport and the witness sighting immediately before the accident could not be determined. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. He received an endorsement from a flight instructor for solo flight training in the accident gyroplane on August 30, 2017, in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.87(c). The pilot's was operating under the provisions of Basic Med and his most recent physical examination was completed on July 10, 2017.

A review of his 4th pilot logbook, which contained entries from January 10, 2010, to September 24, 2017, revealed that the pilot logged about 3,140 hours of flight experience. There were no logged flights between May 29, 2013, and July 8, 2017; between July 8, 2017, and August 31, 2017, he logged 11 dual flights with an instructor in the accident gyroplane, totaling about 20 hours. Between August 31, 2017, and September 24, 2017, he logged six solo flights totaling about 3 hours; one of the flights did not have the flight duration listed.

According to the flight instructor who flew with the pilot during the 11 instructional flights, at that time, the gyroplane was not equipped with a horizontal stabilizer on the mast or on the tail, but it was equipped with a standard pitch trim configuration, which preloaded the main rotor blades with springs. Training provided to the accident pilot included loss of engine power ("engine-out") maneuvers that were performed on final approach and on the downwind and base legs of the airport traffic pattern. At no time was the engine secured as part of the training; the engine-out was simulated by operating the engine between 2,800 and 3,000 rpm, which produced the same aerodynamic drag as an engine at idle. That power setting resulted in greater drag than if the propeller was stopped, which would result in an increased rate of descent. At the completion of the training, he endorsed the pilot's logbook for solo flight, and also logged ground training that he provided the pilot. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe two-place gyroplane, kit serial number H2-97-8-279, was manufactured in 2008 as an RAF 2000 model, and was equipped with a Subaru 4-cylinder 2.2 engine, which drove a composite three-bladed propeller. A digital engine tachometer and separate digital main rotor tachometer were located in the wreckage, but neither tachometer contained non-volatile memory. The builder/previous owner reported the gyroplane was considered to have a high thrust line (the propeller thrust line was above the center of gravity).

Review of the gyroplane's maintenance records revealed that its most recent condition inspection was completed on June 20, 2017. The total time at the time of the last inspection was not recorded. The previous owner reported that the gyroplane had about 218 hours total time when it was sold to the accident pilot on July 5, 2017.

The flight instructor who gave the dual instruction reported that the gyroplane flew well and that the rotor was smooth.

An entry in the engine logbook, dated August 26, 2017, indicated that the accident pilot secured the wires from the "coil" of the crank triggered ignition to an adjacent tube with silicone, and changed the spark plugs. It could not be determined if the coil wire was disconnected and reconnected at that time or any other time during the gyrocopter's operational history.

The preflight checklist specified to make sure all electrical wires in the engine compartment were secure, and included, "Special note should be made of the coil wire." METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1053, a surface weather observation taken at Leesburg International Airport (LEE), Leesburg, Florida, located about 10 nm west-southwest of the accident site, reported variable wind at 3 knots, 8 miles visibility with clear skies, temperature 32°C, dew point 22°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.95 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe two-place gyroplane, kit serial number H2-97-8-279, was manufactured in 2008 as an RAF 2000 model, and was equipped with a Subaru 4-cylinder 2.2 engine, which drove a composite three-bladed propeller. A digital engine tachometer and separate digital main rotor tachometer were located in the wreckage, but neither tachometer contained non-volatile memory. The builder/previous owner reported the gyroplane was considered to have a high thrust line (the propeller thrust line was above the center of gravity).

Review of the gyroplane's maintenance records revealed that its most recent condition inspection was completed on June 20, 2017. The total time at the time of the last inspection was not recorded. The previous owner reported that the gyroplane had about 218 hours total time when it was sold to the accident pilot on July 5, 2017.

The flight instructor who gave the dual instruction reported that the gyroplane flew well and that the rotor was smooth.

An entry in the engine logbook, dated August 26, 2017, indicated that the accident pilot secured the wires from the "coil" of the crank triggered ignition to an adjacent tube with silicone, and changed the spark plugs. It could not be determined if the coil wire was disconnected and reconnected at that time or any other time during the gyrocopter's operational history.

The preflight checklist specified to make sure all electrical wires in the engine compartment were secure, and included, "Special note should be made of the coil wire." WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe gyroplane crashed into a wooded area on private property. Components of the gyroplane consisting of pieces of the propeller blades, foam, fiberglass, and components of the vertical stabilizer and rudder were located on the ground along the direction of flight, south of the resting position of the main wreckage. A section of main rotor blade measuring about 12 ft long was located along the direction of flight south of the main wreckage (see Figure of Google Earth plot depicting key position of components).

Figure: Google Earth Plot Depicting Key Position of Components.

The wreckage was upright and resting on its right side at the base of a pine tree, and was oriented on a magnetic heading of 080°. The horizontal stabilizer and tailwheel were not located, and the longitudinally oriented structural member in the area of the electric fuel pumps was fractured consistent with overload. The rudder flight controls exited the tailboom but were fractured consistent with overload. Examination of the separated section of main rotor blade revealed black, chordwise-oriented marks on the bottom of the blade about 16 inches outboard from the fracture surface. The spar at the blade root was fractured and displaced upward. The fracture surfaces of the main rotor blade were removed and submitted to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, which revealed a highly textured, matte gray fracture surface consistent with an overstress separation. No indications of pre-existing cracking such as fatigue or corrosion were noted at the fracture. The adjacent portions of the spar and skin were deformed and cracked, consistent with nearly 90° of upward blade bending when the spar separation occurred. Examination of the other main rotor blade revealed that it was deformed upward about 90°; chordwise-oriented black marks were noted on the bottom surface of the blade near the blade retention straps.

The upper left side of the rudder exhibited a smooth cut oriented on an angle about 20° down from the forward edge, while the upper portion of the vertical stabilizer exhibited a smooth cut surface about a 50° downward angle from the manufactured upper edge. Both cuts were consistent with being made by the main rotor blade(s).

Flight control continuity was confirmed from the pilot's control to the upper swashplate.

The engine remained attached to the airframe and the propeller remained attached to the engine, but all propeller blades were shattered at varying lengths. Rotation of the propeller by hand revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity to all cylinders. Roughness was noted during rotation of the engine, which was not attributed to be from the propeller gearbox. Disassembly of the engine was not performed. Examination of the spark plugs revealed that all gaps measured within specification and all were light gray in color with no defects noted. The ignition timing was not determined. Examination of the air induction, exhaust, fuel metering, and cooling systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

Examination of the coil of the crank triggered ignition system, which was mounted on the top aft portion of the engine at its centerline and adjacent to the propeller gearbox, revealed that the Nos. 2 and 4 spark plug wires remained connected; however, the Nos. 1 and...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA17FA339