Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate distance from helicopters during the approach for landing, resulting in an encounter with wake turbulence and subsequent loss of control.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On October 2, 2017, about 1048 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 182D, N9021X, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain during landing at Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci Airport (SIG), San Juan, Puerto Rico. The private pilot was fatally injured and a pilot-rated passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was privately owned and operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated at Cyril E. King Airport (STT), Charlotte Amalie, United States Virgin Islands, about 1015.
According to the air traffic controller, the pilot was cleared to land on runway 9 behind a flight of two Blackhawk helicopters. The pilot reported that he had the helicopters in sight. While on short final for landing, the pilot was given clearance to land after the helicopters had cleared the runway at the Bravo 4 intersection. The controller reported that the airplane was still airborne passing the Bravo 2 intersection and touched down about 500 ft before the Bravo 3 intersection. The airplane then bounced and came to rest in inverted in the grass between the runway and taxiway. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), air traffic voice communications were not recorded due to hurricane damage to equipment.
The pilot-rated passenger, who was in the right seat, reported that, approaching SIG for landing, he heard the tower controller tell a Cessna 172 to go around, clear a Cessna Citation to land, and clear a pair of Blackhawk helicopter to land behind the Citation. The accident pilot turned onto the base leg of the traffic pattern and was subsequently cleared to land behind the helicopters. After turning final, he and the pilot noted some turbulence that they assumed was from the helicopters. The tower controller then instructed the pilot to complete s-turns. The passenger estimated that the helicopters would still be in a hover taxi over the runway when they arrived over the threshold, so the pilot asked the controller to confirm that they were still cleared to land; the controller responded that the airplane was cleared to land. As the airplane crossed the runway threshold, the Blackhawks were turning off of the runway. The pilot and passenger immediately felt a "heavy downdraft" and thought that the airplane would hit the runway hard. As the airplane was about to touch down, it encountered another "burst," which pitched the airplane hard to the left. They announced that they were going around, and the pilot turned the airplane to the right. As the pilot added power, the airplane encountered another burst and pitched "straight up." About 50-100 ft above the ground, the airplane rolled inverted and impacted the grass between the taxiway and runway with "full power." The passenger stated that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane and that the engine performed normally during the accident sequence.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land. According to the FAA, the pilot held a second-class medical certificate with no limitations, issued on May 9, 2017. On the application for that medical certificate, he reported 1,057 total hours of flight experience, including 58 hours during the previous 6 months. The pilot's personal logbook(s) were not located.
The pilot-rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. According to the FAA, he held a second-class medical certificate with no limitations, issued on July 14, 2016. On the medical certificate application, he reported 165 total hours of flight experience, including 52 hours during the previous 6 months.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The high-wing, single-engine, four-seat airplane was equipped with fixed, tricycle landing gear and a Continental 230-horsepower reciprocating engine fitted with a McCauley two-bladed, constant-speed propeller.
The airplane's maintenance records were not located after the accident.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1835, the SIG recorded weather included wind from 120° at 10 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, scattered clouds at 3,000 ft, broken clouds at 8,000 ft, temperature 29°C, dew point 25°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Due to the aftermath of Hurricane Maria and the closure of the San Juan FAA Flight Standards District Office during the weeks following the hurricane, no detailed examination of the wreckage was performed. Review of photographs provided by the airport manager indicated that the airplane came to rest inverted in the grass area between the runway and taxiway. Structural damage was observed on the fuselage, empennage, and both wings. There was no fire.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The pilot died in the hospital the day after the accident. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences, San Juan, Puerto Rico, performed the autopsy. The cause of death was attributed to severe bodily trauma.
The FAA's Bioaeronautical Research Sciences Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology testing on specimens from the pilot. Testing was negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Testing was positive for the following emergency treatment medications, all found in the aortic blood: atropine; midazolam and its metabolite, hydroxymidazola; and lidocaine. Sildenafil was also found in the aortic blood.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-23G, Aircraft Wake Turbulence, explains air traffic controller and pilot procedures regarding wake turbulence avoidance:
8. VORTEX AVOIDANCE PROCEDURES.
a. Air Traffic Control (ATC) Responsibilities. Air traffic controllers apply procedures for separating instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft that include required wake turbulence separations. However, if a pilot accepts a clearance to visually follow a preceding aircraft, the pilot accepts responsibility for both separation and wake turbulence avoidance.
11. PILOT RESPONSIBILITY.
e. Techniques for Lighter Aircraft. Pilots operating lighter aircraft behind aircraft producing strong wake vortices should consider the following techniques to assist in avoiding wake turbulence and should be aware of the wind direction and speed along the final approach path:
1) If the pilot of the smaller following aircraft has visual contact with the preceding, larger aircraft and also with the runway, the pilot may further adjust the flightpath to avoid possible wake vortex turbulence by:
(a) Flying slightly above the glidepath and maintain that glidepath to a touchdown point beyond the touchdown point of the larger preceding aircraft.
(b) Establishing a line of sight to a touchdown point that is above and beyond the larger preceding aircraft.
(c) When possible, noting the touchdown point of the larger preceding aircraft and adjusting your touchdown point as necessary.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA18LA002