Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
the flight crew's misidentification of the taxiway as the landing runway due to the failure of the runway lighting that caused only the taxiway lights to be illuminated.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 29, 2017, about 1840 pacific standard time, Horizon Air flight 2184, a Bombardier DHC-8-402, N412QX, landed on a taxiway parallel to runway 6 at Pullman/Moscow Regional Airport (KPUW), Pullman, Washington. Weather at the time of landing was reported as wind from the southeast, light rain, overcast ceiling with 5 miles visibility. There were no injuries to the 42 passengers and crew onboard and the airplane was not damaged. After the airplane landed, the flight crew observed that the runway lights were inoperative. The passenger flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan from Seattle/Tacoma International Airport (KSEA), Seattle, Washington, to KPUW. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the incident.
The incident flight occurred on the second flight of the day for the flight crew. Both pilots began their duty day at 1513 local time on December 29, 2017, in Missoula International Airport (KMSO), Missoula, Montana. The captain and first officer flew a 2 hour and 10-minute flight from KMSO to KSEA, arriving in SEA at 1630.
According to the flight release for Horizon Air flight 2184, there were no Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for the runway lights being out of service at KPUW. Horizon Air flight 2184 departed KSEA at 1748 with 2 flight crewmembers, 2 flight attendants and 38 passengers for a planned 1 hour flight to Moscow Pullman Airport.
According to the flight crew, the takeoff, climb, cruise and descent were uneventful. Flight 2184 was then cleared by air traffic control (ATC) for the RNAV (RNP) M instrument approach to runway 06 at PUW. The captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring for the incident flight.
Conditions at the KPUW airport were wind from the southeast, light rain, overcast ceiling with 5 miles visibility, and the captain used the Head-up Guidance System (HGS) installed on the captain's side of the cockpit during the approach. During post accident interviews, the captain stated he attempted to illuminate the KPUW airport lighting via the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) prior to the initial approach fix and prior to exiting the clouds.
The captain stated that shortly after crossing the initial approach fix, the airplane exited the clouds and that he observed what he believed was runway 06 and runway lights, though according to his interview he questioned whether the runway lights were on bright or dim. The captain stated he attempted to turn the lights up brighter via the CTAF several times, and it was unclear if they had changed. The captain stated he clearly felt he had the runway in sight and the runway lights were on, and it was just a question of the lights not going up to bright, not to an "on" setting.
The captain stated he checked that the gear was down, and as he looked back out to see the runway and saw nothing but black out in front of the airplane, and he saw identifiable pavement that was lit up. He stated he slid the airplane over a little to line up with the illuminated pavement, but there was no abrupt maneuver. The captain stated he lined up with the pavement and did not notice the taxiway lights and stated that what he saw and aligned with looked like runway pavement.
As the airplane was approaching the ground and while in the flare, the FO stated that he was looking for visual cues and noticed the blue taxi lights. Right before touchdown the FO stated he saw that they were on the taxiway. The airplane subsequently landed uneventfully to the left of runway 06 and on the parallel taxiway at PUW at 1840.
The captain stated that there was nothing in front of the airplane on the taxiway that was of any danger and that he did not see taxiway lights, but saw the pavement and concentrated on stopping the airplane As they slowed down, they taxied on the full length of the taxiway, back-taxied on the runway, then continued to the gate. According to both pilots, they attempted to change the illumination of the taxiway and runway lights via the CTAF during their 6-minute taxi to parking and observed the blue taxiway lights change illumination, but the runway lights did not illuminate.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The captain was 49 years old and was based in Medford, Oregon as A Q-400 captain. According to company records and information provided by the captain, he had accumulated 13,528 hours total flight experience, including about 5,997 hours in the Q-400. A review of the FAA Accident/Incident Data System, Enforcement Information System and Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) database showed no records or reports of any previous aviation incidents or accidents involving the captain.
The captain began flying a 3-day trip on December 25, 2017. The captain flew from Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport (MFR) to Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO) with a stop in SEA. His duty day began at 0445 and ended at 1200. On December 26, 2017, he had a 0515 show at RNO and flew 5 legs followed by a deadhead to Mahlon Sweet Field Airport (KEUG), Eugene, Oregon, for an overnight. His duty day ended at 1611. He did not recall anything of significance about the trip and did not recall what time he went to sleep, but knew he was trying to get to sleep early. On December 27, 2017, he thought he woke up about 0400-0415. His duty day began at 0455. He flew 4 legs (KEUG-KSEA-KMSO-KSEA-KMFR) with an overnight in Medford. His duty day ended at 1355. He was based in Medford, so he stayed at a hotel at his expense. He did routine activities during the day and was in bed between 2100-2300. On December 28, 2017, he woke up between 0700-0900, asked for a late checkout of 1130 and had a 1207 show time. He flew 3 legs (KMFR-KSEA-KRDM-KSEA) and was then paired with the incident FO for a flight from KSEA to KMSO. His duty day ended at 0012 MST on December 29. He thought he went to bed about 0100-0130. On December 29, 2017, he and the incident FO had a show time of 1513 MST, with an hour prior van ride. He was up "way" before then but did not recall the specific time he woke up. He did not have any problems falling asleep the previous night and felt rested. He did routine activities during the day which included walking around outside and did not take a nap. The incident crew flew KMSO to KSEA, and then flew the incident flight from KSEA to KPUW. The incident occurred about 1830.
He had no changes in his health, personal or financial status in the previous 12 months; he rated his health as an 8.5-9 out of 10. He did not take any prescription or non-prescription medication in the 72 hours prior to the event that might have affected his performance. He had never been diagnosed with a sleep disorder.
The FO was 38 years old and was based in Medford, Oregon, as a Q-400 FO. The FO's date of hire with Horizon Air was July 10, 2017, and according to company records, he had accumulated 1,582 hours total flying time, including 95.5 total hours in the Q-400. A review of the FAA Accident/Incident Data System, Enforcement Information System and PTRS database showed no records or reports of any previous aviation incidents or accidents involving the FO.
The FO did not recall when he woke up on Tuesday, December 26, 2017. He thought he had commuted to work that day since he was scheduled to be on reserve for the 27th but did not recall specifics. He stayed at a hotel in Portland, Oregon, that night and thought he went to bed about 2200. On Wednesday, December 27, 2017, the FO thought he woke up about 0430 but possibly a little bit later because he thought he was on hotel reserve. He was on home reserve from 1030 until 1230 and airport reserve from 1230 until 2030. He did not get called to fly that day. He did not recall much of his activities but recalled he exercised. He did not take a nap. He thought he went to bed by 2100. On Thursday, December 28, 2017, the FO thought he woke up about 0430 and was on airport reserve from 1030 until 1429. He sat in the crew room at the airport, walked laps around the airport, and did some people-watching. He did not get called to fly that day. He then deadheaded to KSEA and flew from KSEA to KMSO with the incident captain. He went straight to the hotel and to bed about an hour after getting into the hotel. His duty day ended at 0012 MST on December 29. He was not sure the exact time he went to bed. On Friday, December 29, 2017, the FO slept in and woke about 0900 or 1000. His activities that day included going to the gym, watching TV and preparing for the day's flights since he was still new to the company. He and the incident captain utilized the hotel van services for transportation, and those schedules were pre-arranged by the company. His duty day began at 1513 MST and the incident occurred about 1830. He indicated felt fine that day. He had no problems falling asleep at night, and he had never been diagnosed with a sleep disorder. He characterized his health as "pretty healthy," and he exercised "a lot". He had no major changes to his health, financial situation or personal life in the 12 months prior to the incident. He did not take any prescription or non-prescription medications in the 72 hours prior to the incident that could have affected his performance.
The captain and FO had previously flown together on two flight legs preceding the incident flight. Both pilots were drug tested the day following the incident with negative results. According to Horizon Air, the pilots were not able to get on-site drug testing within a 1-hour window following the incident. Attempts to get a qualified tester to Pullman were made immediately after incident notification to duty officer, without success. The pilots were flown to KPDX the next day, all other testing requirements met the timeline. No alcohol testing w...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DCA18IA081