N155GC

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 10, 2018, about 1719 mountain standard time (mst), an Airbus Helicopters EC130 B4 helicopter, N155GC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Peach Springs, Arizona. The pilot and one passenger sustained serious injuries, and five passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 136 air tour flight.

On the day of the accident, the pilot performed a canyon landing, and an air tour flight before the accident flight. All of the day's flights departed Boulder City Municipal Airport (BVU), Boulder City, Nevada. Both the second flight and the accident flight had a destination of Quartermaster, an unimproved landing site regularly used by the operator within the Grand Canyon's Quartermaster Canyon. The pilot's second flight of the day took place in the early afternoon and returned at 1455. The accident flight departed at 1642.

The accident helicopter reached the Hoover Dam about 1652 and entered the Grand Canyon West Special Flight Rules Area 50-2 about 1713, where the pilot flew the standard helicopter route known as the “Green 4 route.” The last radar return was captured at 1717 and depicted the helicopter about 3.5 nautical miles (nm) west of the accident site, consistent with a descent into the canyon to Quartermaster.

The accident helicopter was one of ten helicopters scheduled to land at the site on the afternoon of the accident. The tour operation intended for the ten helicopters to sequentially land at Quartermaster and allowed for them all to be present at the landing site at the same time. The accident pilot stated that, during the approach to Quartermaster, he noted that the eight helicopters that had already landed were facing in different directions, indicating variable wind conditions. The combination of the windsock direction, orientations of the parked helicopters, and unoccupied landing pads on the west side of the landing area prompted the pilot to conduct an approach from the west and touch down on one of the west landing pads. He recalled that the two helicopters that landed immediately before him were on the west landing pads facing east, the same as his chosen approach direction, and noted that the windsock indicated wind from the north/northeast.

The pilot stated that he normally remained on the north side of the Colorado River, crossing the river between 200 and 300 ft above ground level (agl) while approaching Quartermaster for landing. After crossing the river, he entered a left turning descent toward the landing area. (See figure 1.) He stated that, as he made the left turn, the helicopter encountered what he described as a “violent gust of wind” and began to spin, and as a result he was unable to maintain directional control.

Figure 1. Graphical representation of typical approach to west pads

A Papillon pilot on the ground at Quartermaster watched the accident helicopter as it approached from across the river and assumed that the pilot planned to land on the west pads based on his approach path. He reported that the helicopter decelerated and then entered an approximate 15° nose-up pitch attitude. While maintaining altitude, the helicopter began a left turn toward the landing site. According to the witness, during the turn, the helicopter transitioned into a level attitude, followed by a nose-low attitude. He further reported that the helicopter began to drift aft as the left turn continued and returned to a level attitude before it rotated 360° and began a descent. After a second 360° rotation, the helicopter collided with terrain. A postimpact fire ensued.

Previous Approach and Landings at Quartermaster

The first five helicopters to land at Quartermaster on the afternoon of the accident approached from the east and landed on the east pads, facing west. The next three helicopters landed on the west pads and used a similar approach as the accident helicopter. The tenth helicopter did not land due to the accident.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot began his employment as a full-time pilot with Papillon Airways on June 3, 2013 and was trained by Papillon in the accident helicopter make and model. In 2014, the pilot transitioned into a role as a part-time pilot to pursue another career opportunity. At the time of the accident, the pilot’s primary occupation was in a different field (not as a pilot), but he continued flying for Papillon in a part-time capacity.

Company training records revealed that the pilot’s most recent line check in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 was accomplished in December 2017 and showed satisfactory grades for all areas of the examination; however, the lead pilot who conducted a portion of the pilot’s training in preparation for this line check reported that he had marked the pilot’s performance “unsatisfactory.” Specifically, he noted that the pilot had experienced difficulty maneuvering the helicopter during high wind conditions and did not have enough altitude as he turned during 180° autorotations. The pilot passed his check ride with another lead pilot 1-2 days later.

According to the operator, at the time of the accident, the pilot had flown passengers into the Grand Canyon for them a total of 836 times, with 581 landings at Quartermaster. The pilot stated that he felt comfortable flying the Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter) EC130 B4 helicopter and landing at Quartermaster.

Prior to becoming an air tour pilot for Papillon, the pilot flew air tours in non-turbine powered helicopters in the Midwestern United States.

HELICOPTER INFORMATION

Fuel System Crash Resistance

On October 3, 1994, the FAA introduced improved fuel system crash resistance standards for newly-certified normal category helicopters. These standards, outlined in 14 CFR 27.952, are intended to minimize fuel spillage near ignition sources to improve the evacuation time needed for crew and passengers to escape a postcrash fire; however, they were not retroactively applicable to either existing helicopters or newly-manufactured helicopters whose certification and approval predated the revised standards.

The accident helicopter, manufactured in 2010, was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a fuel system meeting the contemporary fuel system crash resistance standards. An option to retrofit the EC130 B4 with a crash-resistant fuel system was approved by the FAA in December 2017. According to the operator, the retrofit kits were not available to them until April 2018, after which they completed a retrofit of their existing fleet of EC130 B4 and AS350-series helicopters by August 2018. Airbus Helicopters issued Safety Information Notice 3281-S-28 on November 5, 2018, which recommended that operators of the EC-130 and AS350 helicopters retrofit them with 14 CFR 27.852 compliant crash resistance fuel systems.

In July 2015, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-15-12, which recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) require the implementation of crash-resistant fuel system airworthiness standards for all newly manufactured rotorcraft, regardless of the original certification date, to reduce the risk of a postcrash fire in survivable accidents involving these rotorcraft. Section 317 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 prohibits helicopters manufactured after April 5, 2020, from flying in US airspace unless certified with a crash-resistant fuel system. Pending further information on the FAA’s efforts to address this issue with rulemaking, the NTSB had classified A-15-12 as “Open – Acceptable Response.”

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Surface Observations

The automated observation at Grand Canyon West Airport (1G4), located at an elevation of 4,816 ft mean sea level (msl) about 2.6 nm northwest of the accident site, recorded wind from 330° at 15 knots (kts) with gusts to 19 kts at 1705. At 1725, the station recorded wind from 330° at 16 kts with gusts to 22 kts.

Papillon and another helicopter operator each owned a weather station about 2 miles north-northwest of the accident site, at elevations about 1,200 ft msl. At 1700, the Papillon station reported wind from the north-northwest at 11 kts; at 1710, the wind was from the north-northwest at 11 kts gusting to 19 kts. At 1720, the wind was from the north at 11 kts, and at 1730, the wind was from the north-northwest at 12 kts, gusting to 24 kts. (The wind was recorded in miles per hour; the data has been converted to kts in this report.)

The other station recorded a north-northwest wind at 10 kts gusting to 19 kts at 1700. The following three observations, recorded at 10-minute intervals, indicated northwest/north-northwest wind at 10 to 11 kts.

Quartermaster was equipped with a windsock that was located near the landing pads. A photo of the windsock taken about 1713 showed the windsock in its fully extended position, consistent with a wind velocity of 15 kts or greater. (See figure 2.)

Figure 2. Photograph taken at 1713 MST of windsock at Quartermaster

Papillion Pilots’ Recollections of Wind Conditions at Quartermaster

One pilot, who entered the canyon about 1646 and landed second in the sequence, encountered what he estimated to be a 20-kt headwind from the west while approaching an east pad. Another pilot, who entered the canyon about 1704 and landed fifth in the sequence, reported a northwest wind while landing on an east pad. He reported that he warned other pilots over the company radio frequency of a tailwind during the approach; however, only the sixth pilot to land recalled hearing this transmission.

The pilot of the sixth helicopter to land, who entered the canyon about 1708, estimated variable winds between 15 and 20 kts.

The seventh pilot to land entered the canyon at 1709. During his approach to the west pads, his intended destination, he recalled that the helicopter's tail swung rapidly due to strong winds and he applied significant right pedal and crab...