N106ER

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 4, 2018, about 0953 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-201, N106ER, collided with terrain following an in-flight separation of the left wing near the wing root during climb after a touch-and-go maneuver at Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB), Daytona Beach, Florida. The airline transport pilot and private pilot were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to and operated by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as an instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight.

The private pilot was conducting a practical test to obtain a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, and the airline transport pilot was acting as a designated pilot examiner (DPE). Radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and automatic-dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) data provided by the operator revealed that the private pilot began the training flight by departing runway 25L about 0927. The airplane then turned southbound and climbed to about 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) at a groundspeed of 100 knots. The airplane flew about 14 miles to the south of DAB, and several climbing and descending turns occurred between 1,300 and 3,000 ft. About 0940 the airplane leveled off at an altitude about 2,200 ft and airspeed of 112 knots on an easterly ground track before turning northbound toward DAB.

The airplane tracked parallel to the coastline about 5 miles inland at 2,200 ft and 115 knots before descending gradually to enter the DAB traffic pattern. About 0940, the private pilot contacted the DAB south arrival radar controller and advised he was inbound to DAB for "closed traffic" (that is, he stated his intention to perform successive operations in the airport traffic pattern) and had automatic terminal information service "Yankee." The controller issued a transponder squawk code, which the private pilot acknowledged.

About 1 minute later, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane was in radar contact and assigned the pilot the ROSE 25 arrival. (The ROSE 25 arrival is used by local aircraft inbound to DAB from the south.) At 0945:00, the pilot advised the DAB tower controller that he was on the ROSE 25 arrival. The DAB tower controller instructed the pilot to follow a Cessna Skyhawk and to maintain 1,500 ft, which the pilot acknowledged. About 0947, the tower controller cleared the pilot to descend to the traffic pattern altitude and join the downwind leg while continuing to follow the Cessna.

About 0948, the DAB tower controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 25, which the pilot acknowledged, stating "we're uh cleared for uh closed traffic." The DAB tower controller responded that the pilot was "cleared for the option"—that is, at the pilot's discretion— which the pilot acknowledged. The pilot subsequently performed a touch-and-go maneuver on runway 25.

During the airplane's initial climb after the touch-and-go maneuver, the DAB tower controller advised the pilot at 0951:44 to continue upwind until advised when to turn crosswind. At 0952:28, the controller instructed the pilot to squawk one two zero four, which the pilot read back. At 0952:47, the pilot asked the DAB tower controller, "…can we turn crosswind." The controller replied, ",,,negative, continue upwind," which was not acknowledged. There were no further communications from the accident airplane. According to ADS-B data, the airplane's radar target was lost about 0953; it was last recorded about 2 miles beyond the departure end of runway 25L at an altitude of 900 ft and a groundspeed of 80 knots.

Witnesses within 1/4 mile of the accident site reported the airplane climbed "normally" on a westerly heading when they saw a wing separate from the fuselage. The wing appeared to "float" down and the airplane descended in a steep spiral before it impacted a field. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 25, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. He was issued an FAA second-class airman medical certificate on June 17, 2016, with no limitations. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accrued 218.2 total hours of flight experience of which 26 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.

According to FAA records, the DPE, age 61, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane-single engine land and airplane multiengine land. He held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine, and instrument airplane. The DPE was issued an FAA second-class medical certificate on April 5, 2017. He reported 27,600 hours total hours of flight experience of which 400 hours were flown during the 6 months before receiving the medical certificate. The DPE's logbooks were not recovered. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe PA-28R-201 airplane, commonly referred to as the "Arrow," has been widely used by flight schools for complex airplane (meaning an airplane that has a retractable landing gear, flaps, and a controllable pitch propeller) flight training. According to FAA airworthiness and operator records, the accident airplane (serial number 2844137) was manufactured on September 17, 2007, and was issued a standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category. It was a single-engine, low-wing, four-place airplane equipped with a 200-horsepower, Lycoming IO-360-C1C6 four-cylinder engine that drove a McCauley two-blade, constant-speed propeller.

ERAU purchased the airplane new (with 5.8 hours accrued) from Piper on September 25, 2007, and subsequently sold it to a leasing company, AVN Air, LLC, on September 28, 2007. ERAU leased the airplane from AVN until September 4, 2015, when it purchased the airplane back from the lessor. The airplane registration number was changed from N712ER to N106ER on July 10, 2014. ERAU was the only operator for the entire operational life of the airplane, which had only been used for flight instructor and commercial pilot training and was never used for initial flight training.

The airframe had accumulated 7,690.6 hours of operation before the accident flight, and 28.3 hours since its most recent annual inspection, which was completed on March 21, 2018. Before the accident flight, the total landing cycles were 33,276 based on ERAU information documented in its education and training administration program.

Maintenance

Examination of the airframe maintenance logbook for the life of the accident airplane found that the airframe was inspected every 50 hours alternating between the ERAU 50-hour and ERAU annual inspection. The accident airplane's most recent inspection was an annual inspection completed on March 22, 2018, at an airframe time of 7,662.3 hours. Between March 28 and April 3, 2018, 12 flight instructors operated the accident airplane, and none reported any anomalies or flight operational safety issues with the airplane. One instructor noted "some side load on one landing" in the discrepancy log. There were no reported hard landings during this period, and all maneuvers were reported as "normal."

The ERAU annual inspection contained all the provisions in the Piper recommended annual inspection with some items added by ERAU. According to chapter 5 of the Piper Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM), the 100-hour inspection was a complete inspection of the airplane and was identical in scope to an annual inspection. The 100-hour inspection was divided into several major groups, including a wing group. Item 13 in the wing group stated, "inspect wing spar to fuselage attachment bolts and brackets" and indicated a recommended interval of 100 hours. According to ERAU, the accomplishment of this item involved removing the small plastic covers over the main spar attach bolts on the lower wing surface to ensure the torque striping on the nuts was not broken. The ERAU inspection would not normally look at the head of the bolts inside the center section even though the airplane interior would be removed from the airplane.

All inspection items for the annual inspection were endorsed by a mechanic and/or inspector, including the wing spar-to-fuselage attachment bolts and brackets. There were no discrepancies pertaining to the wing spars. Examination of an airworthiness directive (AD) compliance list for the airplane revealed that all applicable ADs were in compliance.

The most recent 50-hour inspection occurred on February 27, 2018, at an airframe time of 7,613.4 hours. All the items in the inspection list were endorsed by a mechanic. There were no discrepancies pertaining to the wing spars.

Procedures for a detailed inspection of the wing spars were included in section 57-10-00 of the AMM. The procedures defined airplane usage classes of normal, severe, extreme, and unknown. The normal usage class encompassed most aircraft and included airplanes operated in normal flight training operations, such as the accident airplane. The recommended inspection involved removing the wings from the airplane, visually inspecting the main spar lower caps with a 10-power magnifying glass and performing a dye-penetrant inspection of the spar caps. The special inspections section of the AMM (5-30-00) recommended for airplanes in the normal usage class that the wing spar inspection in 57-10-00 be performed beginning at 30,600 hours, and every 3,000 hours thereafter.

The accident airplane's airframe maintenance logbook indicated four entries for hard landing inspections, dated February 17, August 24, November 11, and November 14, 2011. These four dates corresponded with hard landing entries in the airplane's discrepancy log. The discrepancy log also indicated 14 additional hard landing events including five hard landing e...