N602BP

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 8, 2018, about 1711 eastern daylight time, an MD Helicopters 600N helicopter, N602BP, was destroyed when it collided with a wooden power line support structure and terrain in Smethport, Pennsylvania. The commercial pilot was seriously injured, and two linemen were fatally injured. The helicopter was being operated by High Line Helicopters, Inc., as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 133 external load flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed from an unimproved landing zone adjacent to the accident site.

Three power lines, which were newly constructed in mountainous terrain and oriented approximately east/west, were supported by structures that were constructed of either wood (dual pole, H-frame) or steel (single pole). A static line was affixed to the top of the structures above the power lines. The purpose of the flight was to remove the static line from the wheeled pulley device (dolly) that temporarily secured the static line and permanently secure the static line to the structures ("clipping wire"). One lineman completed the task from the skid of the hovering helicopter, and another lineman inside the helicopter passed tools and equipment back and forth to the lineman on the skid.

The steps to complete the task on each support structure included wrapping the line with a spiraled wire coating (armor rod), attaching a safety strap (safety), ratcheting a chain lifting device (hoist) to the top of the structure pole, and placing the static line attachment device (shoe) to the line. Afterward, the line was hoisted into position and bolted to the structure, and the safety, hoist, and dolly were then removed from the structure and static line. The pilot then repositioned the helicopter so that the linemen could repeat the steps on the next structure.

During a postaccident interview, the pilot reported that he and the linemen (the crew) met earlier in the day and flew to one of the structures to assess the work and tools required to complete the task. The helicopter then returned to the landing zone and was refueled before departing on the accident flight. The crew completed one structure, and the pilot hovered the helicopter into position so that work could begin on the next structure. In a written statement, the pilot stated that the pole where the accident occurred was at "a slight inside angle" but was considered to be a "safe" area in which to work. According to the pilot and the operator, the helicopter was hovering "inside the bite," which was the triangular area comprising the wire from the uphill pole, the turn at the accident pole, and the wire to the downhill pole. The "base" of the triangle was the horizontal line from the uphill pole to the downhill pole. The operator indicated that the "bite" had a vertical dimension as well.

Once the helicopter was in position, the lineman on the helicopter skid attached the first half of the armor rod ahead of the dolly and manipulated the line and the dolly to complete the wrap. According to the pilot, the lineman opened the spring-loaded locking gate on the dolly above the static line to wrap the second half of the armor rod, which was "normal" before the attachment of the safety. About that time, the pilot felt the helicopter being "pulled" toward the structure. The pilot stated that he made full right cyclic and full left pedal inputs to avoid colliding with the structure but that "all I remember is rolling over the structure." The pilot said that he neither felt nor heard anything unusual before the helicopter was "pulled" toward the structure.

A witness to the accident stated that, while the helicopter was hovering, its nose turned away from the pole, and the helicopter "was violently forced back to the pole." The witness also stated that the tail section struck the pole and that the helicopter "broke in two," after which the helicopter appeared "to fall straight down." The witness did not see the helicopter's impact but stated that the engine "continued to surge."

The helicopter descended vertically between and adjacent to the dual-pole structure. The tailboom and the six rotor blades from the main rotor separated from the helicopter during the descent. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The pilot's most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued April 5, 2017. According to the operator, he had accrued about 6,200 hours of total flight experience, 250 hours of which were in the 600N helicopter. The operator estimated that that pilot had accrued 3,000 hours performing power line operations. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe helicopter was manufactured in 1998 and was equipped with a Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C47 600-horsepower turboshaft engine. At the time of the accident, the helicopter's Hobbs meter indicated a total of 5,203.6 hours.

Maintenance record excerpts showed that the helicopter's most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on February 4, 2018. The helicopter had accumulated 5,120.8 hours at that time.

An FAA airworthiness inspector reviewed the helicopter's maintenance records. The inspector found numerous record-keeping errors but overall compliance with hourly and calendar inspections as well as compliance with airworthiness directives.

The helicopter was installed with aluminum diamond-plate flooring, which required the removal of the left-side cabin door, and a 6061-T6 aluminum pipe. A search of the FAA's aircraft registry records and the helicopter's maintenance logbooks found no information regarding these installations. Also, no records were found showing FAA approval for these modifications or company documentation of weight and balance computations that reflected the changes.

According to section 2-1 of the MD 600N flight manual, operations with the left-side cabin door removed were authorized, but operations with the pilot (right) seat removed (resulting in a left-seat command configuration) were not. Neither of these modifications was reflected in the helicopter's weight and balance or aircraft records.

Title 14 CFR 91.107(a)(3) required that all passengers be seated in an approved seat and properly secured with a seatbelt during aircraft movement. The helicopter's cabin had no passenger seats installed.

Weight and balance computations based on pilot and lineman weights, cargo, and three different fuel states (full, one-half, and one-third tank) showed that the helicopter, as configured, was likely within weight, lateral, and longitudinal center-of-gravity limits for the accident flight. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1653, the weather reported at Bradford Regional Airport (BFD), Lewis Run, Pennsylvania, which was located 10 miles west of the accident site, included an overcast layer at 4,100 ft, 10 statute miles visibility, and wind from 290° at 10 knots. The temperature was -3°C, the dew point was -12°C, and the altimeter setting was 29.95 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe helicopter was manufactured in 1998 and was equipped with a Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C47 600-horsepower turboshaft engine. At the time of the accident, the helicopter's Hobbs meter indicated a total of 5,203.6 hours.

Maintenance record excerpts showed that the helicopter's most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on February 4, 2018. The helicopter had accumulated 5,120.8 hours at that time.

An FAA airworthiness inspector reviewed the helicopter's maintenance records. The inspector found numerous record-keeping errors but overall compliance with hourly and calendar inspections as well as compliance with airworthiness directives.

The helicopter was installed with aluminum diamond-plate flooring, which required the removal of the left-side cabin door, and a 6061-T6 aluminum pipe. A search of the FAA's aircraft registry records and the helicopter's maintenance logbooks found no information regarding these installations. Also, no records were found showing FAA approval for these modifications or company documentation of weight and balance computations that reflected the changes.

According to section 2-1 of the MD 600N flight manual, operations with the left-side cabin door removed were authorized, but operations with the pilot (right) seat removed (resulting in a left-seat command configuration) were not. Neither of these modifications was reflected in the helicopter's weight and balance or aircraft records.

Title 14 CFR 91.107(a)(3) required that all passengers be seated in an approved seat and properly secured with a seatbelt during aircraft movement. The helicopter's cabin had no passenger seats installed.

Weight and balance computations based on pilot and lineman weights, cargo, and three different fuel states (full, one-half, and one-third tank) showed that the helicopter, as configured, was likely within weight, lateral, and longitudinal center-of-gravity limits for the accident flight. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe accident site was at an elevation of about 1,600 ft. All major components were accounted for at the scene. The wreckage was contained largely at the bottom of the wooden H-frame structure that was struck, with the six rotor blades separated at the hub and scattered at various distances on the south side of the power lines. One rotor blade traveled about 300 ft down the hill (west) of the structure. The tailboom separated and was found about 70 ft west of the structure. Striating marks consistent with wire contact were visible on top of the left skid forward of the front cross-tube.

The six main rotor blades remained inside their respective pitch housings, and the laminated steel strap sets ("strap packs") were fractured at the hub. The blades showed varying degrees of chordwise and spanwise twisting and bending. One of the rotor blades displayed a concave dent 2...