C-GLKX

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 5, 2018, about 2347 eastern daylight time, a Canadian-registered Cessna 340A, C-GLKX, impacted terrain during an instrument approach to St. Clair County International Airport (KPHN), Port Huron, Michigan. The pilot received fatal injuries, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was owned by Flex Air, Inc., and was being operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight departed St. Thomas Municipal Airport (CYQS), St. Thomas, Ontario, Canada, about 2304, and was enroute to KPHN.

Flight track data obtained from the Stratus 2S unit onboard the airplane indicated that, the day before the accident flight, the pilot completed three flights for a total of 3 hours 37 minutes of flight time. A fuel receipt showed that the airplane was fueled with 106 gallons of fuel at 1836 on the day of the accident at Carp Airport (CYRP), Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, where the airplane was based.

The owner of the airplane reported that the pilot intended to fly to fly to KPHN to clear US Customs before proceeding to his destination in Wisconsin on the day of the accident for business purposes. He stated that the departure from CYRP was delayed about 4 hours because the airport was out of fuel and the pilot had to wait for a fuel truck to arrive.

Flight track data indicated that the flight departed CYRP for KPHN about 1929 and climbed to 23,000 ft; however, according to the aircraft owner, the pilot encountered adverse weather conditions and diverted to CYQS. The flight from CYRP to CYQS lasted about 2 hours 23 minutes. There was no record of the airplane refueling at CYQS.

The pilot subsequently departed CYQS about 2304 and climbed to 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and maintained a 290° heading toward WYDUK, the initial approach fix for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 22 approach at KPHN. Review of air traffic control (ATC) information indicated that, about 2335, the pilot confirmed that he was inbound to WYDUK at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl).

About 2337, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane was no longer in radar contact (the airplane had descended below the floor of the radar coverage available for that area).

About 2342, the controller asked the pilot if he had passed WYDUK; the pilot confirmed that he had and was inbound for runway 22. The controller then instructed the pilot to cross the ZORIX waypoint at or above 2,200 ft, cleared the flight for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 22 approach, and approved a frequency change to the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF); the airport was not staffed with a tower controller. Radar track data indicated that the airplane was at 4,000 ft msl at 127 kts groundspeed at that time. At 2343:23, the engine data monitor recorded a rapid decrease in fuel flow to the right engine with a coinciding decrease in EGT and engine rpm. The airplane was about 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from ZORIX. The engine data recorded a brief spike in fuel flow to the right engine a few seconds after the initial fuel flow drop; the EGT and engine rpm displayed coinciding spikes.

About 2344:01, the airplane crossed the final approach fix, ZORIX, at 3,500 ft msl at 118 kts groundspeed. Another spike in fuel flow, EGT, and engine rpm was recorded, and the engine rpm returned to 600. No other spikes were recorded.

About 2344:33, about 3,200 ft msl, the pilot contacted the controller and advised him that he had "just lost my right engine." When the controller asked if he would still make the landing, the pilot stated, "I'm gonna work on it."

About 2346:41, the airplane was at 1,700 ft msl at 100 kts groundspeed; the pilot stated, "I see no lights at the runway, uh, and I tried to turn them on. They don't turn on." The controller responded that he did not have control over the lights and there were no NOTAMs concerning the runway lighting. The controller then asked if the pilot could see the airport, and he responded, "Negative."

About 2347:20, at 1,300 ft msl and a groundspeed of about 93 knots, the pilot stated, "I'm right above the airport on, uh, one engine, so I'm gonna make a slow turn (unintelligible) to reshoot that approach." The radar data indicated that the airplane was above the airport environment.

The controller asked again if the pilot could see the airport. About 2347:32, the pilot responded, "There's nothing lit up here, sir." Radar data indicated that the airplane was at 1,200 ft msl at 84 kts groundspeed.

About 2349:35, the ATC controller tried contacting the pilot, but there was no response. The last radar return indicated that the airplane was at 1,100 ft msl at 72 kts groundspeed and had turned right to a westerly heading. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe 51-year-old pilot held a Canadian private pilot certificate with single-engine airplane, multi-engine airplane, and instrument airplane ratings. His first-class airman medical certificate, issued on January 22, 2018, listed no limitations. The pilot's logbook indicated about 690 total hours of flight experience, including about 51 hours in the accident airplane. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane was a low-wing, twin-engine Cessna 340A that was manufactured in 1981. The airplane was equipped with two Continental TSIO-520-NB9A engines modified with the RAM conversion (STC-SE4327SW) in March 2007, which increased the engine horsepower to 335 horsepower. The airplane's maximum takeoff weight was 6,390 lbs. The airplane originally seated six, but one passenger seat had been removed. The last annual inspection was conducted on May 16, 2018, at a total aircraft time of 4,038.4 hours. The last flight recorded into the airplane's journey log was the day before the accident, which noted an aircraft total time of 4,161.1 hours and 1,095.5 hours since major overhaul for both the left and right engines.

Fuel System

The airplane's fuel system comprised two 50-gallon main tanks mounted on each wingtip, two 31.5-gallon auxiliary tanks located between the spars in the outboard wing, and two 20-gallon wing locker tanks, for a total of 203 gallons. Two fuel selectors, one for each engine, were located between the pilot and copilot seats and were mechanically connected to fuel valves located in each wing. The right fuel selector allowed selection of the right main fuel tank, the right auxiliary fuel tank, crossfeed, and OFF. The left fuel selector was similar, allowing selection of the left tanks.

The Cessna 340A Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) provided procedures for fuel management. The procedures stated the following:

1. Set fuel selector valves to left main tank for left engine and right main tank for right engine in takeoff, descent, landing, emergency, and first 90 min. of flight.

2. Takeoff and land with auxiliary fuel pumps on.

3. Use full rich mixture and auxiliary fuel pumps on "LOW" when switching tanks.

4. Operate on main tanks until fuel quantity is less than 180 pounds per tank.

5. Transfer wing locker fuel while operating on main tanks in straight and level flight.

6. Turn transfer pumps off when lights illuminate.

7. Use fuel crossfeed system to balance main fuel quantities if one wing locker does not transfer.

8. Switch to auxiliary tanks when main fuel is again less than 180 pounds per tank.

Engine Inoperative Procedures

The POH procedures for Engine Failure During Flight (Speed above Vmca) were:

1. Inoperative Engine – Determine.

2. Operative Engine – Adjust as required.

3. Fuel Flow – Check. If deficient, position auxiliary fuel pump to ON.

4. Fuel Selectors – Main Tanks (Feel for Detent).

5. Fuel Quantity – Check.

6. Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature – Check.

7. Magneto Switches – Check On.

8. Mixture – Adjust. Lean until manifold pressure begins to increase, then enrichen as power increases.

Note: The first 8 items are outlined in black in the POH. According to the POH, these items are "immediate-action items and should be committed to memory."

If Engine Does Not Start, Secure as Follows:

9. Inoperative Engine – Secure.

a. Throttle – Close.

b. Mixture – Idle Cut-off.

c. Propeller – Feather.

d. Fuel Selector – Off (Feel For Detent).

e. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – Off.

f. Magneto Switches – Off.

g. Propeller Synchrophaser – Off.

h. Alternator – Off.

i. Cowl Flap – Close.

10. Operative Engine – Adjust.

a. Power – As Required.

b. Mixture – Adjust for power.

c. Fuel Selector – As Required (Feel for Detent)

d. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – On.

e. Cowl Flap – As Required.

11. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator.

12. Electrical Load – Decrease to minimum required.

13. As Soon as Practical – Land.

The POH procedures for Engine Inoperative Go-Around (Speed Above 91 KIAS) were:

1. Throttle – Full Forward (38.0 Inches Hg.)

2. Positive Rate-of-Climb – Establish.

3. Landing Gear – Up.

4. Wing Flaps – Up, if extended.

5. Cowl Flap – Open.

6. Climb at One Engine Inoperative Best Rate-of-Climb Speed – 100 KIAS.

7. Trim Tabs – Adjust 5° bank toward operative engine with approximately 1/2 ball slip indicated on the turn and bank indicator.

The first 4 items in this checklist were designated as immediate action items.

The POH indicated that, given the estimated weight of the airplane at the time of the accident (5,471 lbs) at 21°C, with one engine inoperative, landing gear retracted, wing flaps retracted, the inoperative propeller feathered, and with a 5° bank toward the operative engine, the service ceiling was about 16,000 ft msl. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 2335, the surface weather observation at KPHN included calm wind; 10 miles or greater visibility; moderate rain; scattered clouds at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft; broken ceiling at 12,000 ft; temperature 21°C; dew point 20°C; and an altimeter setting of 30.16 inches of m...