Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control following takeoff in night instrument meteorological conditions.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn March 1, 2019, at 1921 eastern standard time, a Cessna 182S, N26617, was destroyed when it collided with terrain after takeoff from Triangle North Executive Airport (LHZ), Louisburg, North Carolina. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the personal flight which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and a commercial vendor revealed that the pilot obtained a weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan through a commercial on-line site at 1819. According to LHZ security records, the pilot's truck passed through the gate onto the airport at 1852.
The pilot obtained his IFR clearance by telephone before departure. The clearance instructed the pilot to depart from runway 23, fly a heading of 180°, and climb to an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). After takeoff, a radar target identified as the accident airplane was acquired at 1920:03 over the runway at 425 ft msl (about 60 ft above ground level [agl]) and 91 knots groundspeed. The airplane maintained the approximate runway heading until 1920:56, when the airplane entered a right turn while at 1,225 ft msl (about 860 ft agl) and 99 knots groundspeed. At 1921:02, the airplane reached the top of its climb at 1,300 ft msl (about 930 ft agl) while in the turn. Afterward, the airplane entered a descending right turn while its groundspeed began to accelerate. The airplane's last target, at 1921:17, showed the airplane at an altitude of 625 ft (about 260 ft agl) and a groundspeed of 145 knots, in the vicinity of the accident site. Interpolation of the radar data toward the bottom of the descent revealed an descent rate of about 6,000 ft per minute. Communication between the pilot and air traffic control was never established.
Two airport employees witnessed the takeoff and reported that they heard the airplane's engine "power up," which surprised them because they had not noticed the airplane taxi past them or heard the pilot perform an engine run-up. The airplane's lights were not clearly visible in the fog and had a "halo" appearance. The witnesses also reported that the airplane accelerated and that the sound of the engine was smooth and continuous throughout the takeoff roll and the takeoff. The witnesses lost sight of the airplane when it was about 200 to 300 ft above the runway, which was about the same time that the airplane entered the clouds.
One of the airport employees described the weather conditions as "foggy in moderate rain." The other airport employee indicated that there were "low clouds and a lot of rain" and that he wondered "who would want to fly in this [weather]?"
Several witnesses who lived near the airport provided written statements. These witnesses stated that they heard the airplane just after it took off flying "low overhead" and that the engine "went in full throttle" when the sounds of impact were heard. One witness stated that "it was raining so hard" at the time of the accident that it disabled his satellite television signal. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued February 20, 2018, and he reported 1,270 total hours of flight experience on that date. On August 28, 2018, the pilot declared 1,422 total hours of flight experience on an insurance application form.
The pilot obtained his private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land on January 9, 2013. He added his instrument airplane rating about 15 months later.
A commercial pilot and flight instructor who flew with the accident pilot recreationally and in the Coast Guard Auxiliary stated that the pilot was "proficient" but was a "heavy user" of the autopilot and that he would routinely depart, set up the autopilot, and then contact air traffic control. When asked about the pilot's mission planning and operational risk management assessments for flights with the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the commercial pilot/flight instructor stated that the accident pilot was "proficient" in those skills. When asked how those skills transferred to the accident pilot's personal flying habits, the commercial pilot/flight instructor stated that the accident pilot "abandoned" those practices when he flew for personal business or pleasure.
The aircraft broker who sold the airplane to the pilot in December 2012 was also based at LHZ. The broker stated that he had watched the pilot depart in the airplane under visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) on numerous occasions before the pilot acquired an instrument rating. The broker also stated that, after the accident pilot acquired his instrument rating, he departed in conditions that the broker considered challenging for a small single-engine airplane. The broker added that he had cautioned the accident pilot "numerous" times about flying VFR into IMC and about overall risk management and risk decisions when flying into IMC, when measured against the equipment one operated, but that "there was no getting through to him." AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was owned by the pilot and manufactured in 1998. Its most recent annual inspection was completed November 12, 2018, at 3,709 total aircraft hours.
The airplane was equipped with Aspen EFD1000 Flight Displays. While research indicated that Aspen Mandatory Service Bulletin SB2018-1, and FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-01-02 were current for Aspen EFD1000 Flight Displays, neither applied to the accident airplane based on their installation and configuration. According to the FAA airworthiness inspector assigned to the investigation who researched the installation and both documents, "By not activating the RS-232 ports ADS-B functions were not available" and therefore, the Service Bulletin and the AD did not apply to the accident airplane.
The flight instructor/commercial pilot, who was the friend and colleague of the pilot, stated the airplane's flight displays "blanked out" and were hot to the touch when he flew the airplane on a cross country flight in July 2018. Aspen representatives there suggested it might be a cooling issue and to open the cockpit vents for the return flight. With the vents open, the unit did not malfunction on the return flight. According to the instructor, the pilot/owner stated he had made numerous warranty claims and had several components of the Aspen system replaced. He further stated that the pilot/owner had an air-conditioning system installed in the airplane (in August 2018) to address the issue of cooling the avionics. According to Aspen Avionics, a search of company records revealed that the pilot/owner made no warranty claims to them, and that no replacement parts or components were shipped or otherwise attributed to the accident airplane. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1920, the weather recorded at LHZ included scattered clouds at 300 ft, a broken ceiling at 600 ft, an overcast ceiling at 1,100 ft and winds from 020°at 4 knots. Visibility was 5 statute miles in rain. The temperature was 4°C, and the dew point was 4°C. The altimeter setting was 30.08 inches of mercury.
Weather radar base reflectivity images taken from the Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina WSR-88D, located about 21 miles southwest of the accident site, indicated that reflectivity values between 20 and 35 dBZ (light to moderate precipitation) were located above the accident site at the time of the accident. The reflectivity bands were moving from west to east.
About 1 hour before departure, the pilot obtained an on-line weather briefing from a commercial vendor (ForeFlight) that included terminal area forecasts for low IFR conditions, AIRMETs for low-level wind shear, and a pilot report for severe turbulence along the airplane's proposed route of flight. According to the vendor, the pilot did not view any weather imagery before the flight or obtain any updates or additional weather information before or during the accident flight. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the airplane was owned by the pilot and manufactured in 1998. Its most recent annual inspection was completed November 12, 2018, at 3,709 total aircraft hours.
The airplane was equipped with Aspen EFD1000 Flight Displays. While research indicated that Aspen Mandatory Service Bulletin SB2018-1, and FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-01-02 were current for Aspen EFD1000 Flight Displays, neither applied to the accident airplane based on their installation and configuration. According to the FAA airworthiness inspector assigned to the investigation who researched the installation and both documents, "By not activating the RS-232 ports ADS-B functions were not available" and therefore, the Service Bulletin and the AD did not apply to the accident airplane.
The flight instructor/commercial pilot, who was the friend and colleague of the pilot, stated the airplane's flight displays "blanked out" and were hot to the touch when he flew the airplane on a cross country flight in July 2018. Aspen representatives there suggested it might be a cooling issue and to open the cockpit vents for the return flight. With the vents open, the unit did not malfunction on the return flight. According to the instructor, the pilot/owner stated he had made numerous warranty claims and had several components of the Aspen system replaced. He further stated that the pilot/owner had an air-conditioning system installed in the airplane (in August 2018) to address the issue of cooling the avionics. According to Aspen Avionics, a search of company records revealed that the pilot/owner made no warranty claims to them, and that no replacement parts or c...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA19FA113