N733KZ

HISTORY OF FLIGHT**This report was modified on June 23, 2021. Please see the public docket for this investigation to view the original report.**

On May 1, 2019, about 1251 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172N, N733KZ, was destroyed when it when it was involved in an accident near Tyrone, Pennsylvania. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan through the ForeFlight application for the intended flight from University Park Airport (UNV), State College, Pennsylvania, to Pittsburgh/Butler Regional Airport (BTP), Butler, Pennsylvania. According to audio recordings from the UNV air traffic control tower (ATCT), on initial contact with ground control, the pilot advised the controller that he had obtained automated terminal information service update Papa and requested to taxi to runway 24 for a westbound departure. The controller asked the pilot if he wanted to depart on the filed IFR flight plan or if he was “going VFR [visual flight rules],” and he replied he would depart under VFR. The controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff from runway 24, provided him an updated altimeter setting, and told him to advise when he departed class D airspace. The pilot acknowledged the instruction but ultimately did not advise the controller when he departed the airport’s airspace. No further communications were received from the pilot.

According to Federal Aviation Administration radar flight track data, the airplane departed about 1240 and remained on the runway heading for about 4.5 nautical miles (nm) while climbing to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane turned slightly right to a west-southwest heading, descended to about 2,000 ft msl, and remained on that heading and altitude for about 10 nm. The airplane then turned to the same heading initially flown after takeoff, descended slightly, and then climbed back to about 2,000 ft msl over about 3 nm. The airplane entered a right turn before the flight track data were lost at 1251:07. At that time the airplane was at an altitude about 2,050 ft msl. The accident site was located about 700 ft north-northwest of the last radar data target, at an elevation of about 2,100 feet.

A witness located about 2,078 ft east-southeast from the accident site reported that, at the time of the accident, it was very foggy, but it was not raining. She heard a loud sounding airplane, which got her attention. She then saw the airplane flying below the fog, “straight” in a westerly direction then banking but not too steeply. She lost sight of the airplane when it went behind trees, followed by the sound of an explosion.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. Review of the pilot’s application to join the flying club that operated the accident airplane, which was submitted to the flying club in June 2017, revealed that he had accumulated 563 total hours of flight experience, of which 523 were in the accident airplane make and model. He also noted that he had accumulated 79 hours of instrument flight experience. On the application the pilot stated that his most recent flight was in May 2011. The pilot subsequently completed 13 flights in the accident airplane, over the course of 20.7 flight hours, between August 2017 and April 2019.

The pilot’s personal logbook recorded simulated instrument flight for a duration of 0.3-hour during a 1.0-hour-long flight for the purposes of a flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56(a), on August 15, 2017, more than 20 months before the accident. He had logged a total of 13.5 hours and 66.0 hours of actual instrument flight time and simulated instrument flight time, respectively. Between the flight review date and the last logbook entry, dated April 18, 2019, he did not record any actual or simulated instrument flight experience, the completion of an instrument proficiency check, or any instrument approaches.

According to members of the flying club, a flight instructor flew in the accident airplane with the pilot, about 1 month before the accident after it had undergone maintenance for an extended time, and during which two Garmin G5 electronic flight instruments and a Garmin GFC 500 autopilot were installed. The club had advised pilots to fly the airplane with an instructor to refamiliarize themselves with the airplane and for a proficiency check.

The flight instructor who flew with the pilot stated that the proficiency flight covered loss of control, power-on and power-off stalls, steep turns, and emergency procedures. Because the instructor was not an instrument instructor, he did not cover topics that might have been addressed during an instrument proficiency check, but he did have the pilot fly for about 18 minutes using a vision restricting device. The flight instructor described that during that time, the pilot struggled to hold altitude, but he was within +/- 100 ft. The pilot mentioned that the likely reason he struggled to hold altitude was that the display format of the new electronic flight instruments were more responsive than the previously installed analog instruments. The pilot did not mention anything to him about his instrument flight experience or instrument currency. After the flight, flight instructor did not sign the pilot’s logbook, and he suggested he fly a few more times VFR to familiarize himself with the new electronic flight instruments.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONFollowing the airplane’s last annual inspection on March 15, 2019, a maintenance facility employee conducted a test flight and deemed it satisfactory during all phases of flight. He reported that he was impressed with the autopilot system. Club personnel estimated that, excluding the accident flight, the airplane had been operated about 20 hours since the annual inspection. The president of the flying club conducted a 1.0-hour flight on April 30, 2019, which was the last flight of the accident airplane before the accident flight. He reported no issues with either the G5 or autopilot. The only discrepancy he noted was a 20-second loss of the GPS signal. There was no record that the airplane was flown after the president of the club flew it and the accident pilot began his flight.

The airplane’s altimeter, altitude reporting, and static system tests required by 14 CFR Part 91.411 and the transponder test required by 14 CFR Part 91.413 were last completed on November 14, 2018.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA review of ForeFlight records revealed that the pilot obtained preflight weather briefings at 0854 and 1125. The weather briefing package contained all the standard weather information, including valid and active AIRMETs Sierra and Tango, a current surface analysis graphic, METARs, pilot reports, graphical forecasts for aviation (GFA), TAFs, and winds aloft forecasts. He last checked the UNV airport information (which can include METAR and TAF information) about 1235. It could not be determined if the pilot checked or received any additional weather information before or during the flight.

AIRMET Sierra warned of instrument meteorological conditions and mountain obscuration due to clouds and mist, and AIRMET Tango warned of moderate turbulence between 2,000 ft msl and flight level 180. The GFA cloud forecast products indicated a broken-to-overcast cloud ceiling between 2,100 and 2,500 ft msl with cloud tops at 5,000 ft msl. The UNV TAF, which was issued at 1125, forecast an overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet above ground level (or about 2,400 ft msl) around the time of the departure.

The 1300 High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) sounding for the accident site indicated alternating layers of stable and conditionally unstable environments from the surface through 8,000 ft msl. The HRRR sounding also indicated that the cloud base was near 2,000 ft msl within about 1.6 nm of the accident site. The Rawinsonde Observation (RAOB) identified the possibility of clouds from between about 2,000 and 6,000 ft msl and indicated that a frontal inversion existed above the accident site at 4,348 ft msl with clouds below the inversion layer and no possibility of icing conditions below 14,000 ft msl. The RAOB indicated the possibility of light, low-level wind shear from the surface to about 3,500 ft msl and light-to-moderate clear-air turbulence (CAT) in several layers between the surface and 14,000 ft msl with moderate CAT between 3,000 and 5,000 ft msl.

At 0658, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center issued a Center Weather Service Unit Meteorological Impact Statement, which warned of patchy instrument meteorological conditions and isolated marginal visual flight rules conditions at the accident site and BTP with conditions valid through 1500.

At 0825, the National Weather Service Office, State College, Pennsylvania, issued an Area Forecast Discussion, and its aviation section reported widespread instrument meteorological conditions due to low cloud ceilings across the area with clouds remaining across the area through the morning with conditions improving from west to east in the afternoon.

AIRPORT INFORMATIONFollowing the airplane’s last annual inspection on March 15, 2019, a maintenance facility employee conducted a test flight and deemed it satisfactory during all phases of flight. He reported that he was impressed with the autopilot system. Club personnel estimated that, excluding the accident flight, the airplane had been operated about 20 hours since the annual inspection. The president of the flying club conducted a 1.0-hour flight on April 30, 2019, which was the last flight of the accident airplane before the accident flight. He reported no issues with either the G5 or autopilot. The only discrepancy he noted was a 20-second loss of the GPS signal. There was no record that the airplane was flown aft...