N534FF

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 30, 2019, about 0911 central daylight time (CDT), a Textron Aviation B-300 (marketed as King Air 350), N534FF, was destroyed when it impacted a hangar shortly after takeoff from runway 15 at Addison Airport (ADS), Addison, Texas. A postimpact fire ensued. The airline transport pilot, the commercial co-pilot, and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight. The airplane was owned by EE Operation LLC and operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight en route to Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida.

During postaccident interviews, personnel from Flyte Aero (an aviation service provider at ADS) reported that they arrived at the owner’s hangar between 0700 and 0730 on the morning of the accident to prepare the airplane for the flight; they did not perform any maintenance. According to fueling records, all four of the airplane’s tanks were filled with a total of 329 gallons of fuel.

According to Flyte Aero personnel, the pilots and passengers arrived about 90 minutes before the flight. The co-pilot greeted the passengers at the hangar and loaded their bags into the baggage compartment. No scale was present, and none of the bags were weighed. Flyte Aero personnel observed both pilots walk around the airplane before the flight but did not see the airplane taxi out.

The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR)—but was not required to be—that recorded the taxi and accident flight (it was not equipped with a flight data recorder nor was it required to be). It was also equipped with automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS). ADS-B recorded the time, the airplane’s latitude and longitude, altitude, inertial speed, pressure altitude, geometric altitude, and other parameters, and TAWS recorded radio altitude, latitude, longitude, and airplane roll angle.

The CVR started recording at 0706:54. At 0749:51, an unidentified person began discussing an oil consumption issue concerning the left engine with the pilot and stated that the issue needed to be monitored. The unidentified person concluded by saying the pilots needed to “keep a log” on the issue and “keep notes.” Flyte Aero personnel reported during postaccident interviews that they did not have this conversation with the pilot; the identity of the person was not determined.

About 0826, the flight crew obtained local weather information via the automatic terminal information service. At 0830:11, the flight crew received clearance to SPG on the ground control frequency. At 0902:59, the CVR recorded a noise similar to an engine starting. At 0903:15, another sound was recorded similar to the second engine starting. The pilots did not call for the airplane’s Before Engine Starting, Engine Starting, Before Taxi, or Before Takeoff (Runup) checklists nor did they discuss any emergency procedures.

According to CVR data, the pilot contacted ground control about 0905 stating he was ready to taxi and was provided taxi instructions to runway 15. At 0909:41, the local controller gave the pilot departure instructions to turn left to heading 050 and cleared the flight for takeoff from runway 15. A sound similar to an increase in propeller rpm was recorded about 0910:11, and the co-pilot called “airspeed’s alive” at 0910:25. The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) sound spectrum study of the CVR recording and performance study estimated that rotation occurred about 0910:32 at a groundspeed of about 101 knots (102 knots calibrated airspeed).

A reduction in broadband noise recorded at 0910:34 was consistent with the airplane lifting off from the runway. Using available data, the NTSB’s performance study calculated that the airplane fully lifted off the ground about 1,900 ft from the beginning of the takeoff roll at a groundspeed of about 105 knots (106 knots calibrated airspeed). The propeller speeds at the time of liftoff were estimated to be consistent with takeoff power, and the two propellers were operating about the same speed (1,714 to 1,728 rpm).

The pilots did not verbalize any V speeds before or during the takeoff roll. With the reported weather conditions (wind at 6 knots from 100° and temperature at 26°C) and at maximum takeoff weight, the takeoff decision speed (V1) for the flight would have been 106 knots, Vr (rotation speed) would have been 110 knots, V2 (takeoff safety speed) would have been 117 knots, and Vmc (minimum controllable airspeed) would have been 96 knots (with flaps retracted) or 94 knots (with the flaps at the approach setting of about 14º).

Six seconds after liftoff (0910:40.1), the pilot stated, “what in the world?” The CVR recorded the sounds of the engines’ propeller rpm diverging about the same time; the airplane’s groundspeed was about 109 knots (110 knots calibrated airspeed). The NTSB’s sound spectrum study determined that the left engine’s propeller speed decreased to about 1,688 rpm, and the right engine’s propeller speed decreased to 1,707 rpm about this time. A click sound was also recorded about 0910:41 followed by a sound similar to a stall warning horn less than 1 second later. The stall warning horn ended at 0910:43; the left engine’s propeller speed was 1,545 rpm about this time. At 0910:43.6, the co-pilot stated, “you just lost your left engine.” The NTSB’s performance study determined that the airplane had passed over the left edge of runway 15 at this time and continued to climb while turning left.

At 0910:44, the sound of a chime was recorded followed by the sound of another click. About this time, the left engine’s propeller speed increased to 1,632 rpm but began to decrease again. The NTSB’s performance study calculated that the airplane began to roll left about 0910:45. At 0910:45.2, the stall warning horn sounded again and continued until the end of the recording. About 0910:47, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 100 ft agl. At 0910:48.8, the “bank angle” annunciator sounded; the airplane had rolled to 10.6º left-wing down about this time. At 0910:49.5, an expletive from the co-pilot was recorded along with two more “bank angle” annunciations at 1-second intervals. The airplane’s altitude was about 70 ft agl and its groundspeed was about 85 knots about this time.

At 0910:51.1, the sound of the airplane’s impact with the hangar was recorded. About this time, the estimated speed of the left engine’s propeller was 1,403 rpm, and the estimated speed of the right engine’s propeller was above 1,700 rpm. Digital video obtained from multiple cameras both on and off the airport showed that the airplane rolled to its left and impacted the hangar in an inverted attitude and that an explosion immediately followed. The airplane then impacted the hangar floor, breached a closed roll-up garage door, came to rest on its right side outside of the hangar, and was consumed by fire.

Multiple witnesses observed the brief flight. One witness standing on the ramp at the airport reported that the airplane sounded underpowered immediately after takeoff “like it was at a reduced power setting.” A second witness standing on the ramp reported that the airplane sounded like it did not have sufficient power to takeoff. A third witness described the rotation as “steep”; the same witness along with two others witnesses reported thinking that the airplane was “showboating” or performing aerobatics.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to people who knew both pilots, they had flown together many times before the accident flight. Although the B-300 is certificated for single-pilot operation, an acquaintance of the pilot reported that he was not comfortable flying the B-300 as a single pilot and that he always had a co-pilot for his flights.

The Pilot

The accident pilot completed recurrent training in the accident airplane (N534FF) on March 23, 2019, at Rich Aviation Services, Fort Worth, Texas. The training consisted of 2.7 hours in the airplane, including abnormal and emergency procedures, and ground training on the airplane’s systems, which included—but was not limited to—engine/propellers, performance, and weight and balance.

During a postaccident interview, the flight instructor for the accident pilot’s most recent recurrent training stated that it was the only time he had flown with the pilot. They briefed the entire profile before the flight; it was a good briefing of everything they planned to accomplish on the flight. The accident pilot performed well on the simulated single-engine failure on takeoff. Because they were training in the airplane rather than a simulator, the instructor did not reduce power on one of the engines on the runway for safety reasons. The instructor waited to reduce engine power until the airplane had a positive rate of climb, had reached about 200 to 300 ft agl, and the landing gear were coming up. This maneuver, like all the others, was prebriefed.

The instructor stated that the accident pilot was “super strong” on knowledge about the airplane and nothing about his performance during the training stood out. If the instructor had to point out an area where the accident pilot was weak, it was on the airplane’s avionics. They spent extra time with the external power connected to go over the avionics in the airplane. The accident pilot demonstrated a good attitude during the training and accepted advice and coaching well. The recurrent training also accomplished a flight review and instrument proficiency check. The instructor stated that it was obvious to him that the pilot was a career professional pilot and had gone through professional training before.

Several pilots who knew the accident pilot and flew with him in the past were interviewed. Regarding the accident pilot’s takeoff rotation technique, two pilots reported that he used two hands during the rotation. None of the pilots interviewed reported that the accident pi...