N621JE

Substantial
Serious

Cirrus SR22S/N: 2168

Accident Details

Date
Monday, August 19, 2019
NTSB Number
ERA19FA251
Location
Tappahannock, VA
Event ID
20190819X74817
Coordinates
37.860000, -76.884719
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
1
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's inability to land on the runway in dark night conditions with reported smoke in the cockpit, which necessitated the deployment of the airplane's parachute system.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N621JE
Make
CIRRUS
Serial Number
2168
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
2006
Model / ICAO
SR22SR22
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
CIRRUSSR22 LLC
Address
621 RIDGELY AVE STE 201
Status
Deregistered
City
ANNAPOLIS
State / Zip Code
MD 21401-1083
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 19, 2019, about 0343 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N621JE, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Tappahannock, Virginia. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot departed Richmond International Airport (RIC), Richmond, Virginia, about 0327. According to radar and communication data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), at 0335, the airplane was in cruise flight at 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl) when the pilot reported to air traffic control that he was diverting to Tappahannock Essex County Airport (XSA), Tappahannock, Virginia, due to an electrical smell in the cabin. The controller acknowledged the transmission and attempted to confirm that it was an electrical smell in the cabin, to which the pilot replied that he did not know what the smell was, but he was going to start a descent for XSA. At 0336, the pilot reported XSA in sight and the controller advised the pilot that he could switch radio frequencies to the common traffic advisory frequency for XSA, which the pilot acknowledged. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane.

According to the pilot, he noticed smoke and attempted to land at XSA but performed a go-around because the airplane was too high to land. He then turned off the air conditioner and electrical system and attempted to land again, but it was dark and hard to see and breathe due to the smoke. At 0343, the pilot entered an emergency transponder code and the controller attempted to contact the pilot three times with no success. At that time, the airplane was at 600 ft msl and the airspeed began to decrease. The pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and did not recall anything else except waking up in a hospital 3 days later. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot's logbook was not recovered. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was located in swampy terrain at the bottom of a ravine about 600 ft from the approach end of runway 28 at XSA. It came to rest in a near-vertical, nose-down position in deep mud. The empennage had separated from the airplane; there was no damage to the vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, rudder, or elevator. The deployed CAPS parachute remained attached to the airframe. The entire wing structure remained intact but had separated from the fuselage. The left wing exhibited leading edge impact damage. The right wing was fractured outboard of the outer aileron attach point. The left fuel tank was breached while the right fuel tank remained intact and contained fuel. The wing flaps and ailerons remained attached; the flaps were in the fully-extended position.

The nose section remained buried in mud and water up to the instrument panel. The pilot's four-point harness was cut by rescue personnel. Initial examination of the primary flight display (PFD), multifunction display (MFD), integrated flight display, autopilot unit, circuit panel, switch panel, and their associated wires did not reveal any evidence of electrical arcing or burning. A data card from the Avidyne MFD and the Avidyne DFC-90 autopilot unit were retained and forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, for data download. The wreckage was retained for further examination.

The airframe and engine were examined again at a recovery facility by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator, an NTSB Fire & Explosion Specialist, and an investigator from the airframe manufacturer.

None of the wires in the instrument panel or on the engine exhibited any chafing, sooting, melting or evidence of electrical arcing. The PFD, MFD, Avidyne 540, Avidyne 440, blower motor, avionics cooling fan, XM receiver, enhanced ground proximity warning system, ADS-B receiver, data acquisition unit, heat sync, turn coordinator, directional gyro, and Mode S transponder were all opened for examination. None of their circuit boards exhibited any evidence of arcing, sooting, melting, or electrical damage. Additionally, the cockpit switches and circuit breakers were examined and no anomalies were noted.

Examination of the engine revealed that the three-blade propeller remained attached to the crankshaft. Two propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratches and tip curling, and one of those blades was also twisted. The third propeller blade was bent aft. The Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 intake tubes were separated from the top of their respective cylinder. The top spark plugs were removed and their electrodes were intact, with the exception of the No. 4 spark plug, which exhibited impact damage. The electrodes exhibited corrosion consistent with submersion in the water at the bottom of the ravine. The engine-driven fuel pump was removed and its drive coupling was intact. Due to impact damage, the crankshaft could only be rotated about 90°; however, camshaft and crankshaft continuity was established to the rear accessory section of the engine. FLIGHT RECORDERSData were successfully downloaded and plotted from the MFD and autopilot. The data ended consistent with the pilot's report that he shut off the electrical system before CAPS deployment. Review of the data did not reveal any mechanical or electrical anomalies that would have resulted in smoke in the cabin.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA19FA251