N214K

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn January 27, 2020, at 1254 eastern standard time, an Aeropro CZ A220 airplane, N214K, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Grafton, West Virginia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness and registration records, the pilot purchased the newly assembled airplane on January 23, 2020. The mechanic who completed the airplane’s final assembly reported that the pilot arrived at Shawnee Field Airport (1I3), Bloomfield, Indiana, on January 25, 2020, to begin taking delivery of the airplane. He reported that the pilot completed multiple training flights with a flight instructor the day before the accident.

The mechanic further reported that, on the morning of the accident, the pilot planned to begin his trip toward his home in Massachusetts. He added that the pilot told him that he would be “scud running” most the morning in order to “clear some miles.” The instructor who flew with the pilot over the weekend reported that, “I was afraid he [the pilot] was going to try to scud run,” because the pilot stated to him on the morning of the accident, he was going to “scud run.” The mechanic and flight instructor reported that the pilot departed from 1I3 for the cross-country flight about 0900. They both added that, at the time of his departure from 1I3, low ceilings and visibility with fog persisted in the area.

According to fixed-based operator (FBO) employees and fuel receipt records, the airplane arrived at North Central West Virginia Airport (CKB), Clarksburg, West Virginia, shortly before 1230. The pilot requested to fuel the airplane himself and he subsequently added a total of 16 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation fuel divided between both wing fuel tanks. He informed the FBO employees that he was headed to Massachusetts; however, he did not provide any specific intermediate destination. Before departing, he showed the airplane’s parachute system to one of the employees. The other employee reported that the pilot, prior to departing, stated, “your weather is bad.”

Review of FAA air traffic control (ATC) communications revealed that the pilot was given clearance by a CKB tower controller to taxi and subsequently depart runway 21 under visual flight rules (VFR). The pilot departed the area to the northeast, a frequency change was approved, and there were no further communications with ATC.

Review of FAA automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data revealed that the airplane departed runway 21 at 1246 and proceeded to climb to about 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) on a northeast heading for 4 minutes. The airplane leveled off for about 1 minute, then re-entered a climb at an increased rate. For the next three minutes, the airplane continued to climb, its groundspeed slowed significantly, and the airplane’s course began to deviate to the left and right.

In the final minute of the flight, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 5,500 ft msl, and then descended about 600 ft before climbing to 5,100 ft. Subsequently, the flight track showed the airplane complete a 180° rapidly descending left turn. The final data point was at 1254:16, which depicted the airplane about .25 nautical mile from the accident site heading south, at 4,300 ft msl. Figure 1 provides an overview of the final few minutes of the flight.

Figure 1: Overview of the ADS-B flight track for the final few minutes of the flight.

Figure 2 provides a three-dimensional view of the ADS-B data for the final minute of the flight.

Figure 2: A three-dimensional view of the ADS-B flight track for the final minute of the flight.

Figure 3 is a chart of the reported altitude and groundspeed for the entire flight. The source of this data is from L3 Harris OPSVUE.

Figure 3: A chart of the reported altitude and groundspeed for the entire flight.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONA review of the pilot's logbook revealed the pilot had logged 967 total hours of flight experience, of which 5.3 hours were instructional hours in the accident airplane recorded the day before the accident. The pilot logged 25 and 8 hours in the past 90 and 30 days, respectively. From August 8, 2019, to January 26, 2020, the pilot had logged 7 hours of actual instrument fight time and accumulated 16 instrument approaches. His most recent flight review was completed on September 8, 2018. Several pages of the pilot’s logbook were damaged by the postcrash fire and were not legible.

The instructor who completed the 5.3 hours of initial training in the accident airplane with the pilot reported that the pilot performed “just fine” in their flights, which included takeoffs, landings, maneuvering, and simulated instrument conditions. He recalled stating to the pilot, that the airplane “would be very difficult” to fly in clouds. The instructor believed that the airplane’s flight manual stated that the airplane must be flown only under day visual flight rules conditions. He could not recall having any conversation with the pilot about the whole airframe parachute system installed on the airplane.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the 2-seat, single-engine, high-wing special light sport airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate on January 23, 2020. It was powered by a Rotax 912 ULS 100-horsepower engine and was equipped with a BRS Aerospace Whole Aircraft Rescue Parachute System. According to a bill of sale and registration application, the pilot purchased and registered the airplane on January 23, 2020.

The operating limitations in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) provided a warning against flight into instrument and icing conditions. (see Figure 4.)

Figure 4: A warning excerpt from the POH.

The POH stated that the aerodynamic stall speed was 43 mph (37 knots) with flaps down, and 49 mph (42 knots) with flaps up. It also provided an additional warning that stated, “The stall speed mentioned above are with wings level. Once any angle of bank (e.g. turn) is encountered the stall speed is significantly increasing. Example: angle of bank 60° ……. VS = 73 MPH [63 knots].”

A review of the POH found that the airplane was not equipped with any anti-ice or de-ice equipment, including pitot heat.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe route of flight and accident site were located immediately northeast of a stationary front and behind a trough in an area of general low pressure. Weather observations near the route of flight about the time of the accident indicated marginal VFR conditions and instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions.

The 1253 recorded weather observation at CKB (the departure airport), which was located about 10 miles southwest of the accident site at an elevation of 1,224 ft, included a broken ceiling at 1,800 ft above ground level (agl), an overcast ceiling at 2,300 ft agl, 10 statute miles visibility, wind 260° at 6 knots, temperature was 4°C, dew point -2°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.83 inches of Hg.

The 1253 recorded weather observation at Morgantown Municipal Airport (MGW), Morgantown, West Virginia, which was located about 16 miles north of the accident site at an elevation of 1,244 ft, included an overcast ceiling of 2,100 ft agl, 10 statute miles visibility, wind 280° at 7 knots, temperature 3°C, dew point -2°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.82 inches of Hg.

The 1255 recorded weather observation at Garrett County Airport (2G4), Oakland, Maryland, approximately 34 miles northeast of the accident site at an elevation of 2,933 ft, included, ceiling overcast at 600 ft agl, wind from 260° at 10 knots gusting to 16 knots, wind from 242° variable 302°, 10 miles or more visibility, temperature -2°C, dew point -3°C, altimeter 29.72 inches of Hg.

According to a High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) numerical model performed for the area surrounding the accident site, a cloud layer existed from about 2,600 ft msl through 11,500 ft msl. The freezing level was about 1,800 ft msl, which supported conditions conducive to structural airframe icing in the clouds with a mixture of clear to rime type icing at moderate intensities. The model also identified possible mountain wave turbulence in the clouds.

According to Leidos Flight Service, there was no record that the pilot received a weather briefing or filed flight plans on the day of the accident. Forecast weather products that would have been available to the pilot included a terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) and AIRMETs calling for overcast clouds, IFR conditions, moderate icing, and mountain obscuration conditions.

AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airworthiness records, the 2-seat, single-engine, high-wing special light sport airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate on January 23, 2020. It was powered by a Rotax 912 ULS 100-horsepower engine and was equipped with a BRS Aerospace Whole Aircraft Rescue Parachute System. According to a bill of sale and registration application, the pilot purchased and registered the airplane on January 23, 2020.

The operating limitations in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) provided a warning against flight into instrument and icing conditions. (see Figure 4.)

Figure 4: A warning excerpt from the POH.

The POH stated that the aerodynamic stall speed was 43 mph (37 knots) with flaps down, and 49 mph (42 knots) with flaps up. It also provided an additional warning that stated, “The stall speed mentioned above are with wings level. Once any angle of bank (e.g. turn) is encountered the stall speed is significantly increasing. Example: angle of bank 60° ……. VS = 73 MPH [63 knots].”

A review of the POH found that the airplane was not equipped with any anti-ice or de-ice equipment, including pitot heat.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe initial impact point coincided with a 100-ft-tall tree, about 110 ft fr...