N6071R

Destroyed
Fatal

Piper PA60S/N: 61P-0686-7963324

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, January 28, 2020
NTSB Number
CEN20FA070
Location
Springfield, IL
Event ID
20200128X73907
Coordinates
39.762389, -89.572190
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
3
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
3

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s failure to follow the instrument landing system (ILS) course guidance during the instrument approach.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N6071R
Make
PIPER
Serial Number
61P-0686-7963324
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Year Built
1979
Model / ICAO
PA60M600
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
LKJ PROPERTIES LLC
Address
101 N 4TH ST
Status
Deregistered
City
SPRINGFIELD
State / Zip Code
IL 62701-1201
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn January 28, 2020, about 1503 central standard time, a Piper PA-60-601P airplane, N6071R, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Springfield Abraham Lincoln Capital Airport (SPI), Springfield, Illinois. The pilot and two passengers, and a dog were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

About 1301, the flight departed from Huntsville International Airport (HSV), Huntsville, Alabama, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to SPI. According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, the flight departed runway 18L at HSV and turned north-northwest toward SPI. The airplane subsequently climbed to 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and continued direct toward SPI.

At 1440:34, the pilot established radio contact with Springfield approach and reported level flight at 10,000 ft msl. The approach controller replied that the pilot should expect radar vectors to join the localizer for the instrument landing system (ILS) to runway 31 at SPI. At 1441:20, the approach controller told the pilot about pilot reports (PIREP) for light-to-moderate mixed icing in the clouds at 3,000 ft msl and cleared the pilot to descend and maintain 3,000 ft msl. At 1441:32, the pilot reported leaving 10,000 ft msl for 3,000 ft msl. At 1441:43, the approach controller instructed the pilot to fly a 350° heading for vectors to the localizer. The pilot confirmed the heading change, and the airplane turned to a 350° course while still in a descent.

At 1448:54, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were at 3,000 ft msl. At 1449:00, the approach controller told the pilot, "roger, thank you, seven miles from CALDE [the locator outer marker], turn left heading three four zero, maintain three thousand until established on the localizer…I-L-S runway three one approach." The pilot replied, "three four zero on the turn, here we go."

At 1449:29, the pilot transmitted, "we're not picking these navs [navigation signals] on thirty one." At that time, the airplane was still flying along the assigned 340° heading to intercept the localizer and was about 0.6 nautical miles (nm) left of the localizer, as shown in figure 1. At 1449:36, the approach controller asked the pilot to repeat his previous transmission, and the pilot replied, "we still got neg nav [negative navigation] lights on thirty one." At 1449:53, the approach controller transmitted "we're getting green indications here… (unintelligible) just to verify that you are on one one zero point one five on the localizer?"

Figure 1. ADS-B track data with localizer centerline and limits.

At 1449:59, the airplane flew through the localizer centerline while still on the assigned 340° heading, as shown in figure 2. After crossing through the localizer centerline, the airplane made a left turn to a 295° course.

Figure 2. ADS-B track data for first ILS approach to runway 31.

At 1450:01, the pilot replied to the approach controller, "one one zero, three." At 1450:04, the approach controller transmitted, "it’s one one zero point one five” and asked the pilot if he wanted to be revectored for the approach. At 1450:10, the pilot asked the controller, "Is it one one zero, five?" The approach controller replied, "It is one one, ah, zero point one five. one one zero point one five. ten point one five." The pilot did not respond to the controller’s question.

At 1450:24 and 1450:40, the approach controller asked the pilot if the airplane was established on the localizer and receiving the glideslope, respectively, and the pilot responded affirmatively. At that time, the airplane was flying through the localizer at 2,930 ft msl while still on the 295° course and was about 3.8 nm southeast of CALDE. At 1450:45, the approach controller told the pilot to contact the tower controller. At 1450:52, the airplane made a right turn to a heading of about 306° to rejoin the localizer centerline.

At 1450:58, the pilot established contact with the tower controller and, 1 minute later, told the controller that the airplane was established on the localizer. At 1451:10, the tower controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 31. At that time, the airplane was at 2,960 ft msl and was heading toward CALDE about 0.1 nm left of the localizer centerline.

At 1451:25, the tower controller told the pilot that the airplane appeared to be "slightly left of course." The pilot replied, "correcting." The airplane crossed through the localizer centerline on a 340° course and an altitude of 2,450 ft msl.

At 1451:56, the tower controller transmitted, "cancel any clearance, climb and maintain three thousand, turn right heading three six zero," At 1452:02, the pilot replied, "Okay (unintelligible) thousand, here we go, seventy one romeo." At 1452:11, the tower controller transmitted, "seven romeo lima, again, cancel any clearance, climb and maintain three thousand, turn right heading three six zero." At 1452:16, the pilot replied, "three six zero on the turn, here we go, seventy one romeo." At 1452:37, the tower controller told the pilot, "seven one romeo, contact departure, they'll vector you around for another, ah, approach here, you were, ah, right (and) left of course we, ah, it just didn't look safe from here so contact departure one two six point one five."

At 1453:10, the pilot reestablished contact with Springfield approach control and reported flying along a 360° heading. The approach controller asked the pilot if he wanted to be vectored back to the ILS 31 instrument approach or change to the ILS 22 instrument approach. At 1453:45, the pilot replied, "How about we go back to three one?" The approach controller told the pilot to turn right onto a heading of 090° for vectors to the ILS runway 31 approach.

At 1454:11, the approach controller asked the pilot, "are you having some issues with your nav head?" The pilot replied, "Yup." At 1454:17, the approach controller asked the pilot if he would prefer to fly an approach surveillance radar (ASR) approach instead of the ILS approach. The pilot's response was unintelligible. At 1454:27, the approach controller told the pilot that his transmissions were intermittent and asked him if the airplane was having electrical issues. At 1454:33, the pilot replied, "Ah, that's negative." At 1454:39, the pilot transmitted, "we will just do three one over again and…we're picking up a little ice." At 1454:35, the approach controller asked the pilot again if he would prefer the ASR approach instead of the ILS approach. At 1454:52, the pilot replied, "Okay, no we will try it again, it just, ah, took off when we, ah (unintelligible) when we were ah about twenty three hundred."

At 1455:22, the approach controller told the pilot to turn right to a 130° heading and asked if the airplane was still in icing conditions. The pilot replied that the airplane was above the icing conditions at 3,000 ft msl. At 1457:46, the approach controller told the pilot to turn right to a 220° heading and then asked the pilot to verify if the airplane was receiving the localizer signal. At 1458:12, the pilot replied, "we're picking up the localizer."

At 1500:09, the approach controller transmitted, "six miles from CALDE, turn right heading two eight zero, maintain three thousand until established on the localizer, cleared I-L-S runway 31 approach." The pilot acknowledged this instruction. The airplane entered a descent from 3,000 ft msl following the approach clearance. The published glideslope intercept altitude for the ILS runway 31 approach was 2,100 ft msl.

Between 1500:35 and 1501:00, the airplane's course was about 270° as it approached the localizer from the east, as shown in figure 3. At 1501:00, the airplane turned right to a 290° course and subsequently flew through the localizer centerline at 1501:28. When the airplane flew through the localizer centerline, about 4.4 nm from CALDE, the airplane was descending through 2,650 ft msl. The airplane continued toward CALDE slightly left of the localizer centerline. At 1502:03, the approach controller transmitted, "Aerostar seven one romeo, is everything looking good now, we are showing you on course." At 1502:07, the pilot replied, "yup, looking good."

Figure 3. ADS-B track data for second ILS approach to runway 31.

At 1502:11, the approach controller instructed the pilot to contact Springfield tower, and the pilot acknowledged this instruction. At that time, the airplane was about 3 nm from CALDE, descending through 2,300 ft msl, and 0.05 nm to the left the localizer centerline. About 1502:16, the airplane entered a left turn away from the localizer and descended below the glideslope intercept altitude (2,100 ft msl), as shown in figures 3 and 4.

Figure 4. Airplane altitude with glideslope reference.

At 1502:37 and 1502:45, the tower controller attempted to contact the pilot. At 1502:47, the pilot replied, "we've got a prob,” and then the transmission cut off. At that time, the airplane was descending through 1,275 ft msl on a 246° course. No further transmissions were received from the pilot.

The final recorded ADS-B data point, at 1503:11, indicated that the airplane was at an altitude of 641 ft msl (about 66 ft above ground level [agl]) with a groundspeed and ground track of 87 knots and 267°, respectively, as shown in figure 5. During the final 5 seconds of recorded data, the airplane’s descent rate changed rapidly from 1,500 to about 5,450 fpm. The final ADS-B data point was located about 380 ft east-northeast of the location where the airplane impacted terrain. A postcrash fire ensued.

Figure 5. Altitude, groundspeed, and vertical speed data for the second ILS approach. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONA review of available logbook documentation revealed that the pilot's last recorded flight was for a 2017 flight review. The available evidence for this investigation did not indicate whether the pilot had a more current logbook. The pilot w...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN20FA070