N456FL

Substantial
Minor

RAYTHEON 400AS/N: RK-365

Accident Details

Date
Sunday, November 1, 2020
NTSB Number
ERA21LA036
Location
Fernandina Beach, FL
Event ID
20201103102225
Coordinates
30.611833, -81.461194
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
1
Uninjured
5
Total Aboard
6

Probable Cause and Findings

The flight crew's improper decision to land with a tailwind on a wet runway, which resulted in a runway overrun. Contributing to the accident was the copilot’s early retraction of the speed brakes and the pilot’s decision to turn off the anti-skid system.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N456FL
Make
RAYTHEON
Serial Number
RK-365
Engine Type
Turbo-jet
Year Built
2003
Model / ICAO
400ABE40
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Multi Engine
No. of Engines
2

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
CONSTANT AVIATION LLC
Address
18601 CLEVELAND PKWY DR
Status
Deregistered
City
CLEVELAND
State / Zip Code
OH 44135-3231
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 1, 2020, about 1400 eastern standard time, a Raytheon 400A airplane, N456FL, operated by Georgia Jet Incorporated, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida. One passenger sustained minor injuries, and the pilot, copilot, and three passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight.

The flight departed from Naples Municipal Airport (APF), Naples, Florida, about 1304 in visual meteorological conditions. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), at 1337:22, while the airplane was en route to its destination, air traffic control informed the flight crewmembers that they would be entering an area of moderate-to-heavy precipitation in the next 1.5 miles and that an area of heavy-to-moderate precipitation was directly over FHB. The pilots then discussed the weather that was over the airport and the runway to use. The pilots stated that the airplane had plenty of fuel for holding if the weather over the airport did not improve before their arrival in the FHB area.

At 1349:46, the flight crew requested a descent to 2,500 ft, which was approved by the controller. Upon reaching 2,500 ft, the flight crew discussed that the airplane was still in instrument meteorological conditions. The flight crew then asked the approach controller for vectors for the area navigation (RNAV) approach for runway 13. The copilot stated that, if needed, the airplane could hold at a waypoint before attempting the approach. At 1352:22, the copilot told the pilot that they should attempt the approach. The pilot agreed and noted that the reported weather was “just a little rain shower” and that he did not expect any concerns with windshear. At 1355:25, the controller cleared the airplane for the RNAV approach to runway 13.

In a postaccident statement, the copilot described that he checked the automated weather observing system on the downwind leg of the approach. The wind was from about 110° at 4 knots gusting to 18 knots. Rain showers had passed over the airport before the airplane’s arrival in the FHB area. He also described that the landing data calculations were within limits for a 5,152-ft-long wet runway (based on the wind reported by the automated weather observation).

At 1357:39, the flight crew performed the before landing checklist and stated that the landing gear was down and that the flaps were at 30°. At 1358:04 the copilot stated, “I got you at ref (Vref) plus 20” (the airplane’s calculated Vref speed was 110 knots). At 1358:30, the pilot stated, “we’ll probably just go hold for 15 minutes and try it again.” The copilot replied, “yeah you got a 22-knot tailwind.” The flight crew continued the approach. At 1359:05, the copilot reported 300 ft until minimums and stated that he had the runway in sight. The pilot stated he had the runway in sight and that the approach would continue. At 1359:52, the copilot stated, “speeds good. Hold whatcha got and put [the airplane] on down. Still got a tailwind.”

In their post accident statements, the pilot and copilot described the subsequent landing. The copilot stated that the engine was at idle power when the airplane was 50 ft above ground level. The airplane touched down on speed, on centerline, and on aim point. The copilot deployed the speed brakes when the airplane’s speed was about 97 knots. The pilot applied the brakes, but the airplane was not decelerating normally. The pilot further described that he knew immediately that there was a problem with the brakes because he received “zero feedback.” The pilot then instructed the copilot to deactivate the anti-skid system during the final third of the runway, but the braking action did not improve. The pilot was able to reduce the airplane’s groundspeed with side-to-side steering, and then he straightened out the airplane as it departed the end of the runway.

According to data retrieved from the airplane’s flight data recorder, after touchdown, ground speed was initially in excess of 120 knots. The weight on wheels switch did activate indicating that the airplane had transitioned from air to ground mode, and the speed brakes were deployed after touchdown. However, about 6-seconds after being deployed (at a ground speed of more than 100 knots), the speed brakes were retracted (at 1400:18).

At 1400:11, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airplane touching down on the runway. Afterward, the pilot stated, “it won’t stop.” The copilot reported the speed as 105 knots. The pilot repeated, “it won’t stop” and “hang on.” Four alert tones, similar to the landing gear warning tone, were then recorded. The pilot stated, “anti-skid off,” and the copilot replied that the antiskid was off. The copilot stated, “go around,” and the pilot replied, “I can’t go around,” to which the copilot stated, “okay.” At 1400:35, a sound similar to the airplane departing the paved surface was recorded. After the airplane came to rest, the CVR recorded the pilot stating, “man those brakes did not work at all,” and the copilot replying, “nope.” Neither pilot reported any anomalies with the antiskid system, and no “ANTISKID FAIL” annunciation occurred during the accident flight.

In his postaccident statement, the copilot described that the airplane stopped about 150 ft beyond the runway in soft soil and grass. According to the pilot, when he observed the runway after the accident it appeared wet and opaque with no standing water. The pilot also stated that there were no skid marks on the runway except in the area of the side-to-side skidding.

According to a witness, who was flying his airplane about the time of the accident and landed at the airport shortly afterward, he could see some weather coming through the airport area. Air traffic control had vectored him to the west; while he was outbound on the vector, the visibility decreased to about 1/2 mile, the wind direction shifted to 340°, and the wind gusts increased to 20 to 30 knots, and heavy rain began. After landing, the witness noticed that the runway was extremely wet.

According to a passenger aboard the accident airplane, during the landing, they “hit the ground” and it felt “like a push, like they were going up again.” The airplane started to slide and then went off the runway into dirt. The passenger heard the pilot say that he had no brakes. She could see the left wing dig into the dirt and thought that the airplane was going to flip over. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONWheel Brake System

The main landing gear wheels were equipped with full-powered brakes operated by pressing on the rudder pedals. The brake system can work with or without the anti-skid system. Emergency braking could be accomplished through a nitrogen brake system using the emergency brake control lever, which was installed on the upper right side of the cockpit pedestal.

Antiskid System

The antiskid system was electrically controlled. The system detected the start of a skid condition at the wheels and automatically released the brake pressure for both wheels based on the severity of the skid. The system was activated by placing the “ANTI SKID” switch, which was located on the center pedestal, in the “ON” position. A stationary wheel speed transducer, mounted inside each main gear axle, would electrically sense any change in wheel rotation speed. As a skid was detected, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which would then release hydraulic pressure from the brakes. With brake pressure released, the wheel speed would then increase, and hydraulic pressure would be restored to the brakes. The antiskid system would continue this cycle if the braking pressure was causing the skidding condition. The “OFF” position on the “ANTI SKID” switch would restore the system to the power brake mode after a 2- to 3-second delay.

Avionics System

The airplane had a Collins Pro Line 21 integrated avionics system. The system had four adaptive flight displays that showed attitude, heading, altitude, airspeed, navigation, flight control functions, and engine and systems indications.

The primary flight display and multifunction display had overlays that showed weather hazards. Groundspeed was displayed in knots along the bottom of the multifunction display. Wind speed and direction were displayed on the primary flight display and the multifunction display. An arrow showed the wind direction relative to the airplane’s position.

Weight and Balance Information

Review of the passenger load and fuel load found that the airplane was within weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONWeather at Time of Accident

A trough was moving through the area near the accident site at the time of the accident. The trough helped to initiate a line of rain showers that moved eastward across the area during the period surrounding the accident.

The 1355 meteorological aerodrome report for FHB indicated a southeast wind gusting to 18 knots, heavy rain, and temporary instrument meteorological conditions. The wind quickly shifted to the northwest by 1400 with gusts to 23 knots. The wind remained from the northwest through 1410.

Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler indicated moderate-to-heavy precipitation over the airport before the accident, and the 1400 high-resolution rapid refresh sounding indicated downdraft or gusting surface wind up to 37 knots.

Accident Weather Forecast

A center weather advisory issued at 1254, which was valid through 1500, warned that areas of scattered rain showers and isolated thunderstorm could occur near the accident site. The Jacksonville International Airport (JAX), Jacksonville, Florida, terminal aerodrome forecast warned of gusting wind conditions during the time surrounding the accident. (JAX was the closest airport to the accident site with a terminal aerodrome forecast.)

Pilot Weather Information

The pil...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA21LA036