Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to depart into low instrument meteorological conditions.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 26, 2021, about 1811 eastern standard time, a Cessna R182 airplane, N3652C, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Gainesville, Georgia. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The airplane departed Lee Gilmore Memorial Airport (GVL), Gainesville Georgia, destined for Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB), Daytona Beach, Florida.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) information, the pilot established communication with the clearance delivery controller and requested an IFR clearance to DAB. The pilot also requested an enroute altitude of 3,000 feet msl. The controller subsequently issued a release for departure with instructions to fly heading 140°, maintain 3,000 feet, and issued a clearance void time of 10 minutes.
The airplane departed about 1808:24, and the pilot established communication with the controller while climbing through 1,800 feet for 3,000 feet. The airplane then began turning southwest as it climbed through 2,200 ft msl. The controller informed the pilot that they appeared to be on a westbound heading and asked them if they were on the assigned heading of 140°; however, the pilot did not respond. The airplane began a rapid descent and then the Low Altitude Alert System activated at the controller’s station. The controller issued a safety alert to the pilot as the airplane was descending through 1,400 ft, but the pilot did not respond. The airplane was next observed climbing to 2,500 ft before entering another rapid descent, followed by a loss of radar contact.
Track data indicated that, after departure, the airplane began a right turn and continued climbing, and ground speed continued to increase until about 1809:25, when ground speed started to decrease. Several seconds later, after reaching a maximum altitude of about 2,200 ft msl, the airplane began to descend while remaining in the right turn. About 1809:34, the ground speed began to increase from about 75 knots (kts) to a high of about 165 kts, then altitude and ground speed varied between 1,700 and 2,000 ft msl and 100 to 110 kts, respectively. About 1810:19, the airplane started to lose ground speed rapidly from about 100 kts to below 30 kts while climbing from about 2,000 to 2,500 ft msl, before ground speed increased and the airplane descended rapidly until track data were lost. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on April 8, 2019. He had accrued approximately 384 total flight hours, of which about 44 hours were in the airplane make and model. He had also accrued about 33 hours of actual instrument time and about 38 hours of simulated instrument time. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was a four seat, high wing, airplane of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with a variable pitch propeller and retractable landing gear.
Review of FAA airworthiness records indicated that the airplane was equipped with a rate-based autopilot, an electric turn-and-bank indicator, a standby vacuum pump, radar altimeter, and horizontal situation indicator (HSI).
A Garmin GNS 430W, which was capable of providing Wide Area Augmentation System navigation capabilities and position relative to ground features, chart data, navaids, flight plan routings and approach procedures, was installed, as well as a 3M WX-10A Stormscope, which offered thunderstorm avoidance information. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt the time of the accident, a northeast wind and cold air damming east of the Appalachian Mountains along with a frontal boundary located across central Georgia, helped to induce low cloud cover across northern Georgia and the accident site.
At the time of the accident, visibility restrictions due to fog and mist with ceilings at 400 feet agl were indicated at GVL. Light rain was also noted between 1809 and 1837; however, the weather radar imagery did not support the light rain. It is therefore likely that mist near the ASOS sensor triggered the report of rainfall.
Wind gusting to 18 knots with low level wind shear (LLWS) and turbulence was indicated by a high-resolution rapid refresh (HRRR) sounding valid at the time of the accident.
An AIRMET advisory for instrument flight rules conditions and LLWS and a Center Weather Advisory (CWA), which warned of ceilings below 500 feet agl and visibilities less than 1 mile, were valid for the area of the accident site at the time of the accident.
The pilot had received weather briefings from Leidos Flight Service at both 1715 and 1759 and during both of the weather briefings, the forecast and warnings for low cloud ceilings and LLWS were provided to the pilot. During both discussions with Leidos, the pilot seemed most concerned with the freezing level and the potential for icing conditions below 5,000 ft msl (his intended enroute cruise altitude). Based on the 1800 sounding, the freezing level was above 10,000 ft msl at the accident time. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was a four seat, high wing, airplane of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with a variable pitch propeller and retractable landing gear.
Review of FAA airworthiness records indicated that the airplane was equipped with a rate-based autopilot, an electric turn-and-bank indicator, a standby vacuum pump, radar altimeter, and horizontal situation indicator (HSI).
A Garmin GNS 430W, which was capable of providing Wide Area Augmentation System navigation capabilities and position relative to ground features, chart data, navaids, flight plan routings and approach procedures, was installed, as well as a 3M WX-10A Stormscope, which offered thunderstorm avoidance information. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane contacted the top of an approximately 50-ft-tall tree about 0.66 nautical miles (nm) southwest of the approach end of runway 5 at GVL. The airplane continued on a northerly magnetic heading, impacting another tree about 30 ft above ground level with the left wing and fuselage. The left wing separated from the fuselage, with the outboard half of the wing remaining in the tree while the inboard half fell through the roof of a mobile home. Parts continued to separate from the airplane, including the outboard portion of the right wing and the empennage. The cabin area, engine, and the remainder of the right wing were found about 550 ft from the initial impact point with the tree.
Examination of the airplane revealed that the flaps remained attached to their respective wings, and the inboard half of each aileron remained attached to the wing. The outboard aileron hinges also remained attached to each wing. The right aileron separated from its wing and was found in multiple pieces along the wreckage path. The right fiberglass wingtip and the remains of its navigation light were found near the start of the wreckage path. Both aileron direct cables had separated near the firewall, and the aileron interconnect cable had separated in the cabin overhead.
Both elevator torque tubes separated from the aft bellcrank. The left horizontal stabilizer was found in two pieces; the inboard piece remained attached to the empennage, the outboard portion was found near the start of the wreckage path. The left elevator was found in two pieces along the first half of the wreckage path. The right elevator remained attached to the right horizontal stabilizer apart from the counterweight, which was found embedded in the ground near the end of the wreckage path.
All the flight control cables exhibited signatures of tension overload, with their associated cable ends attached to the cockpit flight controls and flight control surfaces. The rudder cables, upper elevator cable, and both elevator trim cables had separated in tension overload at the bottom of the firewall. The lower elevator cable separated near the aft bellcrank.
Fuel came out of the fuel strainer when it was removed from the firewall. The electric boost pump screen was clear of debris and fuel was found inside. The fuel selector valve was found near the right wing at the end of the wreckage path. The shaft was bent and exhibited impact damage. The valve was in an intermediate position, though ports were observed at all holes. A strong fuel smell was present in the mobile home that contained the inboard section of the left wing.
The attitude indicator was disassembled, and rotational scoring was present on the gyro rotor and the rotor housing. The vacuum pump was opened, and the composite drive assembly, carbon rotor, and carbon vanes were intact. The radar altimeter indicated an altitude of 200 feet. The standby vacuum pump switch was in the “OFF” position. The throttle control, mixture control, and carburetor heat control were all fully forward, and a needle slap mark was observed at the 25 inHg line on the manifold pressure gauge.
The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. The propeller spinner was partially crushed. One propeller hub socket was fractured, and the corresponding propeller blade was displaced aft about 50° and was free to rotate in the hub. The outboard 8 inches of that blade were bent aft about 90°. The blade tip was broken off, and the trailing edge of the bent portion exhibited “S” bending. Another blade was also free to rotate in the hub. The tip of that blade was bent forward slightly. The remaining blade tip was twisted slightly toward the blade face. The governor control arm separated from the governor. The governor drive spline was rotated freely by hand. The governor oil screen was absent of debris.
The engine remained attached to the airplane firewall through the tubular engine mount. The intake and exhaust tubing were partially crushed. The exhaust muff...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA21FA140