N560AR

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 2, 2021, at 0951 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 560XLS+ airplane, N560AR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Farmington, Connecticut. All four airplane occupants (the pilot, copilot, and two passengers) were fatally injured. One person on the ground sustained serious injuries, and three people sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

According to FAA air traffic control audio recordings and CVR transcription, about 0913, the copilot contacted the Yankee Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility to obtain an instrument flight rules clearance to Dare County Regional Airport (MQI), Manteo, North Carolina. The controller provided the clearance and advised the flight to hold for release. About 0948, the copilot contacted the controller and advised that the flight was taxiing and would be ready in 1 minute, and the controller instructed the flight crew to hold for release. The flight taxied toward runway 2, and at 0948:20, the CVR recorded the controller advising the flight crew that the flight was released for departure and to enter controlled airspace on a 20° heading.

The copilot, who was the PM and seated in the right seat as SIC, repeated the instruction. The CVR recorded the PM discussing the departure frequency and transponder code while the PF, who was seated in the left seat and was PIC, said, “kay flaps. trim three times. pitot heat on.” The copilot then said that the pitot static was coming on. Those items were part of the before takeoff checklist, but there was no challenge response for the taxi, before takeoff, or takeoff checklists, and the flight crew did not perform a crew briefing. Further, there was no mention in the CVR recording of releasing the parking brake before takeoff was initiated. FDR data did not indicate any flight control movements consistent with a check of the flight controls.

The CVR recorded the copilot make a radio call on the airport common traffic advisory frequency advising that the flight would be departing runway 2 straight out and that the final and base legs of the airport traffic pattern appeared clear. The sound of engine power advancing was heard at 0950:15. According to data from the airplane’s FDR, both thrust levers were set at about 65°, and both engines were set at and remained at 91% N1 throughout the takeoff roll. While accelerating on the runway the CVR recorded the copilot stating that “power is set…airspeed’s alive… eighty knots cross check… v one”, with the v one call occurring about 1,670 ft down the 3,665-ft-long runway. The flight continued on the runway and at 0950:44, the copilot called, “Rotate.” According to the data from the FDR, the airplane was about 2,000 ft down the runway at about 104 knots calibrated airspeed and the elevator was about +9° when the copilot made the rotate callout. Three seconds later, the CVR recorded the copilot stating, “Oht oht ‘sa matter,” followed 1.7 seconds later by a sound of heavy strain from the pilot and him stating, “it’s [not] rotating.” Then 2.4 seconds later, a sound of physical strain/grunt was recorded from the pilot.

The airplane continued along the runway centerline with left rudder input between 2° and 4,° which decreased to about 0.3° when the airplane was about 2,375 ft down the runway. The flight crew applied an increasing amount of right rudder input to a maximum of about 10°, while the right rudder input remained until the flight was about 2,500 ft down the runway, and a slight deviation to the right began. Several on- and off-airport video cameras that captured the takeoff roll and final portion of the flight showed smoke trailing the airplane, and a ground track reconstruction model determined the smoke appeared about 2,685 ft down the runway (the model is further discussed in the Additional Information section of this report). While deviating to the right, the flight crew applied left rudder input to a maximum of about 18°, and the deviation to the right ended about 0950:52 when the airplane was about 3,125 ft down the runway. The rudder values remained near neutral from the point when the right deviation stopped and the airplane track remained straight to the end of the runway, though the airplane path was offset right of the runway centerline.

When the airplane reached the end of the airport terrain, FDR data indicated the airspeed had increased to about 120 knots, the elevator deflection increased to a maximum value of about +16°, the WOW remained in an on-ground state, and the pitch of the airplane minimally changed briefly to +1° then decreased to 0°. The FDR data further indicated that past the end of the airport terrain where the ground elevation decreased 20 to 25 ft, the WOW indication changed from on-ground to air mode, the elevator position increased to a maximum recorded value of about +17° deflection (or ANU), and the airplane’s pitch increased to about +22° in less than 2 seconds. While the airplane rapidly pitched up, the elevator position rapidly decreased to about 1.0°. At 0950:54, the CVR recorded the sound of electronic stall warning followed one-tenth of a second later by stick shaker activation.

Two witnesses on the ground reported seeing a puff of blue smoke behind the airplane during the takeoff roll. One witness noted the airplane appeared to be “going slower” compared to previous flights, and because of that, he knew there was a problem. That same witness also reported that the airplane never lifted off from the runway.

A witness who was located about 280 ft north-northeast of the departure end of the runway reported seeing the airplane come off the runway in a level attitude. As the airplane continued, it pitched into a nose-up attitude but was not climbing. He noted the front portion of the right engine impact a nearby pole followed by a shower of sparks and a metallic grinding sound.

FDR data showed that the N1 and N2 values of the No. 2 engine were 91.0% and 99.4%, respectively before the airplane impacted the pole past the departure end of the runway. After impacting the pole, the right engine N1 and N2 values immediately decreased to 80.1% and 95.1%, respectively, then both continued to decrease despite the thrust lever angle for both engines remaining at 65° for the remainder of the recording. The airplane began a roll to the right and became inverted in about 3.5 seconds. The airplane impacted the ground then an occupied building, whose sprinkler system was activated. The building and its contents sustained significant structural and fire damage. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot

The pilot was a salaried pilot employed by Interstate Aviation, Inc., which was the accident operator. He received transition training in a level D simulator for the Cessna 560XL (Excel), which was the original type design of the accident airplane, at Flight Safety International (FSI) in December 2009. He subsequently obtained recurrent training at FSI in the Excel in 2017, and recurrent training in the XLS+ (a derivative model of the Cessna 560XL) in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. All training was conducted in a level D simulator, and he passed all of the practical tests on the first attempt. On the paperwork for his latest training, Citation XLS+ Recurrent Pilot-In-Command Course, the instructor remarked during one flight that he observed no weaknesses, and his strengths were, “Good aircraft control, CRM [crew resource management], and procedures.”

The accident operator’s president, who normally flew as copilot with the accident pilot, reported that during typical takeoffs, the accident pilot would center the airplane on the runway, then when almost to a full stop, he would begin the takeoff. The accident pilot would not normally stop on the runway, apply the brakes, then advance thrust and release the brakes. When they flew together, they used the checklist and performed challenge and response. During takeoff, they would call airspeed alive, 80 knots crosscheck, takeoff-decision speed (V1), rotate. At V1, the flight crew’s hands would move from the thrust levers to the control yoke, then engage the autopilot at 400 ft.

Copilot

The copilot was a contract pilot for the accident operator. A review of his available training records revealed that he completed initial training at FSI in a Cessna 525 (Citation Jet) in November 2015. He also received training in the Gulfstream G450 in 2018 and recurrent training at FSI in the Gulfstream G550 on two occasions in 2019. The latest training performed in a level D simulator between November 18, 2019, and November 23, 2019, consisted of 6 hours as the PF and 6 hours as the PM.

A review of provided logbook entries revealed no entries showing a sign off as SIC specifically for the accident make and model airplane. Entries between September 2020 and July 29, 2021, showed that he logged 11 flights as SIC in the accident airplane totaling 25 hours. The remarks section for the flights in the accident airplane did not indicate whether he had performed engine-out procedures, maneuvering with an engine out while acting as pilot-in-command, and CRM training. The attorney representing the copilot’s estate cited the flights in the accident airplane but reported the copilot’s family was unable to locate any records concerning simulator training and had no recollection of whether he had attended training for the Cessna 560 series. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to the airplane’s type certificate data sheet and FAA-approved airplane flight manual, the minimum flight crew for all operations were one pilot and one copilot. Inspections of the airplane and its systems as part of the manufacturer’s scheduled inspection program were last performed last on July 2, 2021. At the beginning of the accident flight, the airplane had accumulated 11.3 hours since the last inspections were completed. According to the aircraft status report, the airp...