N590DM

Substantial
Fatal

BRUCE R PROUSE M24 ORION PLUSS/N: 24213475

Accident Details

Date
Sunday, May 22, 2022
NTSB Number
WPR22FA184
Location
Cape Girardeau, MO
Event ID
20220522105112
Coordinates
37.228004, -89.584832
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s failure to maintain controlled flight, which resulted in a hard left roll, excessive blade flapping and a subsequent in-flight separation of the right horizontal stabilizer.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
BRUCE R PROUSE
Serial Number
24213475
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
2022
Model / ICAO
M24 ORION PLUS
Aircraft Type
Rotorcraft
No. of Engines
1
Seats
2
FAA Model
M24 ORION PLUS

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
PROUSE BRUCE R
Address
6850 S HEATHERRIDGE AVE
City
SIOUX FALLS
State / Zip Code
SD 57108
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 22, 2022, about 0803 central daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Magni M24 Orion Plus gyroplane, N590DM, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Cape Girardeau, Missouri. The private pilot was fatally injured. The gyroplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

A witness reported that the pilot was ferrying the gyroplane to his home in South Dakota on a cross-country flight and had planned a stopover at Cape Girardeau Regional Airport (CGI), Cape Girardeau, Missouri. According to air traffic control audio, the pilot informed the CGI control tower of his intent to taxi to runway 02. After the controller issued taxi instructions, the pilot requested progressive assistance to the departure runway. GPS data retrieved from an onboard device showed that the pilot started to taxi the gyroplane about 0750. The pilot subsequently departed runway 02 to the north about 0758. During the gyroplane’s climbout, the pilot informed the controller that he wanted to return to the airport and the controller cleared him to land on runway 02. The GPS flight track showed the gyroplane make a left turn to the west as the gyroplane continued its climb to an altitude of about 1,400 ft mean sea level (msl). The gyroplane then made a left turn to the southeast about 0800:09, at which time it began a 600-700 fpm descent. The GPS data ceased at 0800:35, when the gyroplane, at a recorded airspeed of about 75 KIAS and an altitude of 1,112 ft msl, was about 320 ft north of the accident site. According to a witness, at some point along the downwind leg to runway 02, she heard a “crack” coming from the direction of the gyroplane. The same witness immediately observed the gyroplane descend rapidly towards the ground. The controller reported that the gyroplane appeared to enter a spin during the descent. Witnesses estimated that the gyroplane was between 750 ft and 1,000 ft above ground level before it descended rapidly and impacted the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAn instructor of the accident pilot who listened to the pilot’s request to air traffic control to return to airport on the day of the accident reported that this was not his normal tone and that he sounded distressed. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe pilot had purchased the gyroplane kit from the manufacturer in Italy in 2021 and had it shipped to a facility in Gulf Shores, Alabama, where he assembled it with assistance from a mechanic. Assembly was completed in March 2022 and the pilot returned to his home in South Dakota. The following month, the pilot returned to Gulf Shores to complete phase one testing. The gyroplane subsequently received a condition inspection before the pilot returned again to pick up the gyroplane the day before the accident. The instructor who helped the pilot transition into the accident gyroplane model reported that he flew the gyroplane for 2.5 hours on Thursday, May 19, 2022, the day before the pilot picked it up and did not observe any mechanical anomalies.

The pilot departed Friday, May 20, 2022, bound for CGI, which was an intermediate stop in his planned route of flight. His planned waypoints and stops beyond CGI are unknown. According to the instructor, after he had landed at CGI, the pilot informed him that his first two stops on his way to CGI were “great”. The instructor recalled that the pilot seemed pleased with the operation and performance of the gyroplane at the time. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe pilot had purchased the gyroplane kit from the manufacturer in Italy in 2021 and had it shipped to a facility in Gulf Shores, Alabama, where he assembled it with assistance from a mechanic. Assembly was completed in March 2022 and the pilot returned to his home in South Dakota. The following month, the pilot returned to Gulf Shores to complete phase one testing. The gyroplane subsequently received a condition inspection before the pilot returned again to pick up the gyroplane the day before the accident. The instructor who helped the pilot transition into the accident gyroplane model reported that he flew the gyroplane for 2.5 hours on Thursday, May 19, 2022, the day before the pilot picked it up and did not observe any mechanical anomalies.

The pilot departed Friday, May 20, 2022, bound for CGI, which was an intermediate stop in his planned route of flight. His planned waypoints and stops beyond CGI are unknown. According to the instructor, after he had landed at CGI, the pilot informed him that his first two stops on his way to CGI were “great”. The instructor recalled that the pilot seemed pleased with the operation and performance of the gyroplane at the time. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe gyroplane impacted a muddy field about 1,000 ft west of the departure end of runway 10 at a field elevation of about 330 ft msl. All major structures were accounted for at the accident site. The main wreckage, comprised of the fuselage, rotor, engine, and empennage, was oriented on a northwest heading. A section of the right horizontal stabilizer had separated from the main wreckage and was located 171 ft south of the main wreckage. The engine was partially submerged in the mud along with two of the gyroplane’s four propeller blades. The other two propeller blades were visible above the surface, and both had separated about midspan; one blade tip was found about 200 ft south of the main wreckage. Both rotor blades were attached at the rotor hub and exhibited similar impact signatures about 3 ft from their outboard ends. They also displayed black transfer marks about 3 ft from the hub of each blade. One blade displayed blue transfer markings on the bottom of the blade about 3 ft from the outboard end, which corresponded to the paint color of the gyroplane including the separated right horizontal stabilizer.

Photograph 1: Accident site

Figure 1: Main wreckage and debris field

Wreckage Examination

Postaccident examination of the gyroplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. The cyclic control system was traced from the multifunction grips at the cockpit to the rotor head through one separation at the upper right control rod about midspan. The damage to the control rod was consistent with overload separation. The rudder cables were continuous from the cockpit to the rudder. All of the hardware for both the cyclic and rudder control systems were secured at their positions.

Both rotor blades remained attached to the rotor hub after the accident and were later removed by recovery personnel. The rotor head remained attached to the mast through the hub bar. The blade 1 teetering stop displayed a partial bend.

The engine was unremarkable. Mechanical continuity was established throughout the rotating group, valvetrain, and accessory section as the crankshaft was manually rotated at the propeller by hand. Thumb compression was achieved at all four cylinders and the valves displayed normal lift when the crankshaft was rotated. Examination of the cylinders’ combustion chamber interior components using a lighted borescope revealed normal piston face and valve signatures, and no indications of catastrophic engine failure.

The four-bladed, ground-adjustable propeller remained attached at the crankshaft flange. All four blades were separated about midspan and remained attached to the hub.

Door Examination

The pilot side door was found undamaged except for a torn hinge, about 170 ft south of the main wreckage near the right horizontal stabilizer.

The door locking mechanism for both the pilot and passenger sides are comprised of a closing block, a locking pin, a door pin, and a latching mechanism. Two door pins were mounted to each of the doors and two corresponding closing blocks were mounted to the door frame openings of the fuselage. To lock the door, with the door closed (and the door pins inserted into the closing block), movement of a hand-operated lever actuates the push/pull rod linkages to insert the locking pins into the closing blocks.

A door annunciation on the instrument panel will illuminate if the door is ajar. If the pilot attempts to take off with the door ajar, the rotor tachometer necessary for the gyroplane to attain pre-rotation rpm before takeoff will not illuminate in addition to the door annunciation light.

An NTSB materials laboratory examination of the pilot side door pins, corresponding locking pins, and closing blocks did not reveal any preimpact or postimpact mechanical anomalies or deformities that would have prevented the locking pins from engaging with the door pins. The passenger door was found normally latched at the accident site with the door damaged. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONDynon HDX1100

The gyroplane was equipped with a Dynon HDX1100 panel-mounted unit that could serve as either a primary flight display or a multifunction display. Data retrieved from the unit included altitude, airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, and heading. In addition, the unit contained alert logs that showed both caution, warning, and aural alerts that were generated during the flight.

According to the data, at 0800:01 as the gyroplane turned to the south at an altitude of about 1,437 ft msl, an audio annunciation began with the aural warning “GEES.” According to Dynon, this alert would have been prompted when the G meter was outside the yellow caution range. The configuration file from the Dynon showed that the G meter yellow range was set between -1 and +3 Gs. During this time, the gyroplane rolled about 36° left and maintained about a 3° positive pitch attitude. The gyroplane continued to maintain a left turn and then rolled into a 19° right roll with a pitch attitude of about -9° (nose down) at 0800:29. Three seconds later true airspeed rapidly decreased from about 85 KIAS to 0 KIAS. One second later the gyroplane rolled inverted in a 20° nose down attitude at an altitude of 1,210 ft msl. Over the 3 seconds beginning at 08:00:32, the gyroplane transi...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR22FA184