Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control after entering instrument meteorological conditions shortly after takeoff.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 10, 2022, about 0800 Pacific daylight time, a Mooney M20K, N305L was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Camarillo, California. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot had flown from his home base of Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT), Phoenix, Arizona, to Camarillo Airport (CMA), Camarillo, California, on the day before the accident, and the accident flight was to be the return trip. The pilot’s wife stated that he called her at 0600 on the day of the accident to tell her that he would delay the departure because of cloudy weather.
About 0724 the pilot contacted Leidos Flight Service and requested an abbreviated weather briefing. The briefer stated that a marine layer was present in Camarillo, and the pilot responded that it was “socked in.” The pilot requested cloud top information and was provided with a pilot report (PIREP) that indicated 700-ft cloud tops along the coast about 40 miles to the southeast at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California, in the adjoining Los Angeles Basin. The pilot responded, “there you go.” After receiving information on a local temporary flight restriction, the pilot asked how he should file a VFR-on-top flight plan with the briefer. The briefer stated that he would need to file an IFR flight plan with a VFR-on-top clearance and that they could do it immediately. The weather at the time included calm wind, a visibility of 4 miles, a 300ft agl overcast ceiling, and mist.
After the flight was plan filed, the pilot contacted the CMA tower controller. The controller provided the pilot with an IFR clearance to DVT with instructions to turn right to 275° after departure for radar vectors, climb and maintain 3,000 ft, and expect 7,000 ft 5 minutes after departure. The pilot replied but omitted the initial 3,000-ft altitude instruction, which was corrected by the controller. About 8 minutes later, the pilot stated that he was ready to taxi the airplane and was given instructions to taxi to runway 26 via taxiways F and A. During the next few minutes, the pilot began to taxi the airplane but appeared to be using taxiway G. The pilot then told the controller that he had not previously departed from CMA, and the controller provided the pilot with amended taxi instructions to the runway 26 run-up area.
About 0758, the airplane was cleared for takeoff; about 90 seconds later, the pilot was instructed to contact the departure controller. The pilot acknowledged the instruction but did not contact the departure controller. About 1 minute later, a controller from the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control called the CMA tower controller and reported that the pilot had not made contact and that the airplane did not appear on radar.
A witness driving along Route 101, a freeway located parallel to and about 0.5 miles north of the departure runway, reported seeing a low flying airplane traveling at a high speed from south to north. The witness stated that the airplane did not appear to have any trailing smoke or vapors and that he could hear the engine operating. The airplane was in a 90° right bank with its belly in view. The airplane then collided with the ground just past the freeway, and a postcrash fire ensued. A video from another witness’ dashboardmounted camera captured the flames and the low clouds and fog enveloping the area. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot’s most recent flight review occurred on May 22, 2021. The NTSB’s attempts to reach the flight instructor who provided the pilot with his most recent flight review were unsuccessful.
FAA regulations require that for a pilot to act as pilot in command under IFR conditions they must maintain currency by performing and logging within a 6-calendar month period preceding the flight, at least; 6 instrument approaches, holding procedures and tasks, and intercepting and tracking courses through the use of navigational electronic systems. The procedures should be performed in actual weather conditions, or under simulated conditions using a view-limiting device.
The pilot’s last logbook showed that he generally documented the specific flights required as part of flight currency and proficiency, such as instrument approaches and flight reviews. The remaining flight time was entered in block entries covering periods of time that often coincided with engine oil changes.
An entry dated March 31, 2022, indicated the pilot had performed an unknown number of RNAV (area navigation) instrument approaches during a round-trip flight from DVT to Hayward, California. A review of publicly available flight data for the accident airplane revealed that its last eight flights from May 4 to June 9, 2022, were not documented in the pilot’s logbook. An entry dated June 6, 2022, noted that the pilot had performed two instrument landing system approaches at Casa Grande Municipal Airport (CGZ), Casa Grande, Arizona.
The first logbook entry, dated July 11, 2012, indicated that the pilot’s total previous flight experience was 1,672 hours. The remaining 11 pages showed that the pilot had flown about 787 hours, 80 hours of which were in actual instrument conditions. The logbook had four references to “VFR on top,” the last of which occurred in May 2019.
The pilot’s most recent FAA medical certification examination was in 2014, and his third-class medical certificate expired in 2016. According to FAA records, the pilot completed a BasicMed Course on May 6, 2019, and reported completing the BasicMed comprehensive medical examination checklist (CMEC) the same day. No CMEC form was found with the pilot’s logbook or was otherwise recovered during the investigation. Records were requested from and provided by the physician who the pilot indicated had performed the CMEC examination. These records did not include a CMEC examination or a record of an examination on May 6, 2019. (The FAA does not require a physician to retain records related to a BasicMed examination, and CMEC forms are not routinely submitted to the FAA.)
The pilot’s wife stated that he had previously flown in actual instrument conditions and that he might have flown in such conditions during a trip to Alameda, California, in February 2022. She stated that he had no appointments, meetings, or compelling reason to return home on the day of the accident. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONFAA records indicated that the pilot purchased the airplane in 2006.
The airplane was fueled to capacity at a CMA fixed-base operator shortly after the airplane landed on the day before the accident. The fuel supplier tested the fuel after the accident, which yielded nominal results.
The airplane was equipped with an autopilot. The roll servo was repaired on March 11, 2021. and an overhauled vacuum pump was installed on March 8, 2022. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONCMA is located within a coastal basin about 7.5 miles from the Pacific Ocean. The area is affected by marine layer weather patterns, particularly during the early summer months.
A terminal aerodrome forecast for CMA issued at 0506 on the day of the accident indicated persistent marine layer conditions throughout the morning and early afternoon with a 3-knot wind, 6-mile visibility, mist, and a broken ceiling at 600 ft agl. A forecast issued at 0713 indicated that these conditions would worsen between 0700 and 0900 with expected variable wind at 3 knots, 1/2mile visibility, fog, and an overcast ceiling at 200 ft agl.
Area PIREPs surrounding the time of the accident indicated cloud tops between 400 and 1,600 ft. A Graphical Forecasts for Aviation issued before the accident flight, which was valid at the accident time, indicated broken cloud coverage with bases at 300 ft and tops at 2,100 ft.
As previously stated, weather information was relayed to the pilot during his 0724 call to Leidos Flight Service. No evidence indicated what, if any, additional weather information the pilot received before or during the accident flight.
The weather observations surrounding the accident time were consistent with low IFR to IFR conditions. Low IFR is defined as ceilings below 500 ft agl and/or visibility less than 1 statute mile. AIRPORT INFORMATIONFAA records indicated that the pilot purchased the airplane in 2006.
The airplane was fueled to capacity at a CMA fixed-base operator shortly after the airplane landed on the day before the accident. The fuel supplier tested the fuel after the accident, which yielded nominal results.
The airplane was equipped with an autopilot. The roll servo was repaired on March 11, 2021. and an overhauled vacuum pump was installed on March 8, 2022. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe first point of impact was identified by a wing-shaped imprint at the top wall of a building located south of the freeway, 1 mile west-northwest of the departure end of runway 26. The imprint was about 50 ft agl, and its shape corresponded to a 15° rightwing-low impact attitude. The outboard section of the right wing and aileron were located on the building’s flat roof. A trail of debris consisting of wing skin fragments and the right flap continued on a heading of about 035° and across the freeway to a secondary impact point in a strawberry field that was 750 ft beyond the first impact point (as shown in figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1. Location of the wreckage and debris field in relation to the departure runway.
Figure 2. Debris field facing southeast.
Note: The debris field travels from right to left, with the initial impact point to the right on the other side of the freeway. The departure end of runway 8 is 1 mile in the background beyond the clouds.
The debris beyond the secondary impact point consisted of the propeller assembly, cabin skin fragments, and flight instruments, all of which led to the main wreckage, which was on the same heading about 250 ft downrange.
The airframe sustained extensive impact ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR22FA210