N150NE

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 3, 2022, about 1915 mountain standard time, an Eclipse Aerospace EA500, N150NE, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident in Mesa, Arizona. The pilot and co-pilot were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 91 post-maintenance positioning flight.

The airplane underwent maintenance at a facility at Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Henderson, Nevada. The maintenance was completed on the day of the accident, and the accident flight was the first flight after the airplane was returned to service. The work performed included the completion of the 24-month/300-hour airframe inspection. Both pilots reported that the brakes appeared to operate during preflight and taxi operations, although due to rain and the airplane not being equipped with windshield wipers, they were traveling relatively slowly during the taxi.

The pilot reported that, after an uneventful flight, he and the co-pilot began configuring the airplane for the landing on runway 22L at Falcon Field Airport (KFFZ), Mesa, Arizona. After slowing the airplane and configuring the flaps and landing gear, they were cleared to land. He reported that, as part of the before-landing checklist, he confirmed that the ABS was armed and pressed the ALL INTERRUPT switch to ensure the yaw damper was off. He reported that the airplane touched down in the landing zone just beyond the 1,000 ft markings, but when he applied brake pressure, the airplane did not decelerate and started to drift to the left.

The co-pilot then began to also apply brake pressure; however, with no significant deceleration and the runway end approaching, he called for the pilot to activate the ALL INTERRUPT switch, to which the pilot responded that he already had. The pilot stated that he was also applying full right pedal to try to steer the airplane back towards the runway centerline, but the airplane did not respond. It eventually departed the left side of the runway, crossed over the last two taxiways, and came to rest in a drainage culvert. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn automated observation for FFZ was issued at 1854 and indicated clear skies, visibility 10 statute miles, wind from 040° at 4 knots, temperature 11°C, dewpoint 3°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.04 inHg.

The reports at 1910 and 1915 showed that the temperature, dewpoint, and altimeter setting were unchanged. At 1910, the reported wind was from 050° at 5 kts and, at 1915 (the time of the accident), wind was from 050° at 4 kts, and nearly a direct tailwind for runway 22L. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONRunway 22L was examined for evidence of tire transfer marks. The first identified mark was from the left tire, just left of the runway centerline about 3,300 ft beyond the landing threshold. The mark continued for the remaining length of the runway, gradually veering left until it crossed over the side stripe at taxiway D2. Three distinct wheel marks were then evident as they crossed over a grass area and through taxiway D1. As the marks continued across the taxiway, the left tire track became distinctly darker, continuing beyond the taxiway and into a drainage culvert at the end of the runway.

The airplane came to rest in a 6-ft-deep drainage culvert 115 ft beyond the end of runway 22L and about 180 ft left of the runway centerline. The airplane sustained damage to the nose structure and both flaps. The nose and right main landing gear assemblies had partially collapsed into their respective wheel wells. Both the nose wheel and the left wheel and brake assembly had broken away from their respective trunnions, and the nose tire had separated from its rim.

There was no evidence of heat discoloration or fluid/oil contamination to the brake pads or disks, all of which displayed normal wear and had friction surface life remaining. There was no evidence of pre-accident brake line damage. The right brake was functionally tested with brake pedal application and was operational; impact damage prevented a similar assessment of the left brake system.

The left tire had worn down to between 1/32nd and 1/8th inch tread depth; the right tire appeared relatively new with ¼ inch tread depth remaining. Both tire contact surfaces and side walls exhibited diagonal and longitudinal scratches and scuffs, and no bald spots were evident. The left and right tire pressures were 82 and 86 psi, respectively. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONThe Emergency section of the airplane’s Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) provided procedures when the brakes are ineffective, or the airplane pulls to one side, specifically:

1. Maintain directional control using rudder and steering

2. Brakes: Release

3. ALL INTERRUPT: PRESS and HOLD

4. Reapply Brakes (Pump Brakes as required): Stop Normally

NOTE: ABS Functionality Unavailable

The Description and Operation section of the AFM stated:

If emergency disablement of the ABS is needed, the pilot (or co-pilot) may press and hold the ALL INTERRUPT switch which will command the ABS to discontinue its function and restore normal braking. If the ALL INTERRUPT switch is held during heavy braking, the ABS will be inoperative and tires may skid until brake pressure is reduced by the pilot. When the ALL INTERRUPT switch is released the previous ABS state will be restored.

Performance Data

An aircraft performance study was performed by a specialist in the NTSB’s Vehicle Performance Division.

Review of the DSU data indicated that the airplane departed HND about 1823. The flight progressed on a southeast track, reaching 23,000 ft about 10 minutes after takeoff.

At 1902, the pilots set the altimeter to 30.04 inHg, consistent with the FFZ ASOS report. The flaps were set to 15° degrees at 1908:35, and the landing gear extended at 1910:42, followed 30 seconds later by the flaps being set to 32°.

The airplane track aligned with the runway at 1913:00, about 2 minutes before touchdown. At that time, the airplane was about 3.4 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 22L, and about 1,325 ft above the field elevation. The airplane was initially below the 4° glidepath defined by the PAPI lights, but from about 1914:30 and 4,500 ft from the threshold, the descent became aligned with the glidepath. The descent rate for the final 2 minutes varied between about 400 and 800 fpm and was about 600 fpm as the airplane crossed the runway threshold.

According to the EA550 landing distance chart, using the airplane’s weight and landing flap configuration with the runway parameters and a 4-kt tailwind, the expected landing distance would have been about 3,370 ft. The airplane’s landing reference speed (Vref) should have been about 87 knots equivalent airspeed (KEAS), and touchdown speed (Vtd) 75 KEAS.

According to the DSU data, at the threshold, the equivalent airspeed was about 18 kts above Vref. Touchdown was identified by spikes and increased noise in the recorded acceleration at 1915, and at that time, the equivalent airspeed was about 20 kts above Vtd. The data recorded at that time showed the groundspeed as about 106 kts, indicating a tailwind of about 10 kts at touchdown.

Based on acceleration data, touchdown occurred about 1,300 ft from the threshold, leaving 3,800 ft remaining on the runway, plus 650 ft for the blast pad and overrun area. The DSU data indicated that the left WOW sensor transitioned to ground mode about 2,490 ft from the threshold, by which time the EAS was 80 kts (groundspeed 88 kts).

The data corroborated the pilots’ account of the airplane veering to the left of the runway centerline as the runway end approached and suggested that the airplane was still traveling about 40 kts as it veered left and departed the runway surface.

The DSU data showed that the ALL INTERRUPT switch was toggled during the approach phase at 1910:25, and again at 1913:30 consistent with the pilot’s statement; however, there was no recorded discrete event or data indicating that the switch was operated at any time during the landing roll.

Review of the last 10 flights before the accident showed that the airplane routinely exceeded Vref by speeds averaging about 10 kts and ranging between 6 and 16 kts.

Irrespective of the airplane’s performance charts, extrapolations based on the deceleration data attained from the ten previous flights show that with operational brakes, the airplane may still have been able to stop on the 150-ft blast pad beyond the runway, assuming it had not departed the runway to the side.

Various Federal Aviation Administration sources provide general guidance on stabilized approaches. This guidance suggests that for an approach under visual flight rules, a stabilized approach includes having the airplane configured for landing and maintaining a consistent and controllable descent at or above 500 feet above the touchdown zone while on the final approach course. Maintaining the correct flight path should require only small corrections, the aircraft should be within +10 to -5 kt of the recommended airspeed, and it should be descending at less than 1000 ft/min. FLIGHT RECORDERSThe airplane was equipped with an integrated diagnostic storage unit (DSU) capable of recording GPS position along with engine and airframe parameters at various intervals. Neither control surface positions (except flaps), nor parameters regarding brake application or brake pressure were recorded.

The airplane was not equipped (nor was it required to be equipped) with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder. TESTS AND RESEARCHBrake System Operation

The braking system was conventional and consisted of brake master cylinders coupled to the toe brakes and connected via hydraulic lines to brake calipers on each main landing gear. Each caliper contained five hydraulic pistons, which pressed pads against a single disk. There are no brake boosters or other pressure assist systems, and the airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or spoilers for use in land...