N21480

Substantial
Fatal

PIPER PA-28-161S/N: 28-7916043

Accident Details

Date
Saturday, March 25, 2023
NTSB Number
ERA23FA164
Location
Johns Island, SC
Event ID
20230325106955
Coordinates
32.669302, -80.010379
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s decision to continue flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the pilot’s spatial disorientation and loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s degraded judgement and performance due to fatigue.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N21480
Make
PIPER
Serial Number
28-7916043
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1978
Model / ICAO
PA-28-161P28A
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
PATTERSON ANDREW F
Address
PO BOX 364
Status
Deregistered
City
CUTLER
State / Zip Code
ME 04626-0364
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 25, 2023, at 1251 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N21480, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near John’s Island, South Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The non-instrument-rated pilot was traveling from Maine to Florida to meet friends at the annual Sun ‘n Fun Aerospace Expo in Lakeland, Florida. A review of air traffic control communications and ADS-B flight tracking data revealed he departed Machias, Maine, about 0820, made two fuel stops, and landed at the Tarboro – Edgecombe Airport (ETC), Tarboro, North Carolina, about 1800. According to the pilot’s wife, the pilot spent the night at ETC in the pilot’s lounge. The following morning, about 0814, he departed for the Conroy-Horry County Airport (HYW), Conroy, South Carolina, and landed about 1043.

According to an employee at HYW, the pilot said that he was headed to Sun ‘n Fun and had been fighting a strong headwind the entire trip. The pilot appeared tired, and the employee could see “fatigue in his eyes.” The pilot checked the AWOS and mentioned that he might stay the night and wait out the approaching weather. However, the employee saw the pilot walk out to his airplane, check the fuel, and depart.

The pilot departed HYW at 1156 for the Palatka Municipal Airport (28J) Palatka, Florida, and climbed to an altitude of 1,600 ft msl. He was in contact with air traffic control and receiving flight following services. At 1243, a controller asked the pilot if he wanted to remain at 1,600 ft msl or climb to a higher altitude. The pilot said that he wanted to stay low to maintain VFR “due to any clouds up ahead.” A controller acknowledged and said, “maintain VFR, altitude your discretion.” At 1251, a controller noticed the airplane started to turn right and descend. The controller asked the pilot if he was maneuvering to stay below the clouds. The pilot responded, “Mayday Mayday…in the clouds…I’m going down.” This was the last communication from the pilot.

A witness heard the airplane’s engine and looked up. He said the airplane was descending straight down, nose first at a high rate of speed. When the airplane impacted the marsh, he could see mud fly up. The witness said the engine sounded like it was “popping.” He said the weather was overcast with low clouds like when it rains.

Another witness heard a high-pitched whining noise and looked up just after the airplane impacted the marsh across from where he was launching his boat. Mud was flying up in the air. He heard several “chopping” sounds, which he believed was the noise of the propeller chewing up the marsh and the mud. The witness said the airplane sounded like a World War II dive-bomber, with the engine whining at a high pitch. He said the weather was overcast “almost as if it was going to rain.”

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Review of weather information indicated that the accident site was located just east of an outflow boundary. Satellite imagery indicated that a 2-mile-wide, 10- to 15-mile-long area of clouds extended along the coastline in the area of the accident site, with cloud tops about 3,500 ft msl. A Graphical Forecast for Aviation cloud forecast, issued at 1100 and valid for the accident time, forecasted cloud bases around 2,100 ft msl in the area of the accident site. A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model sounding for the accident site depicted unstable to conditionally unstable atmospheric conditions from the surface to 1,000 ft. A text-AIRMET and a graphical or G-AIRMET were also issued for moderate turbulence conditions. The weather conditions were forecast to worsen with the approaching thunderstorm activity an hour or two after the accident timeframe.

An automated surface observation from Charleston Executive Airport (JZI), located about 2 miles north-northeast of the accident site, at 1235, reported broken cloud layers at 1,300 ft and 1,700 ft above ground level (agl) with 10 statute miles visibility. The 1255 observation reported an overcast ceiling at 1,300 ft agl and 10 statute miles visibility.

Review of archived information indicated that the pilot did not request a weather briefing through Leidos Flight Service. According to information provided by ForeFlight, the pilot accessed his ForeFlight account and updated the route about 1130 on the day of the accident; however, he did not file a flight plan or obtain a weather briefing through the service.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He did not have an instrument rating. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical certificate was issued on March 3, 2022. At that time, he reported a total of 740 flight hours. The pilot’s logbook was never located.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a marsh and was embedded in thick mud, water, and vegetation. The disposition of the airplane was consistent with it impacting the ground in a nose-low attitude at a high rate of speed. There was no postimpact fire. First responders reported fuel was present in and around the wreckage. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site.

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it sustained extensive damage from impact forces. Both wings, including the flaps and ailerons, the fuselage, and the entire tail section exhibited impact damage. Both wing fuel tanks were breached. Flight control continuity was established for each flight control surface to the cockpit area. The manual flap selector handle was loose but still connected by a cable. The flap handle was found in the third notch of flaps position. Due to impact damage, it was not possible to check the flap chain/sprocket system to confirm the flap position noted on the selector handle.

The fuselage and cockpit area were crushed. The attitude indicator and directional gyros were recovered and disassembled. No scoring was noted on the interior of either gyro housing.

Examination of the engine revealed that the exhaust muffler, carburetor, alternator, and oil sump were not observed among the recovered wreckage. The vacuum pump remained attached to the engine and no damage was noted. The pump was partially disassembled, and no damage was noted to the composite drive assembly, carbon rotor, or carbon vanes.

The top spark plugs were removed and gray in color consistent with normal wear per the Champion Check-a-Plug chart. The Nos. 1 and 4 bottom spark plugs exhibited normal condition. Nos. 2 and 3 bottom spark plugs were impact damaged. The ignition harness was impact destroyed.

The engine’s crankshaft was manually rotated by turning the crankshaft flange. Continuity of the crankshaft to the rear accessory gears and to the valvetrain was established, as was compression and suction to all four cylinders. Mud and water were observed inside the engine crankcase and cylinders. The interiors of the cylinders were evaluated using a lighted borescope and no anomalies were noted other than water, mud, and corrosion byproducts.

No evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were observed that would have precluded normal operation of the engine or airframe at the time of impact.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy of the pilot was conducted by the Charleston County Coroner’s Office. The cause of death was determined to be “Multiple blunt force injuries due to airplane crash.” The manner of death was an accident.

Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected the cholesterol drug atorvastatin and the blood pressure drug lisinopril in the pilot’s heart blood. Neither drug is generally considered to be impairing.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The pilot’s sleep-wake history in the days preceding the accident could not be determined. Although the time of day when the accident occurred was not a time particularly associated with fatigue, due to the pilot’s long distance flying over two days, mention of fighting a headwind for much of the trip, and less-than-optimal sleeping arrangements the night before the accident, it is possible that the pilot was experiencing some fatigue at the time of the accident. This is consistent with the HYW employee’s report that the pilot appeared tired the morning of the accident. Fatigue has been shown to reduce one’s judgment and degrade performance.

According to the FAA Flight Training Handbook, Advisory Circular (AC) 61-21A, page 9, "The flight attitude of an airplane is generally determined by reference to the natural horizon. When the natural horizon is obscured, attitude can sometimes be maintained by reference to the surface below. If neither horizon or surface references exist, the airplane's attitude must be determined by artificial means - an attitude indicator or other flight instruments. Sight, supported by other senses such as the inner ear and muscle sense, is used to maintain spatial orientation.

However, during periods of low visibility, the supporting senses sometimes conflict with what is seen. When this happens, a pilot is particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation,” and this vulnerability could be exacerbated by fatigue.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA23FA164