N635BD

Destroyed
Fatal

PIPER PA32RS/N: 32R-7680233

Accident Details

Date
Thursday, April 6, 2023
NTSB Number
ERA23FA181
Location
Venice, FL
Event ID
20230406107016
Coordinates
27.067180, -82.461380
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
4
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
4

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s decision to initiate a visual flight rules flight into dark night conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation during the initial climb and subsequent steep banking descent into water.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
PIPER
Serial Number
32R-7680233
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1976
Model / ICAO
PA32RP32R
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1
Seats
7
FAA Model
PA-32R-300

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
LUMPKIN WILLIAM JEFFREY
Address
15362 WHELCHEL DR
City
FISHERS
State / Zip Code
IN 46037-7136
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 5, 2023, at 2137 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-300, N635BD, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Venice, Florida. The commercial pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

Earlier on the day of the accident, the airplane departed Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida, and flew to Venice Municipal Airport (VNC), Venice, Florida. The accident occurred during the climb out from runway 23 on the return flight to SPG while the airplane was operating under night visual flight rules.

About 1540, a friend of the pilot received a text message that the pilot was flying with friends to VNC for dinner and would probably arrive between 1740 and 1800 hours. After they arrived, he picked them up in his vehicle, and he, the pilot, and the three passengers went to dinner. The pilot did not drink any alcohol. About 2050, he retrieved his vehicle from parking and picked up the pilot and his three passengers at the entrance to the restaurant and drove them back to the airport.

He then watched the pilot and front-seat passenger conduct a preflight inspection of the airplane, checking the leading edges, vertical and horizontal surfaces, landing gear, propeller, and oil quantity, and also look inside the cowling. The pilot’s friend estimated that the preflight took about 10 minutes. He became concerned as he saw the pilot and front-seat passenger use their iPhones to light and inspect the right-wing flap nearest the fuselage. But after some examination, the pilot stepped up and entered the right door with the front seat passenger right behind him.

Shortly after 2119, the pilot’s friend heard the engine start and saw a black puff of smoke come from the exhaust as the engine began to idle and cough roughly. It appeared after some acceleration it was not firing on all cylinders consistently. When he heard the engine rpm increase, he thought that something did not seem right. He continued to listen to the engine, and the rough idle seemed to smooth out with increased rpm. He then heard the rpm increase and decrease, likely as the pilot checked the magnetos. The airplane then idled for a few more minutes and began moving forward. The airplane paused for a moment and then taxied toward runway 23. The witness lost sight of the airplane before departure but continued to listen on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). He lost track of time waiting for them to take off, but heard the pilot transmit on the CTAF frequency his intent to depart: “Venice Traffic, 635 Bravo Delta, Departing 230, Straight out.”

Several witnesses described seeing the airplane takeoff. One witness stated the airplane was about 300 to 400 ft above the ground when it stopped gaining altitude. The airplane then turned to the north before it impacted the water. Another witness recalled seeing the airplane rocking back and forth before it entered a right turn and descended straight down into the water.

Examination of video from security cameras at the Venice Airport Festival Grounds and the Venice Fishing Pier revealed that the airplane took off over dark water with no discernable horizon, began a shallow climb, then started a right turn. The runway lights turned off after the airplane departed. The airplane’s altitude peaked, then the airplane entered a rapid descent and impacted the water.

ADS-B track data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), indicated that the airplane lifted off from the runway about 2136 and climbed on the runway heading until reaching a barometric altitude of about 300 ft and a ground speed of about 103 knots. The airplane entered a right turn and, at 2136:40.9, began to descend. Over the next 14 seconds, the track data indicated that the rate of descent and ground speed increased. The last data, recorded at 2136:54.6, showed the airplane at 100 ft, with a ground speed of about 136 knots and a vertical descent rate of 3,008 feet per minute. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the pilot’s most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on June 3, 2016. On June 17, 2021, the pilot received certification under the FAA BasicMed program.

No pilot logbooks were recovered or provided. A review of flight time information from an aviation insurance policy that began on May 15, 2022 (about 11 months before the accident) indicated that the pilot had accrued about 1,566 total hours of flight time, of which 250 hours were in tailwheel-equipped airplanes, 225 hours were in retractable gear airplanes, 15.9 hours were in multi-engine airplanes, and 15 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. Further review indicated the pilot had flown 15 hours in the last 12 months, but it did not indicate how many hours of night flight, or actual and simulated instrument time, the pilot had accrued. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONNo maintenance logbooks were recovered or provided. A review of historical business records (an aircraft status report, and copies of previous maintenance logbook entries) obtained from a maintenance and repair organization indicated that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on September 15, 2022. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 5307.3 total hours of operation and the engine had accrued 134.5 hours since major overhaul. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA review of the 2135 recorded weather at VNC, recorded about 2 minutes before the accident, indicated that the winds were calm, visibility was 10 miles, and skies were clear.

Astronomical data indicated that the moon was full the night of the accident and moonrise had occurred about 2 hours 4 minutes before the accident; however, around the time of the accident the moon was at an altitude of 25° and at an azimuth of 109.68°, which would have been low on the eastern horizon, behind and to the left of the airplane. AIRPORT INFORMATIONNo maintenance logbooks were recovered or provided. A review of historical business records (an aircraft status report, and copies of previous maintenance logbook entries) obtained from a maintenance and repair organization indicated that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on September 15, 2022. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 5307.3 total hours of operation and the engine had accrued 134.5 hours since major overhaul. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONLocal emergency services and Sea Tow Venice (a local Sea Tow franchise that provided boat towing services) recovered most of the wreckage from the floor of the Gulf of America, at a depth of about 23 ft. The wreckage was then moved to a secure facility for examination.

Postaccident examination of the wreckage identified all major airplane components and control surfaces except for the right wing, right aileron, right flap, sections of the main fuselage, and parts of the fuel system.

The fuselage had been destroyed by impact; the top portion of the cabin and right wing were not recovered. The left wing was impact separated. The empennage was also impact separated approximately 12 ft from the rear of the airplane. The two rear seats and one seat back that were recovered were impact separated.

The rudder pedal cables remained attached to the rudder bar and had separated at the rear cabin separation area. The left rudder cable had separated at the turnbuckle. The right rudder cable displayed evidence of tensile overload.

Both stabilator control cables were attached to the T-bar and were separated at the rear cabin area. The rear stabilator control cable displayed evidence of tensile overload, and the forward stabilator control cable was separated at the turnbuckle.

The aileron control chain was separated from its sprockets. Both cables remained attached to the aileron control chain and were separated in the main cabin area. The separation areas displayed evidence of tensile overload.

Examination of the vacuum-powered attitude indicator revealed that the gyro was in place, would rotate, and displayed evidence of rotational scoring. Examination of the electric turn and bank indicator also revealed that the gyro had remained in place and rotational scoring was evident.

Flight control continuity was established from all primary flight control surfaces (except the right aileron, which was not recovered) to the control column and rudder pedals except for impact and recovery related separations.

The left wing was separated from the fuselage and exhibited outboard leading-edge damage. The flap remained in place and the aileron inboard section remained attached to the inboard hinge. Aileron continuity was established from the inboard aileron section to the wing root. Both cables separations at the wing root displayed evidence of tensile overload. The pitot mast was field tested with low pressure air and was free from blockage. The inboard fuel tank finger screen was free from blockage.

The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the empennage, and rudder continuity was established from the rudder to the empennage separation area. The right rudder cable separation displayed evidence of tensile overload, and the left rudder cable was separated at the turnbuckle.

The stabilator was twisted counterclockwise from the airframe. Stabilator continuity was established from the stabilator to the empennage separation area. The top stabilator cable was separated at the turnbuckle and the bottom stabilator cable displayed tensile overload. The stabilator trim jack screw displayed 8 threads (1 inch), consistent with a neutral to nose-up trim position.

Examination of the propeller and engine revealed that the two-bladed propeller had remained attached to the engine. Both blades were bent and twisted towards the face side. One blade (the “B” blade) exhibited leading-edge gouging on the outboard portion of the blade, consistent with the pro...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA23FA181