N725AS

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 7, 2023, about 1849 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 182Q, N725AS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Reliance, Tennessee. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) records, the flight departed the South Bend International Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana, about 1559, on an IFR flight plan enroute to the Jackson County Airport (JCA), Jefferson, Georgia. Radar data indicated that for about the first 2 hours and 30 minutes of the flight, the airplane maintained a relatively straight course on a southeast track, at an altitude of about 9,100 ft msl. Two times during the flight while in contact with separate ATC facilities the pilot requested a radar vector around weather, confirming with one controller that the airplane was equipped with on-board weather observation capability.

About 1834, while flying on a southerly heading assigned by the controller, the airplane was located north of moderate to heavy precipitation as indicated by ground-based weather radar returns. The precipitation was associated with thunderstorms that were moving north to south. The associated cumuliform clouds building ahead of the precipitation line would have had strong updrafts as well.

At 1839:29, the pilot was provided with a radar vector for weather and advised to proceed direct to the destination airport. The airplane remained briefly on the vectored heading and then turned left flying on a southeasterly heading. At 1844:00, the pilot established contact with the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center and advised the controller that the airplane was at 8,900 ft msl, which the controller acknowledged. At 1845:04, the controller asked the pilot if he was assigned 8,900 ft msl, to which he replied that he was assigned 9,000 ft msl but was getting “bounced around a little bit.” The controller advised the pilot that the airplane appeared to be out of the southern edge of the weather and appeared to be “…clear of anything I am showing uh although we do show moderate or greater.” About 1847, a Convective SIGMET was valid for the area and the airplane was at the leading edge of precipitation and building cumuliform clouds, and in an area with multiple pilot reports of moderate to severe turbulence.

The airplane continued on the southeasterly heading when, after 1847:22, heading and altitude deviations occurred. A performance study of the airplane’s flight track, based on ATC radar information, showed that the airplane was flying at a calibrated airspeed that was about 11 knots above the published maneuvering speed for its weight. The calibrated airspeed remained above the published maneuvering speed for the remainder of the flight. Beginning about 1848, while flying at 110 knots calibrated airspeed, the airplane began a second right turn increasing to at least a 20° bank angle; the turn was not announced by the pilot or instructed by the controller. About that time, while flying about 26 knots above the published maneuvering speed, the controller broadcast the call sign of the airplane, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1848:24, the controller informed the pilot, “it looks like you are in a little bit of a descent in a turn is everything alright.” The pilot did not reply to that communication and radar contact with the airplane was lost. At the last radar return the airplane was at an altitude of about 8,900 ft msl, at a calibrated airspeed of about 134 knots, and was flying toward the west-northwest.

An alert notice was issued for the missing airplane and ground and air searches were performed. The airplane’s fuselage was located the next day about .3 nautical mile south-southeast from the last radar target. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to the pilot’s FAA airman records, on November 21, 2020, he received notification of disapproval of application for adding an instrument rating to his private pilot certificate. The notice indicated he would be re-examined on preflight procedures, air traffic control clearances and procedures, flight by reference to instruments, navigation systems, and instrument approach procedures. On December 15, 2020, he passed a check ride in the accident airplane, adding an instrument rating to his private pilot certificate. He reported having accumulated 270 total hours of flight experience and 49.5 hours of instrument flight experience on the application for the instrument rating.

The pilot’s logbook was not located; therefore, the date of his last flight review and his instrument currency could not be determined. He reported to an insurance company having 341 total hours of flight experience and 265 hours of flight experience in the accident airplane make and model as of October 10, 2022. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe airplane Type Certificate design was modified in December 2006 in accordance with (IAW) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA01999CH by installation of a BRS-182 parachute recovery system.

Review of the maintenance records indicated that on August 13, 2007, BRS, Inc., Service Bulletin 07-02 was accomplished by installation of kit part number 014125-01, pickup collar upgrade. On February 12, 2016, the BRS parachute was removed for a 10-year repacking., On August 24, 2017, the repacked BRS parachute was reinstalled, and the rocket and igniter were replaced. That same entry specified that the line cutter was due for replacement in August 2022. There was no record that the line cutter was replaced.

By design, the BRS airframe parachute assembly was secured to the airframe by straps connected to both main spars at each wing root and also by straps connected to the left and right attach plates on the rear bulkhead. The front and rear harness straps were connected to separate bolts/bushings of a 3-point shackle assembly (3-point shackle). The riser (strap) of the parachute was connected to the third bolt/bushing of the 3-point shackle. The flight manual supplement associated with the BRS specified that deployment was approved by the FAA up to an airspeed of 135 knots, which matched a placard on the instrument panel.

As part of the parachute repacking, the technician attached the parachute riser strap and the rear harness strap to separate attach points of the 3-point shackle; the work was confirmed and signed off by a quality assurance inspector. During installation of the parachute into the airplane after repacking, the front harness was the only harness required to be attached to the remaining separate bolt of the 3-point shackle. During the airplane’s last annual inspection, which was completed on September 1, 2022, the mechanic who signed off the inspection reported that he performed an inspection of the airframe parachute system using instructions provided by the airplane owner. He reported that the inspection was mostly visual, and he did not report any discrepancies with the system. The BRS system instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) inspections specified external and internal inspections; however, the 3-point shackle was not specifically mentioned, and it could not be viewed during the external or internal inspection as part of the ICA.

The airplane was equipped with an Avidyne EX500 multifunction display that was able to display weather radar images, datalink weather that included METARs, AIRMETs, and SIGMETs, and traffic and terrain information. The airplane was also equipped with a Sandel SN3500 electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) that could display lightning and datalink weather. Both retained components were submitted to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for read-out. Data recovered from the Avidyne indicated that the weather receiver of the device was functional during the accident flight, but the recovered data did not contain any other pertinent information to the investigation. Each non-volatile memory chip of the EHSI was removed from the circuit board and read out and imaged successfully but further attempts to recover data from the chips were not performed.

Weight calculations were performed using the airplane’s latest empty weight (1,894 pounds), the weight of useable fuel with full fuel tanks (528 pounds), the weight listed at the pilot’s last medical (185 pounds), the estimated weight of a duffle bag found in the wreckage (30 pounds), and subtracting the estimated fuel consumed (255 pounds) during the 2-hour-and-50-minute flight based on the flight plan fuel consumption of 15 gallons per hour. Thus, the estimated airplane weight at the time of the accident was about 2,382 pounds.

According to the airplane Pilot’s Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, the published maneuvering speeds (no abrupt or full control movements) at 2,450 pounds were 100 knots indicated airspeed, or 99 knots calibrated airspeed. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe accident pilot requested and received a standard preflight weather briefing package from ForeFlight at 1544 on May 6th. The weather briefing package contained all the standard weather forecast information valid at that time. Because the weather briefing was more than 18 hours before the intended departure, the weather data provided to the pilot did not include graphical forecast data.

The pilot did not request a standard, updated or abbreviated briefing package from ForeFlight before departure on May 7th. Had he done so, forecast data and graphics would have been provided. The pilot also viewed airport information at 1301, 1313, 1429, and while in-flight at 1624 for his destination airport.

Convective SIGMET 26E, which implied severe or greater turbulence, severe icing, and low-level windshear, was issued at 1755, or about 54 minutes before the accident, and it was valid until 1955. The Convective SIGMET was valid for VA, NC, TN, and KY and it reported an area of severe thunderstorms moving from 320° at 35 knots, with t...