N8074R

Substantial
Minor

BEECH V35AS/N: D-8982

Accident Details

Date
Thursday, June 1, 2023
NTSB Number
ERA23LA253
Location
Statesboro, GA
Event ID
20230601192287
Coordinates
32.482750, -81.736944
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
1
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

Maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the pitch servo bridle cable clamp, which led to binding in the elevator control system that restricted aft yoke movement during the landing approach.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
BEECH
Serial Number
D-8982
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1969
Model / ICAO
V35ABE35
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1
Seats
6
FAA Model
V35A

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
HILDE CHADWICK Q
Address
5030 TWO CHOP RD
City
STATESBORO
State / Zip Code
GA 30461-8212
Country
United States

Analysis

On June 1, 2023, about 1455 eastern daylight time, a Beech V35A, N8074R, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Statesboro County Airport (TBR), Statesboro, Georgia. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot reported that he was testing the function of newly installed servos for the Garmin GFC-500 autopilot and calibrating the fuel flow sensor. During the preflight inspection, he moved the yoke and checked all control surface movements. He programmed the flight director, setting a cruising altitude of 3,000 ft with a pitch climb between 5° and 7°.

During the takeoff roll, the pilot noted the controls felt "slightly heavy" and adjusted the ruddervator trim to nose-up using the electric trim switch. After liftoff, he engaged the autopilot, and the airplane climbed and maintained 3,000 ft. Throughout the flight, the pilot issued heading change commands via the GFC-500 display.

After about an hour, the pilot programmed the autopilot to descend to 2,000 ft in preparation for landing at TBR. However, the autopilot failed to intercept the waypoint he had set. He disconnected the autopilot and assumed manual control. While on approach, he noticed the airplane was descending to an altitude lower than intended. He applied power, but the nose suddenly pitched down. Despite verifying that the autopilot was disconnected, he was unable to move the yoke aft. The airplane continued descending and he struggled to regain control.

On the final approach, the airplane impacted a light pole about 1,000 ft short of the runway threshold before colliding with the ground and coming to a stop.

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed an anomaly with the pitch servo bridle cable installation. The bridle cable clamp’s swaged ball fitting was positioned at the 1 o’clock position with the yoke in a full-forward position. However, installation instructions in the GFC 500 Installation Manual Addendum specified that the swaged ball should be at 1 o’clock with the yoke in the neutral position—defined as 4.5 inches aft of the instrument panel, per the Bonanza 35 Series Shop Manual, Page 3-6C (Elevator Rigging Procedure, Serials D-5726 and after).

This installation resulted in the bridle cable clamp being positioned on the upper elevator cable such that it would bind against the former rib at flight station (F.S.) 179 when the yoke was pulled aft. Further examination determined that the installer did not verify the required .5- to 1-inch clearance between the bridle cable clamp and F.S. 179 when the elevator was in the full-up position, as specified in the installation manual addendum.

Additionally, the installer did not follow the required procedures outlined in the GFC 500 Autopilot with ESP Part 23 AML Installation Manual, paragraph 4.2.1 (Page 45), which required:

1. Moving the flight controls through their full range of travel after servo installation and cable tensioning.

2. Ensuring that flight control surfaces move freely from stop to stop.

3. Verifying that no binding or restriction of flight controls resulted from the servo installation.

4. Confirming that servo cables, cable clamps, and main flight control cables maintained adequate clearance from adjacent structures and feed-through holes throughout the full range of motion.

During an interview, the personnel from the maintenance facility who performed the installation acknowledged that the GFC-500 installation had been performed incorrectly.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA23LA253