N802JR

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 8, 2023, about 1932 eastern daylight time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N802JR, was involved in an accident near Croydon, New Hampshire. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was operated by JBI Helicopter Services under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight.

According to the operator, on October 6, 2023, the accident pilot, in the accident helicopter, was conducting visual powerline patrols in the region of the accident site. Due to poor weather at the operator’s base near Pembroke, New Hampshire, the pilot elected to land on private property that had a large field and was known to company pilots as a safe area to land should weather prevent their return to base. The pilot was then picked up by car and ended his shift later that afternoon.

The accident pilot did not have any scheduled flights for October 7th and was off duty most of the day on October 8th. On the day of the accident, about 1700, management personnel from the operator contacted the accident pilot and detailed an aerial photo mission to be conducted the following day at Quonset State Airport (OQU), North Kingstown, Rhode Island.

The accident flight was to be a positioning flight from the off-airport landing site the pilot had landed at on October 6th to OQU, about 115 miles south. According to a family member of the pilot, on the day of the accident, he played golf with friends and planned to reposition the helicopter after golf.

Data recovered from an Appareo Vision 1000 Airborne Image Recording System showed that the helicopter took off about 1931, climbed vertically to about 500 ft above ground level (agl), and began flying northeast. About 30 seconds of flight data was recorded, which showed that the helicopter climbed northeast about 600-700 ft agl. The helicopter then turned east and eventually southeast, and as the helicopter turned, it began descending while its ground speed gradually increased. The helicopter subsequently impacted trees and terrain about 600 ft southeast of the helicopter’s last recorded position (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Overview of the flight information and wreckage location.

A witness under the helicopter’s flight path heard the helicopter flying over her house and immediately went outside. She saw the helicopter with its lights on and described the engine as being “very loud.” The helicopter disappeared from her view and the sound of the helicopter abruptly stopped, but she did not hear an impact.

Shortly after the accident occurred, company personnel from the operator noticed that the helicopter was no longer broadcasting a position, and they immediately initiated a search and notified local authorities. The wreckage was located about 0200 on October 9, 2023.

A download of the onboard image recorder revealed that the helicopter was powered on at 1919:35 and the pilot conducted preflight activities in the cockpit. The HeliSAS Stability Augmentation System (SAS) was observed to be illuminating white (stand-by mode) on the HeliSAS Control Panel (HCP). The pilot increased the brightness on the instrument panel and instrument gauges before starting the engine, and did not make any further lighting adjustments for the remainder of flight. The pilot was also observed to enter a waypoint in the GPS for OQU.

At 1925:04, the pilot briefly exited the helicopter for a few minutes, re-entered, put on his helmet and started the helicopter.

At 1929:23, the pilot completed a run-up and the engine warning light on the annunciator panel extinguished.

At 1930:46 the helicopter entered a hover and took off. The standby altimeter indicated 1,700 ft at takeoff.

Note that the following altitudes are referenced from the indicated standby altimeter altitude. The primary flight display (PFD) altitude could not be viewed due to video blurring. The field elevation was about 1,110 ft mean sea level.

At 1931:18, the altitude was about 1,850 ft, the trim ball indicated full left deflection, and the pilot stated, “Ah [expletive], it’s too dark.”

At 1931:42, the altitude had increased to 2,450 ft, airspeed was 20 knots, and red chevrons appeared on the primary flight display (PFD), indicating an extreme nose down attitude. At this time the pilot stated, “Ah[expletive], [pilot’s name].” At 1931:46, the pilot stated, “What am I doing?”

At 1931:49, the altitude was 2,400 ft, the airspeed increased to 70 knots, and a double red chevron on the PFD was indicating an extreme nose down attitude, which appeared for about 3 seconds. The helicopter appeared to be in uncoordinated flight with full right needle deflection and full left ball. Large rapid cyclic movements were observed, predominately forward and right cyclic inputs, which were followed by two full left cyclic inputs. About two seconds later, the terrain warning inset appeared on the multi-function display (MFD).

At 1931:53, the annunciator voice said, “warning terrain terrain.” This announcement was heard 3 additional times until the end of the recording. At 1931:57, the ’Check Instrument’ annunciator illuminated for about 3 seconds, which coincided with the engine torque gauge and segmented Trend ARC flashing on and off. These indications were consistent with an engine power exceedance that was about to occur.

At 1932:00, the pilot momentarily reached across his body towards the Garmin 696, which appeared to be the brightest of all of the displays. A few seconds later, altitude decreased to 2,100 ft and the airspeed increased to 120 knots. A red chevron again appeared, indicating an extreme nose-down attitude. The helicopter appeared to be in uncoordinated flight, in an extreme right bank, with full right needle deflection and full left ball. The engine torque gauge appeared to be near its maximum and large cyclic movements continued to be observed.

At 1932:04 the altitude was 2,050 ft and the airspeed increased to 125 knots. The red chevron remained on the PFD, the helicopter remained in uncoordinated flight in an extreme right bank, with full left ball, and large cyclic movements continued. The engine torque gauge flashed on and off, and the Check Instrument light illuminated a second time and remained illuminated for the remainder of flight.

At 1932:06, the gauges blurred in the video, and trees began to be illuminated by the helicopter’s spot light in the pilot’s windscreen. The altitude was 1,900 ft and the airspeed was 125 knots. The video ended one second later.

PILOT INFORMATION

According to FAA airman records, the commercial pilot held ratings for airplane single-engine land and sea, in addition to multi-engine land. He also held ratings for rotorcraft helicopter, as well as instrument airplane and helicopter. He held a flight instructor certificate, with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine, and rotorcraft helicopter. On October 19, 2022, he was issued a second-class medical certificate, with an interim issuance denoting it was not valid for any class after October 31, 2023.

Review of 12 months of the operator’s flight hour history for the pilot found that he primarily flew during daylight conditions. The operator was not tracking night currency, nor was there any requirement for the pilot to possess recent night experience as outlined in § 61.57(b) Recent flight experience: Pilot in command, given the flight was a Part 91 single-pilot positioning flight.

The pilot completed his most recent Part 135.293 and 135.299 airman competency/proficiency check on March 22, 2023. The check was satisfactory. The remarks noted that the following conditions and procedures were evaluated: flat light, white out/brown out, RNAV 17 KCON Airport, IMC, unusual attitude recovery, hydraulic off, and FADEC Fail. Operator records showed that the pilot completed his initial airman/competency check in the accident helicopter on April 6, 2016.

The operator’s check pilot who completed the most recent Part 135 proficiency check with the pilot explained that the evaluation of the white out and brown out conditions was a verbal discussion during preflight, given the inherent danger in those conditions. He said the pilot satisfactorily explained a description of what he would do under white out or brown out conditions.

The check pilot reported that unusual attitude recoveries were evaluated. He placed the helicopter in an unusual attitude and transferred controls back to the pilot, who recovered satisfactorily. He recalled that the pilot did not use the HeliSAS system, and the recovery was made in visual meteorological conditions without any vision reducing equipment (i.e., the pilot was not wearing a view limiting device, nor was he required to be). The check pilot further explained that for proficiency checks, all equipment on-board must be airworthy, but it is up to the pilot as to what equipment they choose to use during the flight (e.g., autopilot, HeliSAS equipment, etc.).

The check pilot was asked to explain his knowledge and experience with the HeliSAS, given his experience in the accident helicopter. He explained that there are two ways to engage the HeliSAS, either on the cyclic via a button, or on the autopilot mode control panel. He explained that engaging the system will level the helicopter from an unusual attitude. He explained that it works like an airplane wings leveler button. He explained that he has experience using the SAS feature, and he knows other pilots that have used it as well. The check pilot did not observe the accident pilot using the HeliSAS feature in their checkride. However, he noted that records indicated the pilot satisfactorily used the autopilot during his initial Bell 407 checkride in 2016.

According to the president of JBI Helicopters, the accident pilot had trained other company pilots on the use of HeliSAS and was well educated on how/when to use this feature. He was not certain as to why the pilot did not activate the system at the time of the accident.

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