Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s loss of airplane control and descent into terrain due to spatial disorientation during a solo night cross country flight. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s self-reported fatigue.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn October 31, 2023, about 0358 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172M, N140FS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Pembroke Pines, Florida. The private pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.
According to ADS-B data, the pilot flew from Miami Homestead General Aviation Airport (X51), Homestead, Florida, to Okeechobee County Airport (OBE), Okeechobee, Florida, and landed uneventfully about 0233.
The pilot stated that for the return flight to X51, which was performed without visual flight rules flight following services, he flew east of Lake Okeechobee then in a southerly direction to X51. During the flight he started to feel tired, so he began singing to keep himself awake and noticed there was no “outside [visual] reference except the city on my left.” According to the ADS-B data for the accident flight, after takeoff the pilot climbed the airplane to 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane remained at that altitude between 0336 and 0341, when it was about 49 nautical miles north-northwest of the destination airport.
While continuing in a southerly direction over a non-populated area, multiple heading and altitude changes occurred. The pilot reported he that during that time he, “…could sense that my body was getting spatially disoriented.” The pilot then flew into a “small cloud”, which resulted in him becoming disoriented. When attempting to correct, the pilot overcorrected and had trouble maintaining altitude. The ADS-B data showed that at 0354 while flying at 1,800 ft msl, the airplane made three 360° right descending turns with each successive turn radius becoming smaller. The initial turn to the right placed the airplane over an unpopulated area with no ground reference lights. The pilot added that he was attempting to fly the airplane using the rudder pedals and “… do what my body thought was correct but when I looked at the instruments I knew I was descending. Fatigue and spatial disorientation got the best of me.” The airplane subsequently impacted the marshy terrain below coming to rest upright. The pilot evacuated the cockpit and waited on the center portion of the wing for rescue.
At 0800, personnel of the flight school began an inventory of all aircraft that had been dispatched for night flights the previous night and the accident airplane, which had not been approved for dispatch on a night flight, was not on the ramp. A search was made using an internet-based commercial flight tracking application to locate the accident flight, but the final portion of the flight, consisting of the descending turns, was not initially depicted (due to the selected zoom level of the image). About 0907, personnel from the flight school first observed a text message from the pilot very early that same morning advising that he would be flying the accident airplane. The flight school personnel then immediately contacted several Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control facilities before calling 911 about 0938, or more than 6 hours after the accident. They also flew multiple trips and first visually spotted the wreckage and heard the emergency locator transmitter’s radio signal on 121.5Mhz at 1020. A search and rescue helicopter arrived in the vicinity about 1045, and the pilot was rescued shortly after. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot obtained his private pilot certificate on September 10, 2023, and received a day and night checkout by the flight school on September 13, 2023.
The pilot had scheduled and was approved by the flight school to operate another airplane with a safety pilot on October 30th from 2000 to 0000 hours local; however, the safety pilot could not fly. About 0100, the accident pilot sent a text message to the manager of the flight school and stated his intention to fly the accident airplane. Due to the time of night when the message was sent, it was not noticed until later the same morning, and the airplane had not been approved for dispatch prior to the flight.
The operator reported that fatigue awareness and mitigation was discussed several times during ground and flight training sessions, and at school meetings before and after the accident. Human factors were also discussed during every stage check. Fatigue mitigation was also part of their dispatching in that they would not allow flight booking longer than 4 hours in a 24-hour period. In addition, on the very first day of ground training, an FAA self assessment tool for pilots to ensure they were physically and mentally fit to fly (IMSAFE) was briefed and discussed. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONMultiple pilots who had flown the accident airplane during the previous six days reported no discrepancies with the airplane, engine, or flight instruments.
The airplane’s altimeter system and altitude reporting testing in accordance with (IAW) 14 CFR Part 91.411, as well as transponder tests and inspections IAW 14 CFR Part 91.413, were last performed on November 10, 2021, and due next November 30, 2023.
The airplane was equipped with an Artex emergency locator transmitter (ELT) 345 that was installed in January 2020. The ELT manufacturer description, operation, installation and maintenance manual specified that the ELT transmitted on 121.5 MHz and 406 MHz frequencies, and the installation kit included a cockpit remote switch, coax cable, audible buzzer, and fixed antenna.
Although the ELT was heard operating by an FAA inspector and a helicopter pilot when in close proximity to the wreckage, the 406 MHz signal was not received by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-monitored COSPAS-SARSAT satellite. A representative of the ELT manufacturer indicated that following ELT activation with a nearly fully submerged ELT whip antenna, attenuation would have likely weakened the signal strength and prevented the 406MHz signal from reaching the satellite. The ELT was also not registered with NOAA.
On the submitted NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report, the pilot reported no preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or its systems. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONOn the accident date and location, the moon upper transit was at 0312, and the phase of the moon was waning gibbous with 90% of the moon’s visible disk illuminated. AIRPORT INFORMATIONMultiple pilots who had flown the accident airplane during the previous six days reported no discrepancies with the airplane, engine, or flight instruments.
The airplane’s altimeter system and altitude reporting testing in accordance with (IAW) 14 CFR Part 91.411, as well as transponder tests and inspections IAW 14 CFR Part 91.413, were last performed on November 10, 2021, and due next November 30, 2023.
The airplane was equipped with an Artex emergency locator transmitter (ELT) 345 that was installed in January 2020. The ELT manufacturer description, operation, installation and maintenance manual specified that the ELT transmitted on 121.5 MHz and 406 MHz frequencies, and the installation kit included a cockpit remote switch, coax cable, audible buzzer, and fixed antenna.
Although the ELT was heard operating by an FAA inspector and a helicopter pilot when in close proximity to the wreckage, the 406 MHz signal was not received by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-monitored COSPAS-SARSAT satellite. A representative of the ELT manufacturer indicated that following ELT activation with a nearly fully submerged ELT whip antenna, attenuation would have likely weakened the signal strength and prevented the 406MHz signal from reaching the satellite. The ELT was also not registered with NOAA.
On the submitted NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report, the pilot reported no preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or its systems. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the wreckage at the accident site by a FAA airworthiness inspector revealed the airplane was mostly submerged but upright with only the left wing, inboard portion of the right wing, and upper portion of the vertical stabilizer with attached rudder visible. The ELT antenna mounted on top of the fuselage just behind the rear window was nearly fully submerged. Following recovery of the wreckage, substantial damage was noted to both wings and left horizontal stabilizer. Additionally, the engine and engine mounts had separated from the fuselage, but the engine remained attached by the control cables.
Examination of the aileron and elevator flight controls revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Rudder control movement could not be confirmed at the rudder pedals due to extensive impact damage to the front portion of the airplane.
Fuel samples from each wing fuel tank were bright blue color with no water contamination. A total of about 25 gallons of fuel were drained from both wing fuel tanks.
Examination of the ELT revealed that it remained secured in the mounting structure and the ELT status light emitting diode was blinking consistent with activation. The BNC antenna connection remained attached at the ELT; however, the 15-pin connector was separated from the ELT consistent with impact damage. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONAccording to the FAA's General Aviation Joint Steering Committee, a pilot's sight, supported by other senses, allows a pilot to maintain orientation while flying. However, when visibility is restricted (i.e., no visual reference to the horizon or surface detected), the body's supporting senses can conflict with what is seen. When this spatial disorientation occurs, sensory conflicts and optical illusions often make it difficult for a pilot to tell which way is up. The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3C) described some hazards associated with flying when visual references, such as the ground or horizon, are obscured. "The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) can and will confuse the pilot...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA24LA030