Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
A hard landing after both burner pilot lights extinguished during the landing approach for undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's inability to relight the burner pilot lights.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
On November 4, 2023, at 0850 mountain standard time, an Aerostar International Inc. RX-8 balloon, N50466, was not damaged when it was involved in an accident near Page, Arizona. One passenger was seriously injured; the pilot and another passenger were not injured. The balloon was operated as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to the pilot, on the morning of the event the balloon crew arrived about 0630.and the balloon envelope was offloaded and prepared for flight. Both burners indicated normal operating pressures of about 110 psi, which was above the manufacturer’s minimum requirement of 44 psi. Each burner was ignited using its dedicated piezoelectric starter, and both functioned properly.
Passengers were given a safety briefing, and at 0800 the balloon launched on its first flight. The flight was uneventful. After landing, the balloon was reboarded, and a second safety briefing was provided to two new passengers. During the second flight, the balloon ascended to 6,200 feet before the pilot initiated a descent to an altitude with winds more favorable for returning to the launch site. When winds shifted, the pilot selected an alternate landing area. After clearing a set of powerlines, the pilot planned to land on a road between single-level apartments.
About 10 yards beyond the powerlines, while maintaining level flight, the pilot attempted to initiate a burn with either burner. Neither burner ignited. The pilot made multiple restart attempts with the piezoelectric ignition system but was unsuccessful. The pilot then attempted to use a secondary ignition source—a butane lighter—but this attempt also failed
The balloon began descending toward the intended landing site on the road between the single-level apartments. The pilot advised the passengers to prepare for a hard landing. The balloon’s basket impacted the top edge of a parked vehicle, which caused the basket to rotate beyond the horizontal position (i.e., the basket laid over on its side tilting down). As the basket righted itself, one passenger fell out of the basket from about six to ten feet above the ground, sustaining serious injuries. The balloon and basket were not damaged.
Immediately after the accident, the weight reduction from the missing passenger caused the balloon to ascend. At that time, the pilot activated the blast valve and noted that one of the burners began to function properly. He surmised that the pilot light may have been successfully ignited with the butane lighter before impact. He then opened the “metering” valve to allow a small flame to be constantly burning in case of another pilot light issue. The balloon then landed uneventfully. The pilot reported that, upon landing, the fuel gauges each indicated approximately 50% to 55% of the fuel remaining in the tanks.
The owner’s manual for the Aerostar International Inc. RX-8 stated in part for burner relighting procedures.
“Should the pilot light become extinguished:
1. Open metering valve to allow very low flow.
2. Use igniter or similar heat source to relight burner.
3. Maintain metering valve at low setting to serve as pilot light.
4. Check that pilot light valves are open at burner and tank.
5. If pilot relights, continue flight as normal.
6. If pilot does not relight, land as soon as practical. If relight of any pilot source is impossible:
7. Prepare for emergency/hard landing.”
The burners and their ignition systems were removed for postaccident inspection and a test run. Operational and functional checks, including ignition system testing, were completed with no defects noted; the reported malfunction could not be duplicated.
The fuel (propane) tanks were not removed for testing. The burners were configured such that one 18-gallon propane tank connected to each burner; there was no cross-feed plumbed between the two burners or tanks.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR24LA029