N76SB

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 3, 2023, about 1548 eastern standard time, a Beech C23 airplane, N76SB, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Midland, Virginia. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

ADS-B track data revealed that the pilot departed from runway 15 at Warrenton-Fauquier Airport (HWY), Midland, Virginia, about 1308 and conducted three RNAV instrument approaches to Stafford Regional Airport (RMN) in Stafford, Virginia, and one RNAV instrument approach to Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR) in Culpeper, Virginia, before returning to attempt an approach and landing at HWY.

According to information obtained from air traffic control, the pilot provided several PIREPs to Potomac (PCT) Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) regarding cloud heights. The flight was cleared for the RNAV runway 33 approach to HWY with an intended full-stop landing. The pilot advised PCT TRACON that he intended to cancel his IFR clearance in the air once he descended below the clouds. ADS-B data revealed that the airplane descended toward runway 33, and track data was lost about 4,350 ft short of runway 33 and right of the runway centerline. The pilot made no distress calls over the radio during the approach.

A witness who was hunting approximately 1 mile from the accident site reported hearing the accident. The witness reported that he did not hear any engine noises just before hearing the airplane impact the terrain.

The accident was partially captured on a local surveillance camera about 0.5 miles from the accident site. In the video, the airplane was not visible; however, the airplane’s engine could be heard operating, followed by the sound of the airplane impacting trees, and a fireball could be seen in the distance. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to FAA airman records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land. The pilot also held an instrument airplane rating. According to the pilot’s training record for his instrument rating, the pilot had accumulated 81.2 simulated instrument hours, and 3.4 actual instrument hours. The last entry in the training record was on April 18, 2021. The pilot’s personal flight logbooks and any further training records were not located. According to the pilot’s last FAA medical examination, dated May 3, 2023, the pilot reported having a total flight time of 628 hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONHWY had the closest official weather station to the accident site. HWY weather at 1555 was reported to be as follows: wind calm, visibility 1.75 miles, with mist, the ceiling was overcast at 300 ft agl, the temperature was 14°C, with a dew point temperature of 13°C and an altimeter setting of 29.66 inches of mercury. The observations from HWY and CJR around the accident time identified low instrument flight rules (LIFR) conditions, while RMN indicated IFR conditions.

The 1600 High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) sounding indicated a stable environment from the surface through 3,100 ft. The Rawinsonde Observation software program indicated a cloud layer between 600 and 1,750 ft agl. The top of a frontal inversion was indicated at 535 ft agl, with the top of a subsidence inversion indicated at 2,085 ft agl.

Cloud cover was indicated above the accident site with the higher cloud cover moving from southwest to northeast.

A PIREP from the accident plane was reported at 1508, over CJR with cloud tops at 1,600 ft msl and cloud bases less than 700 ft msl.

The text AIRMET Sierra was issued at 1545 and forecast IFR conditions due to precipitation, mist, and fog. A similar text AIRMET Sierra was issued at 1303 and 0945 as well. Text AIRMET Tango for moderate turbulence below 16,000 ft agl was valid between 0945 and 1545, along with low-level windshear potential.

The graphical forecasts for aviation (GFA) surface forecasts applicable at 1600 for the accident site indicated VFR conditions with a west wind of 5 kts. The Graphical AIRMET (G-AIRMET) Sierra from before the 0801 forecast was valid at the 1600 timeframe. The GFA cloud forecast applicable to the accident site for 1600 from before 0802 indicated clear to broken cloud cover at the accident site with cirrus clouds being the main cloud type. The only human-generated information reflected in the two GFA products were the G-AIRMETs.

A search of archived information indicated that the accident pilot did request and receive weather information from Leidos Flight Service at 1213. The accident pilot and Leidos Flight Service Specialist discussed the current weather conditions and forecast. Updated AIRMET information was sent by Leidos to the accident pilot at 1305. In addition, the accident pilot had an account through ForeFlight. The accident pilot did enter several route strings into his ForeFlight account, but no weather imagery was viewed in the app before the flight. The HWY and RMN airports were viewed in the app prior to flight, and when accessing airport information the pilot would have had access to text weather information. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane collided with 80-ft-tall hardwood trees on a 330° heading about 0.35 nautical miles east of the runway 33 threshold. There was a postaccident fire that consumed most of the forward fuselage and cockpit. The cockpit instruments were destroyed and no discernible instrument readings were found. The right wing separated during the impact with trees. The left wing remained partially attached to the fuselage and was folded under the cabin area of the fuselage.

Flight control continuity was only partially established due to the extent of the thermal damage. The aileron control cable chains were wrapped in place around the control sprockets. The left direct cable was overload fractured at the point of the wing fracture. The control cables remained connected to the left wing aileron bellcrank. The right aileron control cables were fracture separated from the right aileron bellcrank. The control columns and wheels were consumed by fire. The elevator control cables were continuous from the cockpit yoke to the elevator. The rudder pedal torque tubes were partly consumed by fire, particularly in the area of the rudder control cable attach points. Portions of the rudder control cable cleave ends were observed still attached to the control cable ball ends. The rudder control cable was continuous from the cockpit to the rudder horns. The elevator trim control cables were continuous from the trim actuator to the cockpit. The position of the flap handle could not be determined.

The majority of the airplane’s fuel system was consumed by fire. Both wing fuel tanks were breached and the fuel supply lines to and from the fuel selector valve were burned away near the valve. Both wing tank fuel pick-up screens were clear of any debris. The fuel strainer bowl was thermally damaged, and the strainer screen was exposed. The screen was examined and was found to be free of debris. Operation of the fuel selector valve was verified in the Left and Right positions, and the valve was free of obstructions.

The engine remained attached to the airframe through the engine mounts, wires, cables, and hoses. The engine was impact and thermally damaged. The crankshaft was rotated manually, and continuity was established between the crankshaft, camshaft, connecting rods, and associated components. Cylinder compression and suction were observed on all four cylinders during crankshaft rotation. The cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope, and the internal cylinder components displayed normal operating and combustion signatures.

The fuel pump remained attached to its installation point and was severely thermally damaged. The carburetor remained attached to the engine and was partially consumed by the post-impact fire. The carburetor bowl and floats were destroyed and were not observed, and the fuel inlet screen was fire damaged. The throttle control cable remained secured to its control arm. The mixture control was impact and thermally damaged. Both magnetos were thermally damaged and were unable to produce a spark. The spark plugs remained installed in their cylinders and the electrodes displayed normal operating and wear signatures.

The alternator remained attached to the engine and was fire damaged; a portion of the burned alternator belt was observed in the starter ring gear support pulley groove. The vacuum pump remained attached to the engine and was fire damaged. It was removed from the engine for inspection and disassembled. The drive coupling and drive assembly were destroyed by fire. The carbon rotor and carbon vanes remained intact and displayed normal operating signatures.

The two-blade, fixed-pitch propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft. Neither of the propeller blades displayed leading edge scoring or gouging. One of the propeller blades remained straight and the other propeller blade was bent slightly forward near the tip. There were several tree limbs observed in the accident wreckage path with 45° cuts that were consistent with propeller strikes. One of the cut limbs measured 3 inches in diameter. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONAn autopsy of the pilot’s remains was conducted by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Northern Virginia District, Manassas, Virginia. According to the pilot’s autopsy report, his cause of death was thermal injuries and smoke inhalation, and his manner of death was accident. Mild coronary artery disease was present, with 30-40% narrowing of the right coronary artery by plaque, and 20-30% narrowing of the left main coronary artery and proximal left anterior descending coronary artery by plaque.

Postmortem toxicological testing by the Virginia Department of Forensic Science measured carboxyhemoglobin at approximately 20% in iliac blood. Postmortem toxicological testing by the FAA Forensic Sciences Labo...