Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The separation of a propeller blade during the initial climb due to insufficient blade retention forces. Contributing to the accident was the propeller blade retention design, manufacturing defects that prevented the propeller from achieving adequate grip forces, the pilot’s decision to use the propeller with an untested engine combination, and the lack of initial and ongoing maintenance documentation provided to the pilot by the manufacturer.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 8, 2023, about 1329 Pacific standard time, an experimental amateur-built Series 5 Kitfox, N66180, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Eloy, Arizona. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot had flown from his home base of Ryan Field (RYN), Tucson, Arizona, earlier in the day to have lunch at the Eloy Municipal Airport (E60) restaurant. The pilot told a friend, who flew alongside him on the inbound flight in another airplane, that the flight was uneventful.
The accident flight was to be the return leg to RYN. ADS-B data revealed that after takeoff from runway 20, the airplane climbed to about 2,450 ft mean sea level (900 ft above ground level) before making a left turn to the south. About that time, a witness just below the airplane’s flight path heard an engine “sputter” and then go quiet. He was not concerned with the lack of engine noise, because he assumed they were practicing engine-out procedures into the local field across from his house. He looked up and watched as white pieces fell from the airplane. The airplane continued to maintain a level flight attitude and he looked away.
When he looked up again, he could see the airplane was rapidly descending in a nose-down attitude. It then struck the ground in the field across from his house and burst into flames. The airplane was not trailing smoke or vapors at any time before impact. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONConstruction of the airplane was completed in 2004. At that time, it was equipped with a six-cylinder Corvair automobile engine and a composite propeller manufactured by Warp Drive Propellers. In 2015, the engine was replaced with a four-cylinder 125 horsepower Lycoming O-290-G engine; at that time, according to the airplane’s maintenance logbooks, it underwent 5 hours of Phase II flight testing.
The pilot, who was also a licensed FAA Airframe and Powerplant mechanic, purchased the airplane in December 2019; by that time it had accrued about 200 hours of flight time. Over the next two years, the airplane accumulated a further 200 hours and underwent a series of engine changes. By September 28, 2022, the pilot had reinstalled the original O-290-G engine, which had now been overhauled and upgraded to 160 horsepower through the installation of cylinder assemblies designed for the Lycoming O-320 engine.
A month before the accident, during the airplane’s most recent condition inspection, the pilot replaced the propeller (a Catto Propellers fixed-pitch 76-inch two-blade model), with a three-blade, composite, ground-adjustable propeller manufactured by NR Prop. There was no evidence in the logbooks to show that the airplane had gone through a flight test after the installation of the upgraded engine and new propeller.
Correspondence between the pilot and representatives from NR Prop indicated that the two-blade propeller configuration had been tested with Yamaha engines, which require a PSRU, up to 170 horsepower; however, NR Prop had no data for installation on a Lycoming engine. The pilot purchased the three-blade adjustable pitch SR-118 assembly, with a diameter of 2,024 mm, in addition to a two-blade hub that was also compatible with the blades. The SR-118-2000 is advertised on the NR Prop website for installation on engines between 90 and 150 horsepower.
According to online forum correspondence, the pilot stated that when the propellor arrived it did not include installation instructions and he did not know the mounting hardware torque specifications. Review of subsequent correspondence between the pilot and the manufacturer indicated that he then received torque values for the propeller hub, but there was no evidence he received formal installation or ongoing maintenance instructions.
A friend of the pilot stated that after installation, the engine would not reach its rated rpm. The pilot therefore decided to switch to the two-blade configuration, using the two-blade hub and two of the three blades. AIRPORT INFORMATIONConstruction of the airplane was completed in 2004. At that time, it was equipped with a six-cylinder Corvair automobile engine and a composite propeller manufactured by Warp Drive Propellers. In 2015, the engine was replaced with a four-cylinder 125 horsepower Lycoming O-290-G engine; at that time, according to the airplane’s maintenance logbooks, it underwent 5 hours of Phase II flight testing.
The pilot, who was also a licensed FAA Airframe and Powerplant mechanic, purchased the airplane in December 2019; by that time it had accrued about 200 hours of flight time. Over the next two years, the airplane accumulated a further 200 hours and underwent a series of engine changes. By September 28, 2022, the pilot had reinstalled the original O-290-G engine, which had now been overhauled and upgraded to 160 horsepower through the installation of cylinder assemblies designed for the Lycoming O-320 engine.
A month before the accident, during the airplane’s most recent condition inspection, the pilot replaced the propeller (a Catto Propellers fixed-pitch 76-inch two-blade model), with a three-blade, composite, ground-adjustable propeller manufactured by NR Prop. There was no evidence in the logbooks to show that the airplane had gone through a flight test after the installation of the upgraded engine and new propeller.
Correspondence between the pilot and representatives from NR Prop indicated that the two-blade propeller configuration had been tested with Yamaha engines, which require a PSRU, up to 170 horsepower; however, NR Prop had no data for installation on a Lycoming engine. The pilot purchased the three-blade adjustable pitch SR-118 assembly, with a diameter of 2,024 mm, in addition to a two-blade hub that was also compatible with the blades. The SR-118-2000 is advertised on the NR Prop website for installation on engines between 90 and 150 horsepower.
According to online forum correspondence, the pilot stated that when the propellor arrived it did not include installation instructions and he did not know the mounting hardware torque specifications. Review of subsequent correspondence between the pilot and the manufacturer indicated that he then received torque values for the propeller hub, but there was no evidence he received formal installation or ongoing maintenance instructions.
A friend of the pilot stated that after installation, the engine would not reach its rated rpm. The pilot therefore decided to switch to the two-blade configuration, using the two-blade hub and two of the three blades. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane came to rest in a dirt field 1.5 miles southwest of the departure end of runway 20. The entire structure was consumed by fire with only steel airframe and burnt aluminum, composite, and flight instrument remnants remaining.
The first identified point of impact was an almost-complete impression of the airplane’s forward profile in the dirt, which included the main landing gear strut, wheels, wing leading edges, and lift struts. The engine had separated from the firewall and was in the center of the impression. About 20 feet beyond the engine, both wings had come to rest in line with the impact point. The cabin and tail structure were crushed aft, such that the rudder pedals were comingled with the remnants of the empennage.
A single intact propeller blade (figure 1) was located 1 mile southwest of the departure runway, in the general vicinity of the flight path. A section of exhaust pipe, along with various items of cabin contents, an iPad, and clear plexiglass fragments were distributed another 1/2 mile closer to the main wreckage site.
All remaining primary airframe structure, flight control surfaces, and engine components, along with the thermally damaged second propeller blade, which had fractured from the propeller hub on impact, were accounted for in the main wreckage. The propeller hub remained attached to the engine crankshaft, and the root of the ground-impacted blade remained clamped within the hub. Examination of the engine did not reveal any catastrophic failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Figure 1- ADS-B flight path with debris field, and propeller blade as-found. TESTS AND RESEARCHAn accredited representative from the National Transportation Investigation Bureau of Ukraine, which was the state of the propeller manufacturer, was assigned to assist with the investigation.
The propeller blade and hub assembly, along with the unused third blade, were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination. The manufacturer did not have construction or layup documents available, so the third blade was used as a reference.
Propeller Design
The assembly consisted of two composite propeller blades and an aluminum two-piece hub, clamped together by bolts. Blade retention was achieved through friction between the outer cylindrical surface of the blade and an inner clamping surface on the hub through inboard and outboard grip areas. A collar in the middle of the blade retention area slotted into a groove on the hub to locate the blade spanwise within the hub (figure 2).
Figure 2 - Root of the exemplar propeller blade
Exemplar Blade
The root sections of the exemplar blade were examined by X-ray computed tomography (X-ray CT), revealing that it was constructed of composite fiber polymer matrix layers built around an aluminum tube that was flush against the root of the blade. The innermost layer consisted of unidirectional glass fiber wound circumferentially around the tube. The next layer consisted of unidirectional glass fibers oriented along the axial direction of the blade. The next layer comprised four plies of plain-woven glass fiber fabric with warp and weft at +/- 45°. The next layer was comprised of multiple plies of carbon fiber fabric, and the final outermost layer consisted of a +/- 45° glass fiber fabric ply.
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Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR24FA053