N606HDAMERICAN EUROCOPTER CORP AS350B22023-12-20 NTSB Accident Report

Destroyed
Fatal

AMERICAN EUROCOPTER CORP AS350B2S/N: 7601

Summary

On December 20, 2023, a American Eurocopter Corp AS350B2 (N606HD) was involved in an accident near Hammonton, NJ. The accident resulted in 2 fatal injuries. The aircraft was destroyed.

On December 19, 2023, about 2004 eastern standard time, an American Eurocopter Corp. AS350B2 helicopter, N606HD, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hammonton, New Jersey. The pilot and a videographer were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 electronic news gathering (ENG) flight.

The helicopter Callsign "Chopper 6" was owned and operated by US Helicopters, Inc.

This accident is documented in NTSB report ERA24FA069. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N606HD.

Accident Details

Date
Wednesday, December 20, 2023
NTSB Number
ERA24FA069
Location
Hammonton, NJ
Event ID
20231220193546
Coordinates
39.713917, -74.687567
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
2
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The helicopter’s gradual descent and impact with terrain for reasons that could not be determined.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
AMERICAN EUROCOPTER CORP
Serial Number
7601
Year Built
2013
Model / ICAO
AS350B2

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
US HELICOPTERS INC
Address
PO BOX 625
Status
Deregistered
City
MARSHVILLE
State / Zip Code
NC 28103-0625
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 19, 2023, about 2004 eastern standard time, an American Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter, N606HD, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hammonton, New Jersey. The pilot and videographer were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 ENG flight.

According to the helicopter operator’s chief pilot, about 1923, the helicopter departed Northeast Philadelphia Airport (PNE), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after being dispatched by the news station assignment desk to a scene 44 nautical miles to the south/southeast, in the Smithville, New Jersey area. This was the third flight of the day for the helicopter and crew, and a fixed-base operator at PNE had refueled the helicopter before the accident flight.

The helicopter arrived on scene about 20 minutes later and began orbiting while collecting video footage for the news station. After about 10 minutes on scene, the news station assignment desk cleared the crew to return to PNE via radio.

About 2200, the news station assignment desk notified the helicopter operator that they had tried to reach the crew for another assignment but were unable to contact them by telephone. After the operator confirmed the helicopter had not returned to PNE, the operator took actions to obtain the time and location information of the last contact.

The operator contacted state and local authorities with the last contact information, flight route information, and a possible location obtained from internet-based ADSB tracking platforms. They also contacted the FAA New York Air Route Traffic Control Center to initiate an overdue/missing aircraft report. The ADS-B tracking platforms showed the helicopter's last location about 4 nautical miles east/northeast of Hammonton Municipal Airport (N81), Hammonton, New Jersey.

According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) data, about 1945, after orbiting the scene, the helicopter climbed to about 1,000 ft msl while heading direct to PNE, approximately paralleling its outbound course from PNE to the scene. About 1952, the pilot advised that they were done and heading back to PNE. When ATC asked if the pilot would like flight following, he declined. About 1959, ATC terminated radar service.

About 2001, the helicopter drifted right of course and passed through its outbound course from PNE. Then, at 2001:54, the helicopter began to descend and passed through an altitude of 775 ft. At 2002:16, the helicopter continued to descend through 700 ft, and its ground speed increased through 93 kts. At 2003:08, the helicopter descended through 400 ft and accelerated through 103 kts. At 2003:25, the helicopter descended through 250 ft at 107 kts. The last recorded data for the helicopter, at 2003:37, showed it was traveling at a ground speed of 115 kts.

Around this time, a witness observed a solid light traveling quickly at a steep descent angle. He did not see a fire or explosion. Another witness observed a "giant orange ball" in the forest. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot was the lead pilot for the helicopter operator and had been employed by them for about 19 years. During the accident flight, he was seated in the front right seat of the helicopter.

The videographer was the lead photographer for the helicopter operator and had also been employed by them for about 19 years. During the accident flight, he was seated in the rear left seat and did not have access to the flight controls. His primary duty onboard was to operate the ENG equipment. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model sounding analyzed by the RAwinsonde OBservation (RAOB) program estimated the atmosphere below 15,000 ft was cloud-free except for a shallow layer of few clouds near 4,200 ft. The model estimated the freezing level was about 900 ft, the wind near the surface was from the northwest about 5 kts, and the wind veered and increased in magnitude to a north wind of about 30 kts near 5,000 ft. From 5,000 through 10,000 ft, the model estimated the wind remained northerly to north-northwesterly at 25 to 30 kts.

A review of weather surveillance radar imagery from around the accident time did not reveal any pertinent meteorological echoes in the accident region, and no longline-disseminated PIREPs were submitted between 1800 and 2200 within 50 miles of the accident location.

No non-convective or convective SIGMETs were active for the accident region at the accident time, and the Center Weather Service Units at the Washington and New York Air Route Traffic Control Centers had not issued any Center Weather Advisories or Meteorological Impact Statements that were active for the accident region. About 1600, graphical AIRMETs were issued for moderate icing between the freezing level and 8,000 ft that were valid at both 1900 and 2200 for regions that included the accident location.

According to mooncalc.org, on the day of the accident at a point about two miles from the accident location, moonrise occurred at 1209. At the time of the accident, the moon was at an azimuth of 219° and an altitude of 41°, with 53% of its disk illuminated. Moonset occurred about 2359. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONOn December 20, 2023, about 0005, the wreckage of the helicopter was located in a densely wooded area of the Wharton State Forest near Hammonton, New Jersey. Examination of the accident site revealed a wreckage path that extended about 600 ft on a 320° heading from the first tree strike to the main wreckage.

Most of the helicopter was consumed by a postcrash fire, except for parts of the tailboom, doors, and small pieces that had departed the helicopter near the initial impact. The airframe was destroyed and heavily fragmented, with separation damage from the postcrash fire and signatures of blunt force impact.

The instrument panel was separated from the airframe and heavily damaged. The rest of the cockpit and cabin was unrecognizable other than the floor structure and some of the steel components from the flight controls.

All three main rotor blades were found at the main wreckage site, remained attached to the rotor head, and exhibited damage consistent with high rotational energy of the rotor system. They remained attached at the root ends at their respective main rotor blade sleeves, which were damaged from fire but remained attached to the Starflex bearingless main rotor hub. All three Starflex arms were fractured, with diagonal fracture signatures across the star arms.

All three main rotor blades exhibited impact and thermal damage. Two appeared more heavily impact damaged at the outboard ends, with broom straw signatures. Main rotor blade debris (including rotor blade skin and core foam) was observed near the beginning of the wreckage path and throughout the woods up to the main wreckage. Several trees were observed with smooth cuts consistent with main rotor blade strikes in a long shallow descending path through the woods to the main ground impact area.

The main rotor transmission was separated from the helicopter but generally intact, with the rotor system attached. The chip detector was clean and free of debris. All three main rotor hydraulic servos remained attached and displayed blunt impact damage, and the hydraulic lines were separated. The hydraulic pump was impact damaged and remained attached by its bracket.

Functional continuity of the flight control system and main rotor drive system could not be established due to the postimpact fire damage. However, the flight control path was traced from the cockpit input devices to their aerodynamic component connections through the thermal or blunt impact damage areas. No preimpact anomalies were noted.

Dual flight controls were installed. The collective control arms were found about mid-position. The fuel flow control lever setting was near the forward position. The pilot’s cyclic grip was separated and found about 20 ft forward of the main wreckage. The pilot’s anti-torque pedals were present; however, the pilot’s right pedal was bent in a downward direction. The pilot’s left-side inboard pedal was separated and found on the ground about 20 ft forward of the main wreckage.

Several electronic components, related to ENG, were found separated, lying along the wreckage path. All four cockpit/cabin doors were separated from the airframe and found on the ground near the broken tree limbs at the beginning of the wreckage path. The right front door exhibited a tree impact with a forward/side impact signature.

None of the plastic fuel tank material was observed. Pieces of the windshield and window material were observed throughout the wreckage path.

The tail rotor gear box was separated from the tailboom, both blades were separated from the root, and both weights were separated from the blades. Impact signatures and markings on the tail rotor and driveshaft were consistent with tail rotor driveshaft rotation at impact. The tail rotor gearbox chip detector plug had broken off the gearbox and was not recovered. The ventral fin on the tail section was separated from the tailboom and exhibited impact and postcrash fire thermal damage. The forward section of the tailboom was also broken off and thermally decomposed aft of the rear cargo hold. The section of tailboom with the horizontal control surfaces was also separated, and both horizontal surfaces exhibited leading edge damage and aft bending of the surfaces.

The helicopter was equipped with a high-skid landing gear system. The forward section of each skid and the remainder of the right skid were found toward the beginning of the wreckage path. The rest of the gear system came to rest with the main wreckage. A cargo hook assembly was found underneath the wreckage.

Examination of the Plexiglas windows using black light did not reveal any evidence of a bird strike.

Examination of the engine revealed that it had separated from the airframe during the accident sequence. It remained attached to the ma...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA24FA069