N6659L – BEECH V35 – 2024-02-02 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 1, 2024, about 1907 eastern standard time, a Beech V35B airplane, N6659L, was destroyed when it impacted two residences and the ground near Clearwater, Florida. The commercial pilot and two occupants of one residence were fatally injured, and one occupant of the other residence sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to FAA ADS-B data and air traffic control audio information, the flight departed about 1809 from Vero Beach Municipal Airport (VRB), Vero Beach, Florida, on an IFR flight plan destined for Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at CLW and in the vicinity of the accident site.

While en route, the pilot established contact with several FAA air traffic control facilities as the flight proceeded. At 1856:26, while the flight was at 3,800 ft pressure altitude, the pilot was in contact with the West Arrival/Departure combined with Satellite sector of the Tampa Air Traffic Control Tower (TPA ATCT West Arrival/Departure). The controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 2,600 ft above mean sea level (msl), which the pilot acknowledged. At 1857:32, the pilot requested a left turn to align with runway 34 at CLW, which the controller approved.

At 1859:21, the flight was about 5 nm east-southeast of CLW at 1,400 ft pressure altitude when the controller advised the pilot that CLW was about the pilot’s 2 o’clock position and 5 miles. The pilot advised the controller that he was looking for the airport, then advised the controller that he needed to switch radio frequencies to the CLW CTAF to activate the pilot-controlled runway lights. The controller subsequently advised that there was no traffic between the flight’s position and CLW. The pilot then cancelled the flight’s IFR clearance, and the controller terminated radar services, instructed the pilot to squawk VFR, and approved the frequency change. The flight continued southwest until about 1900, then it turned right and proceeded west-northwest.

About 1902, when the flight was less than 2 nm southeast of CLW, it turned right and proceeded northwest, generally toward CLW but west of the runway 34 extended centerline. Between about 1903 and 1903:30, the flight continued northwest, flying about 0.5 nm west of CLW and nearly parallel to runway 34, then continuing past the airport as it proceeded northwest. Beginning about 1903:46, the flight turned left (to the west, away from CLW), completed a 180° turn, proceeded generally south (flying about 2 nm west of CLW), then continued south past the airport.

Two individuals who were in the FBO at CLW and could hear the CTAF communications over a speaker reported that they heard the accident pilot ask to turn on the runway lights. (The CLW CTAF was not recorded, so the timing of the communications is unknown.) One of these individuals reported that he informed the pilot that the runway lights were on (at medium intensity from a previous pilot who had landed) but that the pilot called back and asked again to have the runway lights turned on.

The individual said he went to the FBO’s very high frequency (VHF) transceiver and keyed the microphone seven times to turn the runway lights’ intensity to high, then again informed the pilot that the runway lights were on. The individual estimated that, about 25 seconds later, the accident pilot again requested that the runway lights be turned on then advised, “I have a fire.” Both individuals at the FBO and some pilots who were flying nearby heard the accident pilot’s “fire” report. One individual at CLW said that he asked the pilot to repeat what he said, but the pilot did not reply. One individual at CLW who saw the airplane maneuvering reported that he did not see an external fire on the airplane.

According to the flight’s ADS-B data, about 1905:15, when the airplane was about 1.7 nm southwest from the center of CLW flying about 900 ft pressure altitude, a 7777 transponder code displayed, followed by a change several seconds later to 7700 (the emergency code).

The flight continued southeast, turned left to the east, then turned right onto a east-southeast heading. At 1905:49, the flight was at 1,200 ft pressure altitude, and the pilot reestablished contact with the TPA ATCT West Arrival/Departure controller by stating “nine five lima,” then “coming to Albert Whitted, I can’t see the other airport.” Albert Whitted Airport (SPG) was located in St. Petersburg, Florida.

The controller advised the pilot that the flight was 1 mile south of CLW and asked if he could turn to heading 180° and to maintain the present altitude. At 1906:15, the flight was at 1,500 ft pressure altitude (and about 1.7 nm south-southeast from the runway 34 displaced threshold at CLW) when the pilot made his last radio transmission, advising the controller, “I’m losing engine.” The controller asked the pilot if he could see the St Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), St. Petersburg-Clearwater, Florida, which was 3 miles ahead of his position. The controller also advised that runways 18/36 were available at PIE.

The ADS-B data reflected that, after the pilot’s last communication, the flight turned right and headed northeast, remaining about 1,500 ft pressure altitude until about 1906:41. After that time, the airplane continued in the same general direction while descending. The last ADS-B target was at 1906:55, when the airplane was located near several buildings, flying at 400 ft pressure altitude. The accident site was about 800 ft northeast of the last ADS-B target.

Based on data downloaded from the airplane’s Appareo Stratus, between 1906:37 and 1906:58, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 297 fpm to a maximum of 5,836 fpm with a corresponding groundspeed increase from 79 to 120 kts. The accident site was about 224 ft from the last data point.

At 1906:59, the pilot of another airplane who was flying at 2,500 ft msl near the accident site advised the controller that the accident airplane had gone down, “really hard and is in flames.” During a postaccident interview, that same pilot reported that, from his vantage point in the right seat, the accident airplane’s descent angle was between 30° and 40° in a steep nose-down attitude, which he described as “like an uncontrolled descent.” He added that, while the airplane was going away from him, he saw a “very bright light” descending very fast to impact.

Another witness, who was a passenger in a car driving south on US Highway 19 about 1/4 mile south of Gulf to Bay Boulevard (about 1,600 ft northwest of the accident site and north of the final flightpath of the accident airplane), reported seeing a “fireball” or something on fire flying ahead of their position from the right to the left, or west to east. She did not hear any sound and did not realize at that time that what she saw was an airplane. She described the fire as a round fireball at the front of a white cone-shaped object.

The airplane crashed in a densely populated residential community, striking two residences and one vehicle. Two other residences were damaged by the postcrash fire.

An individual who was in the first impacted residence sustained a minor injury when he was struck in the right leg by a piece of the airplane. Two individuals in the second impacted residence sustained fatal injuries.

The remains of the extensively heat-damaged and impact-fragmented wreckage were found primarily in the second impacted residence, and all wreckage was secured for further examination. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONReview of two provided pilot logbooks revealed the pilot’s first and last logged flights were March 14, 1994, and December 5, 2022, respectively. His total time and pilot-in-command time (as of the last logbook entry) were about 1,079 hours and 960 hours, respectively. The last logbook reflected that he passed a commercial check ride on March 16, 2022.

An Aircraft Insurance Renewal application dated January 23, 2024, and unsigned by the accident pilot, showed that the pilot reported a total flight time of 1,218 hours.

The pilot’s logbooks reflected no flights into or from CLW. According to an FBO employee who had worked at CLW for just under 1 year, the pilot called the FBO the day before the accident flight to provide his credit card information. The FBO employee stated that the accident pilot had never been to CLW before and that pilots have mentioned that the airport is hard to find. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to the engine’s Type Certificate Data Sheet, its maximum continuous horsepower and rpm were 285 at 2,700 rpm.

By design, the airplane’s fuel supply system forward of the firewall consisted of a flexible fuel hose attached at a fitting on the firewall routed to the inlet of the engine-driven fuel pump, a flexible (unmetered) fuel hose routed from the engine-driven fuel pump outlet to the metering valve, a flexible (metered) fuel hose routed up and on the right side of the engine from the metering valve outlet to the fuel manifold valve inlet, and fuel injector lines from the fuel manifold valve to fuel injector nozzles installed in each cylinder. The engine’s throttle body and attached metering valve were attached to about midpoint of the oil sump. The outlet fitting (for metered fuel) was on the bottom of the metering valve near the forward and right sides.

A review of the airframe maintenance records revealed a factory rebuilt engine was installed on June 27, 2016. Since installation of the rebuilt engine, normal maintenance and inspections occurred. There was no specific entry regarding the flexible fuel hose (metered fuel) from the outlet of the metering valve to the inlet of the manifold valve. The airplane had accrued about 583 hours between the engine installation date and the last annual inspection entry dated November 13, 2023.

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