N1125A

On March 10, 2024, about 1452 eastern daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries 1125 Westwind Astra airplane, N1125A, was involved in an accident at the Ingalls Field Airport (HSP), Hot Springs, Virginia. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by SkyJet Elite under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight.

According to a representative of the operator, the flight crew itinerary for the day was for the pilots to fly from Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to HSP. The passengers planned to attend a conference in Hot Springs, while the flight crew were scheduled to continue to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. According to the operator’s trip itinerary, both flights were non-revenue 14 CFR Part 91 flights.

According to preliminary Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control audio recordings and automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) flight track data, the flight departed FLL about 1246 and proceeded on course to HSP. About 1430, the flight crew checked in with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At that time, the airplane was about 60 miles south of HSP, at flight level 210 (21,000 ft). The controller instructed the flight crew to advise when they had the current weather and NOTAM information at HSP, and to advise of which instrument approach they wanted to utilize. The flight crew acknowledged the instruction.

About 1432, the controller queried the flight crew again about which approach they wanted to conduct at HSP, and if they had the current weather and NOTAMs at the airport. The flight crew responded that they had received the weather conditions at HSP airport, but the information was about an hour old, and they further advised they wanted to fly the ILS approach to runway 25. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to AHLER intersection, which was an initial fix for the ILS approach to runway 25, located about 10 miles northeast of the airport.

About 1433 to 1439, the controller provided 5° to 10° right of course headings as the flight continued to AHLER intersection. The controller also instructed the flight crew to confirm they had the current weather and NOTAMs at HSP.

About 1441, the flight crew advised they had the current weather and NOTAMs. About 1444, the flight crew requested to descend from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 6,000 ft msl. The controller responded by clearing the flight direct to AHLER intersection for the ILS runway 25 approach and to cross AHLER at or above 6,100 ft msl. The flight crew read back the clearance and requested radar vectors for the approach, but subsequently followed up that they were proceeding direct to AHLER and cleared for the approach.

About 1447, the flight crew advised that they would cancel their IFR (instrument flight rules) flight plan once on the ground at HSP with the flight service station. The controller advised that they could still contact the controller while on the ground, and they could cancel the flight plan directly with him. Subsequently, the controller advised that there was no traffic observed between their position and the airport and to switch to the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The flight crew readback the instruction and no further radio communications were recorded between the controller and the flight crew.

According to an HSP airport staff member who was monitoring the CTAF, shortly before the accident he heard two radio calls from an airplane announcing that they were conducting an approach to land on runway 25. Shortly thereafter, he heard the airplane’s impact with terrain and turned to see smoke rising from the approach end of runway 25.

The airplane’s ADS-B flight track revealed that the airplane proceeded about 15 miles northeast of the airport to conduct the ILS approach to runway 25, commencing the approach at the AHLER intersection. The airplane’s altitude descended along the final approach course to runway 25. The final recorded ADS-B position was about 200 ft from the initial impact point with terrain. Figure 1 provides an overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the final 45 seconds of flight track data.

Figure 1: Overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the final 45 seconds of flight track data.

The wreckage debris path was oriented on a 250° to 255° magnetic heading and spanned about 150 ft from the initial impact point to the main wreckage. The initial impact point coincided with several trees that were located along a down sloping ravine about 300 ft from the runway threshold. The wreckage was heavily fragmented and was thermally damaged during a postimpact fire.

All primary flight control surfaces and major portions of the airplane were located at the accident site. The right main landing gear was the only major portion of the airplane to have been located next to runway 25; it was located about 315 ft forward of the fuselage and about 10 ft to the right of the runway edge.

Flight control continuity could not be established from the cockpit to the flight controls due to the extensive impact damage, however; continuity was observed at the flight control surfaces that remained partially intact. The configuration of the airplane at the time of impact was assessed to be landing gear down and flaps set to 40° as measured by actuator and jackscrew positions. The left wing outboard spoiler was observed retracted and its actuator position corresponded to a retracted position. The right wing spoilers were not identifiable due to the impact and thermal damage. The impact and thermal damage sustained to the cockpit prevented any data collection of instrument readings or switch positions.

Both engines were located in the debris field with heavy impact and thermal damage observed. The left engine had separated into two pieces and the right engine remained mostly intact. Both engine spinners exhibited varying degrees of rotational scoring signatures. Both engine fan blade sections exhibited leading edge tearing, gouging, and battering damage, and several fan blades were observed to be bent opposite the direction of engine rotation.

Review of the Aviation Routine Weather Reports (METARs) at the airport found two reports issued, with one issued about 20 minutes before the accident and another report issued a few minutes after the accident. At 1435, the wind was 270° at 21 knots, gusting to 31 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles, and no ceiling was reported. At 1455, the wind was 280° at 19 knots, gusting to 38 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles, and scattered clouds were reported 2,000 ft above ground level (agl), broken clouds 2,400 ft agl, and an overcast ceiling at 4,500 ft agl.

According to FAA airman and operator records, the pilot in command (PIC) held an airline transport pilot certificate and held a PIC type rating in the accident airplane that was issued on January 28, 2024. The PIC was issued a first-class medical certificate on December 19, 2023, the application for which reported 13,655 total flight hours. According to an operator’s electronic pilot logbook, a total of 65 hours, of which 55 hours were PIC hours, had been logged in the accident airplane make and model. The PIC also held the position of Chief Pilot for the operator.

The second in command (SIC) held a commercial pilot certificate, with airplane single, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The SIC was issued a first-class medical certificate on April 4, 2023. He was issued a SIC type rating in the accident airplane on November 20, 2023. According to an operator’s electronic pilot logbook, he had logged a total of 1,068 flight hours, of which 136 hours were in the accident airplane make and model as SIC.

The airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was located in the debris and was forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorder’s Laboratory in Washington, DC. The wreckage was retained for further examination.