N1125A – ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES 1125 WESTWIND ASTRA – 2024-03-10 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn March 10, 2024, about 1452 eastern daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries 1125 Westwind Astra, N1125A, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hot Springs, Virginia. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by SkyJet Elite as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

According to the flight crew’s itinerary provided by the operator, the accident flight, which departed Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Ingalls Field Airport (HSP), Hot Springs, Virginia, was the crew’s first flight of the day. After dropping off the passengers at HSP, the crew was scheduled to continue to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. According to the itinerary, both flights were non-revenue flights conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

A review of ADS-B data and air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings showed that the airplane departed FLL at 1246 and climbed to a maximum cruising altitude of 41,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The enroute portion of the flight was uneventful. At 1428, the controller issued a descent to 17,000 ft msl and an altimeter setting of 29.81 inches of mercury (inHg), which the flight crew acknowledged. At 1430, the flight crew was issued a frequency change, which they acknowledged. At 1431, the new controller issued a descent to 11,000 ft msl and the altimeter setting of 29.81 inHg; after the controller’s third attempt, the flight crew acknowledged The airplane’s CVR recording indicated that the crew did not cross check or verify the altimeter settings.

At 1432, the controller asked if the flight crew had the weather conditions, NOTAMs, and knew what approach they were expecting to fly into HSP. The crew responded with a request for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach for runway 25 at HSP, and that they were attempting to get the weather conditions. The controller then instructed the crew to proceed direct to AHLER, an intermediate fix for the ILS RWY25 approach, which they acknowledged. At 1433:30, the CVR recorded a partial automated weather observation for HSP, which was reporting an altimeter setting of 29.65 inHg. The CVR did not contain any cross check or verification of the altimeter setting from either member of the flight crew, nor did the crew conduct an approach briefing before beginning the approach.

From 1433 to 1438, the controller provided 5° to 10° right-of-course headings as the airplane continued to AHLER intersection. At 1439, the controller instructed the flight crew to confirm they had the current weather conditions and NOTAMs at HSP and issued a clearance to descend to 7,000 ft msl.

At 1440, the flight crew advised they had the current weather conditions and NOTAMs. At 1444, the flight crew requested to descend from 7,000 ft msl to 6,000 ft msl. The controller responded by clearing the flight direct to AHLER intersection for the ILS RWY25 approach and to cross AHLER at or above 6,100 ft msl. The flight crew read back the clearance and requested radar vectors for the approach, but subsequently followed up that they were proceeding direct to AHLER and acknowledged that they were cleared for the approach. At 1445:45, the SIC was heard on the CVR stating, “and NAV available it should start turning.” ADS-B data showed that, about 15 seconds later, the airplane began a left turn toward the final approach course. At 1446:41, the SIC was heard on the CVR stating, “FLOC captured my side. FLOC captured your side.”

At 1446, the controller queried the flight crew asking them to verify they were maintaining 6,100 ft msl until AHLER, as their altitude indicated 5,900 ft. The SIC was heard on the CVR responding “yes sir we’re six thousand one hundred and we’re now intercepting the localizer.” The transmission from the SIC was broken when played back on the FAA ATC recordings.

At 1447, the flight crew requested to switch to the HSP common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and stated they would cancel their instrument flight rules flight plan on the ground; the controller approved the frequency change.

At 1448:12, the SIC was heard on the CVR stating, “that’s uh AHLER sir, six thousand one hundred.” At 1448:21, the SIC offered to set the next altitude, which the PIC agreed to. The SIC then stated, “five thousand one hundred selected, okay?” to which the PIC agreed. The SIC then asked the PIC if he would like “VS,” or vertical speed mode, which the PIC agreed to. The SIC then stated “ok VS selected your side. Five thousand one hundred….six miles to DURAN.” At 1448:45, the PIC was heard stating, “okay its descending.” At 1449:12 the SIC made a radio call on the HSP CTAF reporting that they were on the ILS RWY25 approach for a full-stop landing.

At 1449:57, the PIC asked the SIC if he could see the airport. The SIC responded, “Uh no sir, not yet.” At 1450:09, the PIC stated, “’kay. Okay there is the airport. I saw it.” The SIC then stated, “okay. I see it now.”

At 1450:46 the PIC stated “ok DURAN” followed by “descending” at 1450:49. At 1450:53, the PIC was heard asking “next altitude is?” and the SIC responded “next altitude is four thousand, sir. You want four thousand?” The PIC responded in the affirmative. The SIC responded, “yeah I set four thousand one hundred. Uh speed checks gear selected down” followed shortly thereafter by the sound of landing gear extension.

At 1451:04 the PIC called for the before landing checklist, then stated, “look there’s snow ha ha ha. You see it?” which the SIC responded “yup. yup.” At 1451:16, the SIC began the before landing checklist and asked the PIC if he would like the flaps set to forty; the PIC agreed. The SIC then continued with the checklist, then noted that the airplane was below glide slope, which the PIC acknowledged.

At 1451:38 the SIC stated “full below glide slope,” which the PIC acknowledged; at this time, the airplane was 1.5 nm from the runway 25 threshold. At 1451:45, the SIC stated “and V-REF is one twenty five. V-REF plus fifteen.” The PIC acknowledged, stating “okay. Oh my gosh. Let me put the autopilot off.”

At 1451:53 the SIC asked whether the autopilot was on or off. He repeated the question about five seconds later, to which the PIC responded, “shhh…” Shortly thereafter, the PIC stated, “it’s off?” to which the SIC responded, “it’s uh…it’s no its off yeah.” At 1452:12.7, the EGPWS could be heard announcing “one thousand” followed by the SIC stating, “sir I suggest go around” at 1452:14.4.

At 1452:17.1, the SIC again stated, “Go around,” which was spoken with increased intensity. At 1452:17.4, the EGPWS 500-ft annunciation was heard. At 1452:18, the PIC was heard stating multiple expletives. The sounds of impact were recorded at 1452:20 and the recording ended at 1452:21.

The final recorded ADS-B position was about 200 ft from the airplane’s initial impact point with terrain. Figure 1 provides an overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the final 45 seconds of flight track data. Figure 2 provides an overview of the final 1 minute and 18 seconds of flight track data.

Figure 1: Overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the final 45 seconds of flight track data.

Figure 2: Overview of the final 1 minute and 18 seconds of flight track data.

According to an HSP airport staff member who was monitoring the CTAF, shortly before the accident, he heard two radio calls from an airplane announcing that they were conducting an approach to land on runway 25. Shortly thereafter, he heard the airplane’s impact with terrain and turned to see smoke rising from the approach end of runway 25. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot in Command (PIC)

The PIC moved to the United States in 2014 from Venezuela. He held Venezuelan pilot certificates that were converted to FAA certificates after he relocated.

The PIC was the officially designated Part 135 Chief Pilot at SkyJet Elite. According to the former Director of Operations (DO) of SkyJet, who worked for the operator for about four years and ceased employment with them in November 2023, the PIC was hired as the Chief Pilot “in name only” and was a “place holder.” The former DO explained that the PIC/Chief Pilot had little to no involvement in SkyJet during his tenure as DO at the operator.

The PIC began new hire training in September 2022. The former DO and current DO of SkyJet reported that the PIC was supposed to fly Piper PA31 Navajo airplanes on the SkyJet Part 135 certificate. But from the fall of 2022 through the entirety of 2023, the pilot never completed a Part 135 checkride. An oral exam (135.293a) was completed with the South Florida FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) twice; however, the practical examination was never attempted due to maintenance issues with the PA31 airplanes.

According to both SkyJet DOs, the pilot worked at other Part 135 operators while being named as the Chief Pilot at SkyJet, including Aztec Airways and REVA, a Part 135 Learjet air ambulance operator.

According to REVA, the PIC was hired in May of 2023 as a PIC candidate for the Learjet 31. REVA reported that he struggled tremendously at FlightSafety PIC ground and simulator training and that he needed extra training time. He initially failed his Part 135 PIC checkrides before passing after additional training. Although the PIC passed the Flight Safety training, REVA downgraded his assignment to SIC.

Three standards captains at REVA were interviewed, and all provided similar accounts of the PIC’s performance during his initial operating experience after completing his training at FlightSafety. They stated that the PIC demonstrated a lack of adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs), poor crew resource management (CRM), poor checklist usage, required constant reminders, could not manage the FMS, and had poor aircraft control. One captain stated that they could not believe he...