Summary
On April 01, 2024, a Piper PA28 (N8438B) was involved in an accident near Muncie, IN. The accident resulted in 1 serious injury. The aircraft was destroyed.
On April 1, 2024, about 1027 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-236 airplane, N8438B, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Muncie, Indiana. The pilot sustained serious injuries and two pedestrians on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan. A preliminary review of OpsVue track data showed that the airplane departed from runway 35 at the Monroe County Airport (BMG), Bloomington, Indiana, about 0937.
This accident is documented in NTSB report CEN24LA144. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N8438B.
Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s spatial disorientation and subsequent loss of control while maneuvering outside established instrument approach procedures in instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in an impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the local control controller’s failure to issue appropriate missed approach instructions due to inadequate procedural knowledge.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 1, 2024, about 1027 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-236 airplane, N8438B, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Muncie, Indiana. The pilot sustained fatal injuries and two pedestrians on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.
The purpose of the flight was to transport the airplane, a Piper Dakota, from Monroe County Airport (BMG), Bloomington, Indiana, to Muncie Delaware County Airport (MIE). The pilot intended to transport the airplane to MIE to have a pitot-static test performed to meet the requirements for IFR operations.
A review of ForeFlight records indicated that a VFR flight plan was filed with an estimated enroute time of 40 minutes. The flight plan was subsequently amended to an IFR flight plan.
A review of air traffic control (ATC) surveillance data showed that, about 0937, the airplane departed BMG and climbed to an initial cruise altitude of 5,000 ft.
About 0944, the pilot checked in with the Indianapolis Airport Traffic Control Tower and reported the airplane was level at 5,000 ft. The departure radar east (DRE) controller provided the pilot with the current altimeter setting. The pilot acknowledged and requested a climb to 7,000 ft, stating that he was still in the clouds at 5,000 ft. The controller approved the climb to 7,000 ft. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 0950, the pilot attempted to contact the DRE controller to provide a pilot weather report (PIREP). About 0951, the DRE controller responded, and the pilot reported the cloud bases were at 2,400 ft and the cloud tops were at 7,000 ft. The controller acknowledged and asked if the pilot had experienced any icing conditions. The pilot responded “negative.”
About 0955, the MIE local control (LC) controller called the DRE controller and reported that the airport was in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the RNAV (known as Area Navigation) runway 14 approach was in use, and the current automatic terminal information service (ATIS) code was Echo. Subsequently, the DRE controller instructed the pilot to advise when he had the updated weather at MIE and advised him to expect the RNAV runway 14 approach. The pilot responded that he had ATIS information Echo and he acknowledged the RNAV runway 14 approach was in use. About 1002, the DRE controller instructed the pilot to change to frequency 120.65. The pilot did not acknowledge.
About 1003, the DRE controller attempted to contact the pilot. The pilot reported he was in receipt of ATIS information Echo. The controller acknowledged and instructed the pilot to change to frequency 120.65. After initially reading back the frequency incorrectly, the controller corrected the pilot, and the pilot acknowledged and contacted the controller on the correct frequency. The controller then instructed the pilot to turn left direct to JOGBA (the intermediate fix/initial approach fix). The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 1011, the DRE controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 4,000 ft. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 1013, the DRE controller called the MIE federal contract tower (FCT; the contract ATC services were provided by Midwest ATC) and provided the inbound information for the airplane. The LC controller acknowledged.
About 1016, the DRE controller instructed the pilot to turn right heading 050° and advised him to expect vectors inside JOGBA. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 1017, the DRE controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 3,000 ft. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 1018, the DRE controller advised the pilot that he was four miles from HIXAG (the final approach fix). The DRE controller instructed the pilot to turn right to 120°, maintain 3,000 ft until established on the final approach course, and then cleared him for the RNAV runway 14 approach into MIE. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
About 1020, the DRE controller restated the approach clearance to the pilot, advised that radar services were terminated, and instructed the pilot to contact the MIE tower. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
The pilot contacted the LC controller and advised he had been cleared for the RNAV runway 14 approach. The LC controller instructed the pilot to report the final approach fix inbound and asked him to confirm he was in receipt of ATIS information Echo. The pilot acknowledged, stated he had ATIS information Echo, and would report HIXAG. The pilot reported crossing HIXAG. The LC controller then cleared the pilot to land on runway 14. The pilot acknowledged with a correct readback.
According to ATC surveillance data, the airplane tracked west of the final approach course.
About 1024, the pilot advised that he needed to perform a 360° turn and reported the field in sight. The LC controller acknowledged.
About 1025, the LC controller called the DRE controller and advised that the pilot was performing a 360° turn to realign for the approach.
The DRE controller then asked the LC controller if the pilot was going to come back to the approach. The LC controller stated he was doing a “quick 360.” The DRE controller advised the LC controller that he was going to turn out an uninvolved airplane that had been following the accident airplane and would re-sequence them for the approach. The DRE controller asked the LC controller to let him know when the accident airplane landed. The LC controller acknowledged.
About 1025, the LC controller advised the pilot that there was another airplane inbound for the approach behind him and instructed the pilot to advise when he was reestablished on the final approach. The pilot acknowledged and stated he would report reestablished on the final approach.
The pilot then completed two clockwise 360° turns, and midway through the third turn, the ATC surveillance data ended at 1026, approximately 0.8 nm southwest of the runway 14 threshold at MIE.
About 1028, the DRE controller called the LC controller, and the LC controller stated he was still waiting for the pilot to report reestablished back on the final approach. The LC controller advised that the ceilings were about 500 ft agl, overcast, and he could not see the airplane.
The DRE controller advised the LC controller that he had lost radar contact with airplane about a mile west of MIE. The LC controller stated that it was about the area where they expected the airplane to be located, based on the position where the pilot had requested the 360° turn. The DRE controller said he was going to inform his supervisor about the airplane and asked the LC controller to advise if they were able to reach the pilot. Several attempts to contact the pilot were made by the LC controller with no response.
About 1030, the LC controller called the DRE controller and advised that the airplane had impacted terrain outside of the airport property and that the airport remained open for subsequent arrivals.
During the descent and subsequent impact with terrain in a wooded area, two pedestrians who were walking together on a public walking trail sustained serious injuries. The airplane impacted terrain about 3,400 ft southwest of the midpoint of runway 14. The wings and the empennage separated from the fuselage, and the airplane was destroyed. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot
The pilot worked as a franchise business owner.
A review of the pilot’s logbook found that he had a flight review conducted with a flight instructor on May 17, 2022. The pilot also held a high-performance airplane endorsement for pilot-in-command privileges, issued by a flight instructor on August 14, 2015.
For the 12 months preceding the accident, the pilot’s logbook recorded four instrument approaches and four separate instrument holding procedures. All these tasks were performed under simulated instrument conditions (using a view-limiting device).
During the 6 months preceding the accident, the pilot’s logbook did not record any instrument flights.
The most recent instrument flight conducted by the pilot prior to the accident occurred on May 24, 2023. There was no record that the pilot had completed an instrument proficiency check within the 12 months preceding the accident.
LC Controller
A review of records showed that the LC controller was employed by Midwest ATC and reported directly to the MIE FCT in March 2008. He had been certified on the LC position since April 2008 and was current and proficient in accordance with facility standards on the day of the accident.
He was 54 years old and held a current second-class FAA medical certificate at the time of the accident. His most recent ATC physical was conducted on August 2, 2023. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONA review of FAA registration records showed that the pilot purchased the airplane on July 9, 2015.
The airplane was equipped with a Garmin GTN 750 unit and a J.P. Instruments EDM-700 unit. According to the owner of the BMG Jet Center, the pilot appeared to have difficulty understanding the operation of both units, as well as interpreting the information they displayed. He reported knowing of no issues with either unit.
A review of the airplane’s maintenance records found that the most recent altimeter, pitot-static system, and transponder tests were performed on December 28, 2021. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA review of multiple meteorological sources showed IMC at MIE during the accident sequence.
The MIE automated surface observation system (ASOS) reported visibility of 10 or more miles and a broken ceiling at 700 ft agl at 0953. At 1037, the MIE ASOS reported visibility of 5 miles in mist with an overcast ceiling at 400 ft agl.
The closest civilian airport with a terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) was Fort Wayne International Airport (FWA), Fort Wayne, Indiana, located about 44 miles north of the accident site. The forecast for FWA was issued...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN24LA144