N88DT

On April 4, 2024, about 1633 central daylight time, a Davis DA-3 airplane, N88DT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Antlers, Oklahoma. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

A witness reported having a brief conversation with the pilot between 1530 and 1600 at the Stan Stamper Municipal Airport (HHW), Hugo, Oklahoma. Afterward, the pilot departed in the accident airplane. The witness reported that the airplane’s departure was uneventful and nothing seemed out of the ordinary with the airplane’s performance during the takeoff.

A second witness observed the airplane arrive at the Antlers Municipal Airport (80F) between 1600 and 1630. Two men met the pilot, and they all boarded the airplane. The pilot subsequently departed toward the south. The takeoff seemed to be routine and there were no obvious anomalies with respect to the airplane.

At 1633, local authorities received a report of an explosion. Upon arriving at the site, first responders observed the airplane with an active fire.

The airplane came to rest adjacent to a large tree about 1.4 miles south-southwest of 80F. Multiple smaller trees and low brush was also present at the site. A post-impact fire consumed portions of the fuselage and charred the large tree. Low brush was burned over a large area surrounding the airplane.

The airplane exhibited impact and postimpact fire damage. The forward section of the fuselage and portions of both wings were consumed by the fire. Both wings were separated near the wing roots and located adjacent to the fuselage. The wing fracture surfaces appeared consistent with overstress. The flight controls remained attached to the airframe, and control continuity was confirmed from each control surface to the cockpit area.

The engine was separated from the airframe and resting inverted on the ground near the fuselage. It exhibited localized impact damage. The entire engine was discolored, and a portion of the accessory case was consumed consistent with the postimpact fire. An on-scene examination, which included a cylinder borescope evaluation, did not identify any anomalies attributable to a preimpact failure or malfunction. The examination was limited by the extent of the fire damage.

No Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data was identified for the accident flight.