Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in a loss of airplane control during the go-around. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to properly configure the airplane’s flaps during the go-around.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
On June 1, 2024, about 1218 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR20 airplane, N275RS, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Aitkin, Minnesota. The pilot and one passenger were not injured, and a second passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to the pilot, he departed the Aitkin Municipal Airport (AIT), Aitkin, Minnesota, about 1130, for a short flight, and he noted no anomalies during the flight. During the landing at AIT on runway 16 with mild wind gusts, the airplane touched down, bounced, and the pilot elected to perform a go-around. The pilot reported that he “followed all procedures to execute the maneuver [and] upon applying full power, the engine didn’t respond resulting in very little power.” The pilot determined the airplane would not properly climb and he initiated an emergency landing, including a low-altitude activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The airplane came to rest upright in the swamp vegetation adjacent to the runway. The airplane’s right wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage. Recovery personnel reported they drained about 30 gallons of fuel from the airplane during recovery from the swamp.
One of the passengers stated to local law enforcement that the approach and landing were bumpy, and the pilot conducted a go-around after touchdown. During the go-around, the pilot had the engine at full throttle. Above the end of the runway, the airplane encountered a wind gust, and it did not seem like the airplane had enough power. The passenger felt that the airplane was going to go inverted, and the pilot pulled the airplane parachute.
Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the flaps were at the 100% extended position. The three propeller blades were bent aft about 25-40°. The engine crankshaft was manually rotated with no anomalies. The engine oil filter was punctured and replaced with a new replacement filter to accommodate an engine functional test. A remote fuel source was connected to the airframe fuel boost pump inlet. The airframe was secured to a cart assembly, and a functional engine test was performed.
The engine immediately started, and only 1,400 rpm were achieved due to bent propeller blades and excessive vibration. The damaged propeller was removed and replaced with a minimally damaged (slight aft bend in all three blades), larger diameter propeller (typically installed on an IO-520 series engine). Another engine functional test was performed. The engine immediately started and was test run through a wide range of rpms. The engine went to 2,400 rpm with no hesitation during a simulated quick power increase.
The Avidyne multi-function display (MFD) was removed and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for data extraction. The logged engine data during the accident flight go-around revealed no anomalies with engine performance (see Figure 1). A review of the engine performance data during the go-around was consistent with the engine performance data of the earlier takeoff from AIT.
Figure 1. Avidyne MFD data plotted on Google Earth.
According to the Cirrus Pilot’s Operating Handbook, during a go-around, the flap setting should be reduced to the 50% position.
The pilot’s calculated weight and balance, using 18 gallons of fuel, was near the forward center of gravity limit, and he reported the airplane was about 142 pounds under the gross weight at the time of the accident.
An examination of the CAPS revealed the rocket and D-bag were located near the end of runway 16. The rear harness remained snubbed, with break stitches in place, and the reefing line cutters were not activated. The forward section of the right and left CAPS straps remained stowed in the CAPS channel. The remaining CAPS straps, risers, suspension lines, and parachute were found lying across the swamp terrain. Indications of parachute inflation or aerodynamic load were not present.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN24LA207