N85PG – PIPER PA46 – 2024-06-30 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 30, 2024, at 1355 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-46-310P airplane, N85PG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Trout Creek, New York. The private pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from Albert S Nader Regional Airport (N66), Oneonta, New York, to West Virginia International Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, West Virginia. The flight plan indicated an en route time of 2 hours 47 minutes, the amount of fuel onboard as 5 hours 34 minutes, a cruising altitude of 12,000 ft msl, and a departure time of 1300.

A review of flight track data showed the airplane departed N66 at 1343 and was climbing on a southwesterly ground track when the pilot contacted ATC requesting an IFR clearance. A controller at the Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) acknowledged, provided the pilot a discrete transponder code, and identified the airplane’s location 5 miles southwest of N66. The controller then issued the pilot an IFR clearance to CRW “as filed” and issued an instruction to climb to 10,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged and continued to climb toward the southwest en route to LOPEZ, the first fix noted on the filed flight plan. The flight track in the climb included multiple deviations left and right of course, which continued for the duration of the flight.

At 1345, the controller reported to the pilot that there were areas of moderate to heavy precipitation off his right side that would continue for the next 30 miles and that it was “mostly clear after that.” At 1349, the controller issued the pilot a climb to his filed cruising altitude of 12,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged and continued en route with no noticeable deviations in flight track heading until 1352.

Between 1349:55 and 1351:21, the controller who had been communicating with the pilot provided a position relief briefing to the relieving controller. (See the “Air Traffic Control Services” section for more information.)

At 1352, the airplane’s flight track began a left turn from a heading of 208° to a heading of 166°. At 1353:28, the controller who had just assumed position duties queried the pilot stating, “it looks like you’re deviating left for weather, and what fix do you want to go, uh, downstream to?” The pilot did not immediately respond. At 1353:22, the flight track had begun a right descending turn from a heading of 171° and altitude of 9,800 ft msl to a heading of 127° at 1354:07. During the turn, the airplane descended to its lowest altitude of 8,700 ft msl before climbing back up to 9,600 ft msl.

The controller twice more queried the flight before the pilot responded at 1354:05, stating, “yeah I lost.” During this transmission, an unknown person was heard stating, “oh my god.” At 1354:32, the pilot again stated, “yeah, Boston I, I, lost.” This was the last discernable transmission that could be attributed to the accident flight.

The airplane then continued on an east-southeast heading with altitude deviations from 9,950 ft msl to 8,700 ft msl. At 1354:43, the airplane climbed from 8,800 ft msl to 9,025 ft msl before it began a steep right turn that tightened during the descent. The last flight track data point, at 1354:59, showed the airplane at an altitude of 6,500 ft msl. The main wreckage was located about 0.5 miles north of this data point.

A witness located east of the final portion of the flight track reported seeing the airplane going through dark clouds, then pitching up into the clouds before it “dove into a corkscrew downward.” Another witness, also located east of the final portion of the flight track, reported seeing the airplane flying into the dark clouds before it pitched up and “did a backwards flip and spun.” PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. No logbooks could be located for the pilot, therefore his recent experience operating in actual instrument meteorological conditions could not be determined.

Another pilot, a retired airline captain who had previously flown with the accident pilot, reported that the last time they flew together was in September 2023. He described that flight, stating that the accident pilot was prudent with his checking of the weather both en route and at the destination and that he had performed a thorough preflight inspection. He stated that the accident pilot used the autopilot once airborne, engaging it “no later than 5,000 [ft agl]” and continued to use the autopilot for nearly the entire flight. He also reported that, while en route, the pilot used a tablet computer to continue monitoring the weather, which included looking at the weather radar. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONPilot’s Preflight Weather Briefing

A representative from ForeFlight, the application the pilot used to file his flight plan, reported that the pilot received a weather briefing that was generated as part of ForeFlight’s services but that there was no way to determine which briefing items the pilot had viewed.

A review of the briefing information the pilot received showed that it was generated at 1146 and included both a graphical depiction and textual description of convective SIGMET 90E, which was active for the time and route of flight (including the accident area). (Any Convective SIGMET implies severe or greater turbulence, severe icing, and low-level wind shear.) The briefing also included two PIREPs given near the accident area. One PIREP, which was submitted at 1044 by the crew of an Embraer E170 at 17,000 ft msl just east of the departure airport, reported turbulence of moderate chop. The other PIREP, which was submitted at 1035 by the crew of a Canada Regional Jet CRJ900 at 7,000 ft msl northwest of the departure airport, reported turbulence of moderate chop and included the remarks, “turb[ulence] in clouds, smooth in clear air.”

Investigative Review of Meteorological Information

According to weather surveillance radar, when overlayed on the accident flight track, the accident occurred in a region characterized by light to heavy or extreme values of reflectivity.

Archived data from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS) for the accident region at 1355 indicated that the area of reflectivity that was coincident with the accident location generally had echo tops around 15,000 ft msl, with maximum echo top values identified as 20,000 ft msl.

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model sounding for near the accident site at 1400 using an elevation of about 1,800 ft was retrieved from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Air Resources Laboratory and analyzed by the RAwinsonde OBservation (RAOB) program. Broken or overcast clouds were identified by RAOB from about 4,400 through 8,900 ft msl with few clouds above that to roughly 12,500 ft msl. The freezing level was about 14,700 ft msl. Moderate clear air turbulence was identified between about 6,200 and 8,400 ft msl.

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-16 visible and infrared data were obtained from an archive at the Space Science Engineering Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The visible imagery depicted clouds over the accident region. Brightness temperatures of the underlying opaque cloud close to the accident location, not potentially contaminated by higher thin cloud, was closer to 273 Kelvin (0°C), which, when considering the 1400 HRRR sounding, corresponded to cloud top heights between roughly 12,500 and 14,500 ft msl.

At 1255, Convective SIGMET 03E was issued for an area that included the accident location. The Convective SIGMET warned of an area of severe thunderstorms with tops to flight level 450, hail to 1.5 inches, and surface wind gusts to 65 kts possible. The convective SIGMET polygon was moving from 270° at 20 kts.

Two longline disseminated PIREPs were reported within 25 miles of the accident location within 30 minutes of the accident time. One PIREP submitted at 1330 by the pilot of a Bellanca Viking at 4,000 ft msl reported a broken ceiling at 4,000 ft and moderate chop. The other PIREP submitted at 1405 by the pilot of a Dassault Falcon at 9,000 ft msl reported updrafts.

Air Traffic Control Services

As stated in the “History of Flight” section, the accident pilot received ATC services from the Boston ARTCC. From the pilot’s initial contact to the time of the accident, the pilot was first in contact with an initial and then a relieving controller at the ZBW Delancy sector radar position (R24). At the time of the accident, on-the-job training was being conducted at the R24 position. According to the operational supervisor, the area’s complexity and volume was higher than normal.

A review of ATC services by an NTSB ATC specialist revealed that the weather advisory the initial controller provided to the pilot at 1345:36 (during which the controller described “moderate and heavy precipitation off your right side for the next…30 miles”) did not include depicted extreme precipitation and did not include required phraseology. For example, per FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, paragraph 2-6-4, controllers issuing pertinent observed weather information to potentially affected aircraft should “define the area of coverage in terms of azimuth (by referring to 12-hour clock) and distance from the aircraft and/or the general width of the area and the area of coverage in terms of fixes or distance and direction from fixes.”

Between 1349:55 and 1351:21 (about 3 minutes before the last known communication from the accident flight), the R24 initial controller provided a changeover briefing to the relieving controller. During the time of the controllers’ briefing, the accident pilot had just acknowledged his clearance to climb to his filed cruising altitude, and the flight was continuing en route with n...