N8255Q

Substantial
Fatal

CESSNA 206S/N: U20603116

Accident Details

Date
Tuesday, September 24, 2024
NTSB Number
ANC24FA102
Location
Chalkyitsik, AK
Event ID
20240925195193
Coordinates
66.785289, -144.337910
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

A loss of engine power due to water-contaminated fuel as a result of the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection. Contributing to the accident was the operator’s failure to ensure replacement filters were available for use during refueling operations.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
CESSNA
Serial Number
U20603116
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
1975
Model / ICAO
206C206
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1
Seats
6
FAA Model
U206F

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
KAVIK AVIATION SERVICES LLC
Address
PO BOX 248
City
PALMER
State / Zip Code
AK 99645-0248
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 24, 2024, about 1445 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 206 airplane, N8255Q, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Chalkyitsik, Alaska. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight.

The accident airplane, owned and operated by Kavik Aviation Services LLC, had departed from Circle City, Alaska, and was transporting fuel to another airplane at a remote location. The company owner stated this was the last day of flights for the season and there was a sense of excitement to finally be done. They were also in a hurry to finish up as a storm was coming in.

The accident airplane landed on a remote gravel bar adjacent to the Porcupine River, where a remote fuel site had been set up about two months before the accident. There were two hunters at the gravel bar waiting for another airplane to fly them out and they reported that they added about 30 gallons of fuel to the accident airplane while the pilot loaded fuel containers into the airplane cargo area. The pilot directed the hunters to use fuel from two 15-gallon plastic fuel drums that were part of the fuel stash. Earlier in the day, the 15-gallon fuel drums were filled from a 55-gallon metal drum by another pilot. This was done to help the accident pilot, as she was unable to move the large metal drum. According to one of the hunters, one of the 15-gallon drums was full, and one was about 3/4 full. They used a pump to transfer fuel from the drum into the airplane. The fuel pump consisted of a hose that went into the drum on one side of the pump with another hose that went into the airplane’s fuel tank. The drums contained blue-colored fuel. No filters were used, no examination of the fuel drum was done, and the pilot did not sump the airplane’s fuel tank before departure. The pilot did not discuss the possibility of water in the fuel with the hunters. The airplane was on the ground for about 12 minutes. The hunters reported that, after the airplane was loaded, it departed to the northwest. Just after takeoff, they heard the engine “sputtering,” and they turned back toward the airplane. They saw it abruptly bank hard to the right and the right wing impacted the water. The airplane cartwheeled into the river, spinning about 270° before becoming partially submerged.

During the removal of the remaining fuel drums at the accident site, a company pilot examined one of the 15-gallon drums, which contained about 8 gallons of fuel. He reported that the fuel contained about a coffee cup size amount of water in it, about 8 ounces. This drum was with the same stockpile of fuel that the accident pilot used.

According to the operator, at the beginning of the season there was a fuel filter on the pump and a Mr. Funnel at the fuel stash location. The Mr. Funnel was designed to filter out water, dirt and debris. After the fuel filter became plugged, they removed it from the pump and never replaced it. The funnel was also lost and not replaced. The operator was aware that there were no filters in use at the fuel stashes. During this time of year that the fuel stash was in place, the temperature range varied greatly throughout the day. According to the operator, they had numerous conversations with the pilots about the danger of water contamination in the fuel. They stressed the importance of visually inspecting the fuel, using filters, and sumping the airplane’s fuel tank after refueling. The accident pilot had complained about the difficulties of sumping fuel in the accident airplane. With a belly pod installed it was very difficult for her to get access to the fuel sump. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot had flown in the area for 3 1/2 years with over 600 hours of flight experience in the accident airplane. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONFlight control continuity was established in all axes (yaw, roll, and pitch). Movement of the flight controls (yoke) produced corresponding movement in the ailerons and elevators, which moved freely. The rudder pedals were damaged consistent with impact and were difficult to move; however, limited movement was observed in the rudder. The fuel selector was in the right-wing tank position. The fuel pump rocker switch in the cockpit was in the ON position. Mixture, propeller, and throttle controls in the cockpit were all in the far forward position. Engine control continuity was established from the cockpit to the engine. The mixture control moved freely. Both throttle and propeller control cables had bends from impact, but some movement was visible when moving the corresponding cockpit control. All attachment links and nuts were secure.

Post-recovery examination of the engine revealed the drive coupling to the fuel pump was undamaged. Fuel examined from the unmetered fuel line to the metering valve contained a mixture of fuel and water, with a ratio of about 1/3 fuel to about 2/3 clear water. The fuel line from the metering valve to the fuel manifold contained a mixture of fuel and water with a ratio of about 3/4 fuel to about 1/4 clear water. The fuel injector nozzles were installed in the correct locations and no obstructions were observed. The fuel flow manifold was removed and disassembled; clear water was found inside.

Air pressure was applied to fuel lines above each header fuel tank in the left and right fuel system. When the fuel selector was placed into the left or right position, fluid was pushed out of the respective header fuel tank. The fluid observed was mostly dirty water. The fuel selector worked correctly. The “last chance” fuel filter and the fuel metering valve filter were clean with no contamination observed. Both wing fuel tank vent screens were clean.

The top spark plugs were removed and checked with the Champion Check-A-Plug Chart. The gap was found to be within limits and the top spark plugs were found to be within a normal operational condition. The main crankshaft rotated freely by hand and thumb compression was found on all six cylinders. When rotating the main crankshaft, movement was observed of the fuel pump gear and alternator pulley and the magneto’s impulse coupler was heard. The valve covers were removed and all valves moved in normal operation.

Corrosion was found on the internal working parts of both magnetos, consistent with having been submerged in the river; the magnetos did not spark when operated. The oil filter was removed and cut open. No contamination was found.

The induction and exhaust system was examined using a borescope and no obstructions were observed. All cylinders were observed using a borescope and no abnormalities were observed. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe State of Alaska State Medical Examiner’s Office performed an autopsy on the pilot. The autopsy reported listed the cause of death as drowning with blunt force head injury as a significant other finding.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. In urine, codeine was detected at 6 ng/mL and its metabolite morphine was detected at 1 ng/mL. Neither codeine nor morphine was detected in heart blood. Hydroxychloroquine was detected in heart blood and urine.

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ANC24FA102