Summary
On May 10, 2025, a Piper PA32RT (N30689) was involved in an accident near Yulee, FL. The accident resulted in 1 fatal injury. The aircraft was destroyed.
On May 10, 2025, about 0935 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32RT-300, N30689, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yulee, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot’s wife reported that the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to reposition the airplane from Nassau Airport (83FL), Yulee, Florida to Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida, where they would wait for approaching thunderstorms to pass through the area before continuing on to Tennessee.
This accident is documented in NTSB report ERA25FA201. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N30689.
Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack during takeoff, which resulted in a stall/spin at an altitude too low for recovery. Contributing to the accident was the opening of the nose baggage door and subsequent distraction of the pilot during a critical phase of flight, as well as the external pressure of the approaching thunderstorms, which likely resulted in the pilot rushing to depart.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 10, 2025, about 0935 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32RT-300 airplane, N30689, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yulee, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot’s spouse reported that the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to reposition the airplane from Nassau Airport (83FL), Yulee, Florida, to Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida, where they would wait for approaching thunderstorms to pass through the area before continuing on to Tennessee. She reported that, earlier in the morning, the pilot had dropped her and their dogs off at FHB by ground vehicle before driving back to 83FL, where he planned to finish loading the airplane for their trip and make the short flight to FHB. The straight-line distance between 83FL and FHB was 3.9 nm.
Review of video captured by a motion-activated surveillance camera mounted on a hangar near the end of runway 12 at 83FL showed that the airplane taxied toward runway 12 and began a back-taxi down the runway and out of the video frame (figure 1). During the taxi the airplane’s nose baggage door appeared closed. As the video continued, the airplane re-entered the frame on a takeoff roll about 0934. The video showed that, during the takeoff, the nose baggage door was open. The door stayed open while the airplane became airborne and exited the video frame. Following the accident, a sweep of the usable portion of runway 12 found a case of aviation oil about 100 ft from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. A bag of dog food was also found about 440 ft from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. Review of surveillance video showed the airplane in a nose-high angle of attack just after lifting off. One eyewitness reported that the wings rocked back and forth before the left wing of the airplane dropped and the airplane descended behind trees. Another witness and surveillance videos showed the airplane enter a steep left-wing-low descent just before impacting a tree and the ground about 10 seconds after departing 83FL.
Figure 1. Still frames from surveillance video showing the airplane during taxi and takeoff. Note the nose baggage door area circled in red in each video frame. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe private pilot held an instrument rating. A review of the pilot’s logbook found that the last logged flight was on August 27, 2023, after which he received a logbook entry stating he had satisfactorily completed the flight review required by Title 14 CFR Part 61.56. At the time of the flight review the pilot had a total flight time of 365.6 hours, with 17.2 hours in the make and model of the accident airplane. The pilot’s flight currency could not be determined based upon the available information. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe pilot’s spouse reported that, several weeks before the accident flight, she and the pilot had flown from Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, to 83FL, a flight that was about 1 hour. She reported that they had fully fueled the airplane before that flight and that the accident flight was the first flight since fueling the airplane. She also indicated that 83FL did not have fuel services and they did not add any fuel to the airplane after the flight from CLW to 83FL. Review of the Piper PA-32RT-300 Pilot Operating Handbook showed the airplane had an endurance between 5 and 7 hours depending on the power setting used.
An estimated weight and balance was performed based upon the available information. A weight of 40 lbs was placed in the forward baggage compartment to account for the case of aviation oil and bag of dog food that were found on the runway and likely exited the forward baggage compartment of the accident airplane. Additionally, 100 lbs was placed in the aft baggage compartment because baggage was located in this area of the accident airplane but sustained thermal damage; 100 lbs is the maximum for the aft baggage compartment. Another 100 lbs was placed in the second and third seating rows to account for baggage, “E-bikes,” and more dog food that were found in this area of the accident airplane. Actual baggage weights could not be determined due to the postimpact fire. The calculation included 78 gallons of fuel based on the report made by the pilot’s spouse. The resulting weight and balance was within the airplane's flight envelope. The weight and balance was then recalculated with the 40 lbs placed in the nose baggage removed to simulate the baggage falling out of the open nose baggage compartment. The resulting weight and balance was still within the airplane’s flight envelope.
The manufacturer did not have test data available as to the controllability of the airplane model with the nose baggage door open, but reports from pilots who have experienced a nose baggage door opening in flight in this make and model did not reveal flight controllability issues with the nose baggage door opening in flight. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA regional view of the National Weather Service (NWS) National Reflectivity Mosaic for 0935 showed echoes of 25 to 55 dBZ near the accident site at the accident time. The closest NWS Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) to the accident site was from Jacksonville (JAX), Florida, located 12 miles southwest of the accident site. The reflectivity images depicted portions of reflectivity values between 30 and 45 dBZ (moderate to heavy intensity echoes) near the accident site at the accident time. The moderate to heavy intensity echoes were moving from west to east (figure 2).
Figure 2. JAX WSR-88D reflectivity for the 0.53° elevation scan initiated at 0933:06 with the accident site marked with a black circle.
There was a Convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisory valid for the accident site at the accident time issued by the Aviation Weather Center. SIGMET 42E, issued about 0855, valid through 1055, forecast an area of embedded thunderstorms with tops above flight level 450 ft (FL450), with the SIGMET box area moving from 260° at 25 kts.
A weather station at FHB, which was located about 3 nm east of the accident site, reported about 0935 that the wind was from 180° true at 5 kts, with 10 statute miles of visibility, and scattered clouds at 2,300 ft above ground level (agl) with thunderstorms in the vicinity and lightning distant southwest through north. The same station reported at 0955 wind from 320° at 13 kts gusting to 20 kts, 2 statute miles of visibility in heavy rain and thunderstorms, overcast clouds at 2,100 ft agl, and lightning in all quadrants.
Multiple witnesses reported that it had just begun to rain about the time of the accident. A review of surveillance video showed that there were drops of water consistent with rain on the lens of the camera at the time of the accident. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe pilot’s spouse reported that, several weeks before the accident flight, she and the pilot had flown from Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, to 83FL, a flight that was about 1 hour. She reported that they had fully fueled the airplane before that flight and that the accident flight was the first flight since fueling the airplane. She also indicated that 83FL did not have fuel services and they did not add any fuel to the airplane after the flight from CLW to 83FL. Review of the Piper PA-32RT-300 Pilot Operating Handbook showed the airplane had an endurance between 5 and 7 hours depending on the power setting used.
An estimated weight and balance was performed based upon the available information. A weight of 40 lbs was placed in the forward baggage compartment to account for the case of aviation oil and bag of dog food that were found on the runway and likely exited the forward baggage compartment of the accident airplane. Additionally, 100 lbs was placed in the aft baggage compartment because baggage was located in this area of the accident airplane but sustained thermal damage; 100 lbs is the maximum for the aft baggage compartment. Another 100 lbs was placed in the second and third seating rows to account for baggage, “E-bikes,” and more dog food that were found in this area of the accident airplane. Actual baggage weights could not be determined due to the postimpact fire. The calculation included 78 gallons of fuel based on the report made by the pilot’s spouse. The resulting weight and balance was within the airplane's flight envelope. The weight and balance was then recalculated with the 40 lbs placed in the nose baggage removed to simulate the baggage falling out of the open nose baggage compartment. The resulting weight and balance was still within the airplane’s flight envelope.
The manufacturer did not have test data available as to the controllability of the airplane model with the nose baggage door open, but reports from pilots who have experienced a nose baggage door opening in flight in this make and model did not reveal flight controllability issues with the nose baggage door opening in flight. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was examined at the accident site. The initial impact point was identified as a broken branch about 40 ft up a tree. A crater in the ground was identified about 24 ft away from the tree, and the wreckage came to rest upright about 15 ft from the crater, on a magnetic heading of 264°. The calculated angle of descent between the initial tree impact and the crater was about 50°. An 84-inch-long outboard portion of the left wing was impact separated with the left aileron attached, and remained near the crater.
The cockpit and majority of the fuselage were consumed by postimpact fire. The left flap, right wing, rudder, vertical stabilizer, and a majority of the stabilator and stabilator trim were also consumed by the postimpact fire. Aileron flight control continuity was confirmed...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA25FA201