Accident Details
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
On March 22, 2026, at 2337 eastern daylight time, Jazz Aviation LP flight 646 (doing business as Air Canada flight 8646), an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900) airplane, registration C-GNJZ, was substantially damaged after it collided with Rescue 35 (R35), an Oshkosh Striker 1500 aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) vehicle, while landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York. The captain and first officer were fatally injured. Of the 2 flight attendants, 72 passengers, and 2 crew of the ARFF vehicle, 39 were transported to local hospitals with 6 serious injuries reported. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 scheduled flight from Montréal–Trudeau International Airport (YUL), Montreal, Quebec to LGA.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) traveled to the accident site and invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Sergeant’s Benevolent Association, and the Police Benevolent Association. In accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada assigned an Accredited Representative to the investigation, as the airplane was both manufactured and operated by companies based in Canada. MHI RJ Aviation Group, Jazz Aviation LP, Transport Canada, the Air Line Pilots Association, and the Canadian Flight Attendant Union are technical advisors to the Accredited Representative.
The parties and technical advisors were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Air Carrier Operations and Human Performance, Airplane Structures, Airplane Systems and Powerplants, Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Human Performance, and Airport Operations, ARFF, Survival Factors and Human Performance.
The airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder and quick access recorder were recovered and downloaded at NTSB’s recorders lab in Washington, DC. A CVR group was formed to transcribe CVR audio. In addition, exterior light bulbs and several avionics units were removed from the airplane and sent to NTSB’s laboratories. R35’s vehicle data recorder, engine control module and situational display were also retained for future download. NTSB specialists were also assigned in the areas of data recorders, meteorology, airplane/ground vehicle performance, medical, and drone/surveying.
History of Ground Vehicles Movement and Airplane’s Landing
A review of preliminary airplane and ARFF vehicle tracking data, ATC and airplane CVR audio recordings, airplane flight data recorder information, and surveillance video revealed that prior to the accident, six ARFF response vehicles (four ARFF trucks, a tool truck, and an airstair truck) and one Port Authority police vehicle were responding to an emergency that was declared at 2331:42 near terminal B.
At 2335:07, the ATC local controller (LC, also referred to as ‘tower’) cleared Jazz flight 646 to land on runway 4. At the time the flight was on a 5-mile final at an altitude of about 1,900 ft.
At 2335:28, the accident ARFF vehicle (R35) left the fire station area along with the other six vehicles. Jazz flight 646 was about 4.6 nautical miles from taxiway D at an altitude of about 1,500 ft. The vehicles initially gathered near the intersection of taxiways BB and D, shown as a green circle in figure 1. The intended path was to continue on taxiway D, cross runway 4 (depicted with dashed arrow), and then proceed to the destination noted on the right side of figure 1.
Figure 1. Google Earth image of the accident area, with the green circle indicating where the ground vehicles initially gathered, the yellow dash line their intended path on taxiway D, and the red star indicates where the collision occurred.
At 2335:47, the tool truck (call sign Truck 7), which was planned to be the lead vehicle, crew attempted to call the LGA ATC tower, however a simultaneous radio transmission on the same frequency obscured Truck 7’s radio call. R35 entered taxiway BB, another airplane that had landed on runway 4 crossed taxiway D, and Jazz flight 646 was about 3.7 nautical miles from taxiway D and at 1,180 ft altitude.
At 2336:21, Truck 7 tried again to contact the tower. Before ATC responded, Truck 7 coordinated with R35 (call sign Truck 1) to contact the tower. Jazz flight 646 was about 2.3 nautical miles from taxiway D and about 650 ft altitude.
At 2336:44, the LC asked which vehicle needed to cross a runway. At the same time, Truck 1 moved to the front of the waiting response vehicles at the intersection taxiway BB and D. Jazz flight 646 was about 1.5 nautical miles from taxiway D and at 400 ft altitude.
At 2336:51, the red runway entrance lights (RELs, discussed later) illuminated for the intersection of runway 4 and taxiway D. Jazz flight 646 was about 1.2 nautical miles from taxiway D and at 287 ft altitude. Truck 1 was stopped on taxiway D about 460 feet from edge of runway 4.
At 2336:56, Truck 1’s crew replied to ATC with “Truck 1 and company”, and the LC acknowledged. Truck 1 then requested “Truck 1 and company” to cross runway 4 at taxiway D, and the LC instructed them to cross. At that time, 2337:04, the airplane was at an altitude of about 130 ft above ground and about ¼ mile on final approach, which was about 4,400 ft away from taxiway D (see figure 2).
Figure 2. R35 (Truck 1) and Jazz flight 646 (C-GNJZ) positions at 23:37:04.
At 2337:07, Truck 1’s crew read back the clearance and began moving along taxiway D towards runway 4. Jazz flight 646 was about 3,700 feet from taxiway D and at 87 ft altitude.
At 2337:11, Jazz flight 646 crossed runway 4’s threshold, and Truck 1 was traveling at a speed of 10 kts (11.5 mph) and about 410 ft from the edge of runway 4.
At 2337:12, the LC gave a taxiing instruction to another airplane, and immediately afterward instructed Truck 1 to stop, as the truck was crossing taxiway AA. Truck 1’s speed continued to increase. Jazz flight 646 was about 2,550 ft from taxiway D and at 30 ft altitude and 133 kts ground speed.
At 2337:17, the airplane’s main landing gear touched down about 1,450 ft from taxiway D at a groundspeed of 128 kts and there was a transfer of control from the first officer to the captain. At that time, Truck 1 had crossed the hold short line at a speed of about 24 mph.
At 2337:20, the LC again instructed Truck 1 to stop. At this time the airplane’s brake application began and the thrust reversers were deployed. Truck 1 was just over 100 ft from entering runway 4 and travelling at about 29 mph.
At 2337:21, the RELs extinguish.
At 2337:22, roughly 2 seconds before the collision, the airplane’s nose landing gear touched down while the airplane was about 400 ft from taxiway D and at a groundspeed of 106 kts. Truck 1 was travelling at a speed of 30 mph and just entering runway 4.
Truck 1 turned toward the left just prior to the collision. The airplane’s rudder deflected about 6° to the left just prior to the end of the flight recorder data. The collision occurred at the intersection of taxiway D and runway 4 denoted by the red star in figure 1. The airplane’s last recorded ground speed before the collision was 90 knots (104 mph).
Evacuation
The airplane came to rest adjacent to taxiway B between taxiways D and E, upright on a heading of about 28° magnetic. Initially it was in a nose down attitude, due to the crush damage and partial separation of the forward fuselage and nose landing gear. Truck 1 came to rest just northwest of the airplane, on its left side, on a heading of about 206° magnetic.
Passengers self-evacuated through the 4 overwing exits. The ground vehicles redirected from the emergency at terminal B to the accident airplane, and ARFF personnel assisted with the evacuation. During the evacuation, the airplane tilted nose upward until the tail contacted the ground.
Figure 3. View of both vehicles after collision.
Interviews of ARFF Members and Aft Flight Attendant
Multiple members of ARFF were interviewed. The driver of Truck 7 reported hearing ATC clearing Truck 1 and company to cross runway 4. Shortly thereafter, she saw the airplane and announced “stop stop stop” on the radio. There are no recordings available for the inter-ARFF communications.
The turret operator in Truck 1 recalled hearing the words “stop stop stop” (on the tower frequency) radio, but he did not know who that transmission was intended for. He subsequently heard “Truck 1 stop stop stop” and realized it was for them and subsequently noticed that they had entered the runway. He further recalled that as they turned left, he saw the airplane’s lights on the runway.
The airplane’s CVR captured the communications between Truck 1 and the LC that were transmitted on the LC frequency (including the request and clearance to cross runway 4).
The aft flight attendant reported getting in the aft jump seat for landing and described the flight as normal until he felt an impact and jar. He did not know what had happened and attempted to call the pilots and received no response. He reported the conditions were dark, but passengers deplaned orderly through all exits. He stayed with 4 passengers in front of the airplane until ARFF entered and assisted him and the remaining passengers to the exits.
Debris Field
The debris field was surveyed using drone imaging, GPS locations, and photography. The airplane and truck were scanned with a three-dimensional laser measurement system. The runway was examined to document the witness marks sustained during the accident sequence. The wreckage path was about 300 ft long and 150 ft wide, oriented on a magnetic heading of about 65°.
Airplane Examination
An examination of the airplane revealed that the most severe damage was f...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DCA26MA161