Aircraft Description
N862RW is a 2005 Embraer ERJ 170-100 SE, a twin-engine turbo-fan aircraft registered to Republic Airways INC in Carmel, IN. This aircraft holds a standard airworthiness certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration on September 30, 2005. The registration certificate was issued on January 31, 2017. The registration is set to expire on January 31, 2030. Powered by a Ge CF34 SERIES engine producing 9140 pounds of thrust, N862RW is. The aircraft's Mode S transponder code is ABD7D1 (hex), used for ADS-B identification and flight tracking. N862RW was last tracked by AviatorDB near Raleigh-durham International Airport (KRDU) on June 26, 2026. The FAA registry record for N862RW was last updated on March 12, 2026. AviatorDB monitors aircraft positions through ADS-B surveillance data and updates records as new position data is received.
The Embraer ERJ-170-100, a twin-engine regional jet that established Brazilian manufacturer Embraer as a major force in commercial aviation, first flew on February 19, 2002. This low-wing turbofan aircraft seats approximately 70 passengers and bridges the gap between smaller regional jets and mainline aircraft. Measuring over 95 feet in wingspan, the E170 became the foundation of Embraer's successful E-Jet family. The aircraft was manufactured by Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica at their São José dos Campos facility in Brazil. AviatorDB tracks 781 Embraer aircraft currently registered in the FAA database. The ICAO type designator for this aircraft model is E170.
AviatorDB has found no NTSB accident or incident reports involving N862RW. AviatorDB cross-references all FAA registration data with NTSB accident and incident reports, providing a comprehensive safety overview for every registered aircraft in the United States.
Registered Owner
Operator / Airline
Powerplant & Avionics
NTSB Accident History (1)
| Date | NTSB # | Damage | Highest Injury | Probable Cause |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 18, 2007 | DCA07MA072 | Substantial | None | the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable. Contributing to the accident were (1) the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the first officer's long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle America's failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals. |
Additional Details
Last Known Position
Data Source
Data provided by the US Federal Aviation Administration. View on FAA.gov
Last updated: 2026-06-15 01:32:20 UTC